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  D 100 Diss. Universität Hohenheim Foreword 
For a long time the agricultural sector in most industrialised countries has been – 
and still is – highly subsidised. The applied instruments and the amount of sub-
sidies differ by country and change over time. Due to their strong impacts on 
farmers' incomes, on budgets, and on trade, it has become a routine for agricul-
tural economists to regularly analyse policies and policy options to support pol-
icy makers and the various stakeholders. In general, the focus of the analyses 
was – and still is – either on the sectoral/regional, or on the farm level. More-
over, most analyses were and still are either highly aggregated (at least at the 
regional level) or disaggregated, but neglect interactions between farms. As a 
consequence, the policy analyses usually had little to say about interactions 
between farmers, the speed of farm adjustments, and the resulting structural im-
pacts. The recently agreed reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy as 
well as the previous discussions made these deficits very obvious because topics 
such as policy impacts on land prices and structural change were intensely dis-
cussed, but methods to study them were largely lacking.  
The present study by Kathrin Happe addresses these deficits and explicitly aims 
at giving insights on the impacts agricultural policies on structural change, land 
markets, and farm incomes in the short and in the long-run. In order to achieve 
this ambitious goal, Kathrin Happe develops and follows an even more ambi-
tious research strategy: the development of an agent-based model of explicit 
structural change and its application to a real region to study actually relevant 
policy options. Although in some respects the outcome of this research strategy 
and its goals is based and inspired by previous work, the present outcome is 
unique: the spatial and dynamic agent-based model of agricultural structural 
change AgriPoliS is developed and documented, the model is adapted to the 
region of Hohenlohe in south-west Germany, the model and its adaptation are 
intensely tested and validated, sophisticated quantitative tools such as kernel 
density estimation and data envelopment analysis are utilised to identify high-
dimensional structural policy impacts. Last but not least, several relevant policy 
options are intensely analysed and discussed. The results give a different view 
on the effects of agricultural policies, and particularly on some very specific 
distributional effects of different policies as well as the specific influence on 
structural change. Accordingly, many kinds of common types of subsidies show  
low transfer efficiency. Moreover, there is a danger of slowing down necessary 
adjustment processes and thus creating a dependency on subsidies. These 
findings were possible because the developed model AgriPoliS explicitly allows 
considering structural disequilibria and endogenous structural change. This is 
important to understand structural adjustments of the relatively small-scaled 
agriculture in the "old EU", as well as the often dualistic farm structures in the 
new EU member states and the new EU neighbour countries. 
This study is relevant and important from a methodological, theoretical and from 
a practical perspective: it contributes to the development and testing of applied 
agent-based economic models, it delivers a new agricultural policy analysis tool, 
and it contributes to a better understanding of the role of agricultural policies 
with regard to structural change, farm incomes, and land prices. Although these 
contributions have a value in its own, the real value is their potential stimulus 
for discussions and future research. That is why I wish this book to become 
widespread among researchers. 
Halle (Saale), December 2004  Alfons Balmann Thank you 
One day, during my third semester of Agricultural Economics at Hohenheim, I 
was sitting in the cafeteria and I was talking to some fellow students about what 
to do after graduation. Although it was only quite early on into my studies, I re-
member saying that I wanted – if possible – stay at the University. Why? I just 
loved the people and the atmosphere. After I had graduated in 1997, one more 
reason came up: Although I had a degree in Agricultural Economics, I had the 
feeling that I had not finished my studies. I simply had to go on. In particular, I 
wanted to know why and how things around me change.  
So, I started to walk my PhD way. Many people have accompanied me on this 
way: some from beginning to end, others just on parts of the way. Nevertheless, 
each one of them has contributed to this work in one way or another, be it by 
trusting me to do this rather risky research, by listening, by showing interest, by 
making me laugh, by criticising me, or by something else. In the end, I feel that 
the time of my PhD has been a gift. It is difficult to express all my thanks in 
words. Thus, I just want to say a simple 'thank you' to Alfons Balmann, Jürgen 
Zeddies, Konrad Kellermann, Christoph Sahrbacher, Anne Kleingarn, Martin 
Damgaard, Jarmila Curtiss, Amanda Osuch, Martin Petrick, Valentyn Zelenyuk, 
Marten Graubner, Jörg Zimmermann, Frank-Michael Litzka, Michael Schäfer, 
Sorana Cernea, Olaf Heidelbach, Alfons Oude Lansink, Franz Heidhues, Noel 
Russell, Wilhelm Gamer, Beate Zimmermann, the many collegues with whom I 
had many inspiring discussions and conversations at conferences, workshops, 
and project meetings, the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg, the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Institute of Agricultural Development 
in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Erdentöne-Himmelwärts, Collegium 
Vocale Halle, Junger Kammerchor Baden-Württemberg, Unichor Hohenheim, 
Katrin, Maike, and Niklas Menzel, Martin Plothe, Justine Schuchardt, Elisabeth 
Angenendt, Nicole Schönleber, Agnes Bardoll-Scorl, Konrad and Ruth Sophie 
Scorl, Markus Pietzsch, Daniela and Burkhard Kreft, Christine, Gottfried, 
Daniel, Benjamin, and Sophie Kazenwadel, Steffen Krämer, Steffi Beinhorn, 
Paul Berentsen, my whole big family, and in particular Klaus, Elisabeth, 
Christoph and Norbert Happe. I am sure that each one of you knows how much I 
appreciate your trust, guidance, criticism, company, friendship and love. 
Halle (Saale), December 2004  Kathrin Happe  Short table of contents 
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  1 General  introduction 
1.1 Problem  assessment 
1.1.1  The role of agricultural policies in structural adjustment 
Agricultural structures have been shaped by a variety of factors including eco-
nomic, cultural, historical, political, technological, and geographical conditions.
1 
Hence, agricultural structures are not static but change. Structural change can be 
viewed as an evolutionary process, which is an integral part of any economy. It 
can be characterised – amongst other things – by a constant adjustment to 
changes in demand, supply, and technological progress (OECD 1994). This 
process is ideally guided by market signals, which convey information about 
social preferences and production possibilities. The degree to which agricultural 
structures can adjust to market signals depends on the extent to which produc-
tion factors can move to areas where their productivity is highest. In this sense, 
the mobility of production factors is central to the competitiveness and effi-
ciency of agriculture. 
Market activity, however, also takes place within a policy framework. Policies 
set the rules for market activity, but they can directly interfere with the adjust-
ment processes on markets, too. Regarding the latter, the role of agricultural 
policies is twofold. On the one hand, policies can alter the capacity of the agri-
cultural sector - and thus of agricultural structures - to adjust and create incen-
tives for adjustments. On the other hand, policies can also impede structural ad-
justment, for example, by (artificially) increasing the profitability of one production 
                                           
1   In the context of this study, the term 'structure' refers to the essential the composition of 
an entity made up of inter-related component parts (OECD 1994). Component parts of ag-
ricultural structures are farms, land, labour, and capital, which comprise the productive 
capacity of a region. OECD (1995) defines 'structural adjustment' as the movement of 
production factors among farm units, and between the agricultural sector and other sectors 
of the economy. 2  1  General introduction 
activity relative to others. This affects the allocation of the production factors 
land, labour and capital and thus creates market distortions, which are consid-
ered inefficient. Thus, interference of policies with the adjustment process is 
likely to create both costs and benefits in an economy (GODDARD et al. 1993).  
The development of competitive and efficient agricultural structures has been 
one of the central goals of agricultural policy making in addition to ensuring a 
fair standard of living for farmers. To achieve these goals, the agricultural sector 
in most industrialised nations has long been the subject of government interven-
tions. However, many agricultural policies have worked counteractively to these 
goals by creating distortions in the use and mobility of production factors 
(e.g. DEWBRE et al. 2001; OECD 1995, 1994; FENNELL 1999; VON URFF 1997; 
BALMANN 1995; WISSENSCHAFTLICHER  BEIRAT  BMVEL 1997). In principle, 
policies contributed to inhibit those structural adjustment processes, which 
would take place without support. Distortions emerge mainly because policies 
providing support to farming activity are considered to attract additional re-
sources (in particular labour and capital) to farming activities than would be the 
case without support (OECD 1994). The result is that agricultural support poli-
cies may impede structural adjustment by providing incentive for marginal 
farms to remain in the sector and thus retard the development towards more effi-
cient agricultural structures.  
Regarding agricultural policies in the EU, in the past decades, two types of 
measures have been at the centre of interest: market price support and direct area 
and headage payments.
2 With regard to these measures, impediments to struc-
tural adjustment may particularly become evident in the following areas: 
-  Production: In general, agricultural support policies lead to increasing pro-
duction while encouraging the maintenance of marginal farms. For example, 
market price support leads to higher returns on some products, which trans-
fer into higher input prices for production factors. High prices encourage the 
expansion of production beyond market demand and often the use of capital-
intensive production methods (OECD 1994). Direct area and headage pay-
ments coupled to production activities create also production incentives. 
                                           
2   Although in the agricultural reform of 1992 (and also in Agenda 2000) price support was 
successively reduced, it continued to be in place. Furthermore, to (partly) compensate for 
lower support prices, farmers were granted direct area and headage payments, which, 
however, were bound to production of certain crops and livestock.    1.1  Problem assessment  3 
Moreover, coupled direct payments impede structural adjustment because 
marginal farmers use parts of the payment to cover losses.  
-  Specialisation vs. Diversification: Guaranteed prices reduce uncertainties 
and therefore reduce the incentive for farms to diversify and spread produc-
tion risk. Instead, farms (increasingly) specialise and intensify production to 
take advantage of other input subsidies such as investment programmes, and 
technological progress. Specialisation in combination with intensification 
may cause negative environmental effects (BEARD and SWINBANK 2001). 
-  Land prices: Agricultural support policies intensify competition for scarce 
resources and particularly for land because land supply is inelastic. In the 
case of land, a significant share of future support payments is capitalised into 
farmland prices and rental prices (e.g., WEERSINK et al. 1999; DAUGBJERG 
and SWINBANK 2004). High rental prices benefit land owners, but lead to 
lower profitability on the side of active farms (ISERMEYER 2002). In regions 
with a high share of intensive livestock production, competition on the land 
market intensifies additionally because of land required for manure disposal 
and limits on livestock density per hectare.  
-  Farm size differences: OECD (1994) and FENNELL (1997) argue that exist-
ing agricultural policies have contributed to the growing differentiation be-
tween larger and smaller farms since the former have generally been better 
placed to take advantage of agricultural support. 
1.1.2  The scope for policy reform  
Stimulated by the above considerations, throughout the past 30 years agricul-
tural economists have argued repeatedly that agricultural policies could actually 
be defined and implemented in a way that lifts many impediments to the policy 
and promotes efficiency and competitiveness (e.g., KOESTER and TANGERMANN 
1976; FENNELL 1997; WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT BMVEL 1997; SWINBANK 
and TANGERMANN 2000).
3 The key reform principle behind these proposals has 
been to reduce market protection and to facilitate responsiveness to market con-
ditions by agricultural producers through policy measures that result in lower 
support delivered in less distorting ways. In this way, a policy reform should be 
expected to positively influence the efficiency and competitiveness of agricul-
tural structures. 
                                           
3   FENNELL (1997) provides a detailed account of the EU Common Agricultural Policy after 
World War II. 4  1  General introduction 
Several policies have been envisaged to achieve these goals: Besides successive 
cuts in market support prices, policies going in this vein could be direct pay-
ments which are fully decoupled from production, a successive reduction of any 
kind of support, as well as incentive payments to remove surplus labour of all 
ages from farming.
4 What all of these policies have in common is that they exert 
adjustment pressure on existing producers and hence are expected to increase 
structural adjustment processes towards a more efficient allocation of factors. 
The actual nature of structural adjustment due to policy reform would depend on 
the pace and scope of the reform, structural and natural characteristics of af-
fected regions, and in particular, on individual farmers' capacity to adjust.  
The latter point requires special attention as it indicates that individual behav-
iour, local conditions, and thus, interactions and heterogeneity gain importance 
when studying the adjustment reactions to agricultural policy change. In other 
words, what matters are the specific conditions of individual farms. The degree 
to which individual farms can adjust is determined by a number of factors, such 
as a farm's technology, managerial ability, size, location, specialisation, factor 
endowment, opportunity costs of (human and asset) capital, etc. Depending on 
these factors, possible adjustment reactions may be manifold ranging from a 
change of the product mix, investment or disinvestment, to changing the income 
mix between on and off-farm income sources. Moreover, farms may also en-
tirely withdraw from the sector. However, on the side of the farms, there may 
also be some factors that hinder adjustment such as low opportunity costs of 
production factors. Hence, sunk costs lead to the effect that farms may continue 
production although their long run opportunity costs are not covered (BALMANN 
et al. 1996).
5 
1.1.3  Consequences for modelling 
Thus, when studying farms' and the agricultural sector's adjustment reactions in 
response to a policy change and its dynamics, the question arises, how well agri-
cultural economics is equipped with tools to accompany such policy reforms 
                                           
4   The decoupling of direct payments is the major component of the new common agricul-
tural policy (CAP) of the European Union in Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 
29 September 2003, in which the member states of the European Union agreed on a major 
policy shift. The new CAP is to replace the current one starting in 2005. 
5   BALMANN et al. (1996) define sunk costs as the discrepancy between the calculatory time 
value of an asset, i.e., the value it should have according to the expectation when it was 
installed, and the actual opportunity costs.   1.2  Objectives of the study and methodological approach  5 
with quantitative analyses that explicitly take individual farms' adjustment proc-
esses as well as structural developments over time into account? From a model-
ling point of view, it is thus important to find appropriate ways of modelling ad-
justment reactions to policy change. Against this background, the emergence of 
new and innovative modelling methods such as agent-based modelling, in addi-
tion to ever-increasing computing capacities has offered new possibilities to 
model adjustment reactions and to quantify the impact of agricultural policies on 
a range of indicators. This opportunity shall be explored in this thesis.  
1.2  Objectives of the study and methodological approach 
This thesis takes up these new methodologies and applies them to model and 
gain more insight into the impact of agricultural policy measures on regional 
structural change. Moreover, the study shall contribute to a deeper understand-
ing of farm-type specific adjustment reactions and the dynamics of structural 
change. This study applies an agent-based model to a selected region, which is 
the family-farm dominated region 'Hohenlohe' in southwest Germany. The start-
ing point of the analysis is the hypothesis that Hohenlohe's agricultural structure 
displays structural inefficiencies because structural adjustment in the past has 
been impeded by existing agricultural policies and factor immobilities. More-
over, in this study, it is assumed that the impeding impact of policies has been 
aggravated in some regions by existing structural deficits, which can be attrib-
uted mainly to three phenomena. First, unexploited returns to scale leading to an 
inefficient use of production factors; second, adjustment costs were causing the 
immobility of production factors, and third, path dependencies meaning that a 
path, e.g., a specialisation or the emergence of a specific structure once taken, 
can only be left at high costs. 
Based on these assumptions, it shall be studied whether and to what extent pol-
icy changes can facilitate structural adjustment towards a more efficient and 
competitive agricultural structure. Light will be shed in particular on farm size 
change, factor use, technical efficiency, and income aspects.  
The approach taken in this study is to carry out a number of simulation experi-
ments using the agent-based, spatial and dynamic model AgriPoliS (Agricultural 
Policy Simulator), which establishes a virtual model world on the computer, the 
rules of which can be fully controlled by the modeller. The particular feature of 
AgriPoliS is that it allows modelling a large number of individually acting farms 
operating in a region as well as farms' interactions with each other and with parts 
of their environment. Simulation experiments with AgriPoliS generate an exten-6  1  General introduction 
sive dataset of indicators for individual farms and the entire region based on 
which a host of questions can be analysed using different analysis techniques.  
In this thesis, no formal theoretical discussion of agricultural policies is pre-
sented and no formal policy impact model is derived. This has been the focus of 
other studies (e.g., HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE 1994; HECKELEI et al. 2001; 
BULLOCK and SALHOFER 2003; HOFER 2002, and the literature cited in these ref-
erences). Simulated data are instead treated and analysed 'as if' they were de-
rived from real empirical surveys of Hohenlohe's agriculture as it may evolve 
under certain conditions. 
To achieve the general objective, three sub-goals are pursued in this thesis. The 
first is to discuss the scope of agent-based modelling in agricultural policy 
analysis and based on that to develop the model AgriPoliS drawing upon previ-
ous work by BALMANN (1995, 1997). The second goal is to adapt and to cali-
brate AgriPoliS to the agricultural structure of the region 'Hohenlohe' in south-
west Germany. This goal includes the representation of Hohenlohe's agricultural 
structure based on regional statistics, farm accounting data and standard techni-
cal data. Finally, to answer the overall objective, the third goal is to analyse re-
sults of simulation experiments for different policy scenarios. The types of poli-
cies considered reflect the intention to lift impediment to structural adjustment. 
Two sets of policies are analysed. The first group comprises three fundamentally 
different policies, a retirement payment scheme, fully decoupled payments, and 
a stepwise phasing out of direct payments. Each of these policies aims at facili-
tating structural adjustment. The second set of policies is inspired by the policy 
debate on decoupling direct payments in the European Union. Three ways of 
decoupling direct payments are analysed with respect to their impact on struc-
tural adjustment. Key questions to be answered are: How do the policies affect 
structural change in the region? What is the pace of structural adjustment? How 
do policies compare with regard to their impact of factor use, farm size, in-
comes, efficiency, and government expenses? 
1.3  Structure of the study 
The thesis is organised in three parts, following the three sub-goals. Part I of the 
thesis introduces agent-based systems in general as well as the use of the ap-
proach as a tool for understanding and modelling regional agricultural struc-
tures. Chapter 2 motivates agent-based models as a conceptual framework for 
modelling in (agricultural) economic research. The chapter furthermore provides 
a formal definition of agents and agent-based systems. Specific features of   1.3  Structure of the study  7 
agent-based models relevant for modelling regional agricultural structures are 
discussed, and applications of agent-based models are presented. Particular fo-
cus is put on applications relevant in agricultural and resource economics. Fi-
nally, chapter 2 points out some theoretical and practical challenges of agent-
based modelling. Having provided the theoretical background for agent-based 
modelling in chapter 2, chapter 3 presents AgriPoliS. The agricultural structure 
created in AgriPoliS consists of a number of spatially arranged individual farms, 
called farm agents, that act individually and interact with each other subject to 
their actual state and to their individual environment consisting of other farms, 
factor and product markets, and the technological and political environment. 
Farm agents pursue the goal of household income maximisation, they can en-
gage in a number of production activities, invest into buildings and machinery, 
operate as non-professional farms, or leave agriculture altogether. 
Part II of the thesis presents an application of AgriPoliS and formal testing and 
sensitivity analysis to validate the model. In chapter 4, AgriPoliS is calibrated to 
the agricultural structure of the region 'Hohenlohe' in Baden-Württemberg in the 
financial year 2000/2001, which is taken as the reference year. The calibration 
aims to map key characteristics of Hohenlohe's farming structure as well as the 
variety of farms and production activities. In AgriPoliS, farm agents are defined 
based on farm accounting data of real farms in Hohenlohe. In addition, regional 
statistics, investment data, as well as data on technical coefficients (e.g. KTBL) 
are taken to represent the structure of agricultural production in the region.
6 The 
full implementation of the Agenda 2000 by the end of 2002 is taken as the refer-
ence policy scenario. Chapter 5 further investigates and tests the behaviour of 
AgriPoliS under the reference policy. To shed some light on AgriPoliS from dif-
ferent points of view, three separate simulation experiments are conducted. It is 
aimed to learn more about specific characteristics of AgriPoliS and its behav-
iour. First, the impact of different parameter constellations for technological 
change, interest rates, the region's size, and managerial ability are analysed with 
respect to their impact on results. In particular, the statistical technique of De-
sign of Experiments (DOE) is applied. This procedure involves the systematic 
variation of parameter values and the subsequent identification of result patterns. 
Second, repeated simulations with different random numbers aim to show that 
simulation outcomes are robust against variations of initial conditions. Finally, 
                                           
6   The Kuratorium Technik und Bauwesen in der Landwirtschaft (KTBL) is a German insti-
tute, which regularly identifies and publishes data, e.g., on technical coefficients of pro-
duction, production technologies, gross margins.  8  1  General introduction 
an analysis of the impact of managerial ability on farm survival is conducted. 
Part III of this study is devoted to the simulation of the mentioned agricultural 
policy scenarios with AgriPoliS and subsequent analyses. The study is based on 
an application of AgriPoliS to the Hohenlohe region. The analysis of simulation 
results aims at identifying the policy impacts from different perspectives: farm 
size, production, technical efficiency, economic efficiency, income, and gov-
ernment outlays. For all scenarios, the policies defined under the Agenda 2000 
serve as the reference policy scenario. Chapter 6 introduces different indicators 
and analysis techniques. A popular technique to investigate efficiency differ-
ences between different farms based on observed data is Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Chapter 6 introduces efficiency analysis and different effi-
ciency concepts. It presents a DEA model to study differences in technical effi-
ciency between farms as well as the structural efficiency of the region. The 
model uses simulated data from the policy experiments. Furthermore, analysis 
techniques such as Kernel density estimation, Gini coefficients, and Lorenz 
curves are introduced which are subsequently used to analyse indicators derived 
from the policy simulation experiments. Chapter 7 shows results of policy ex-
periments comparing the impact of a retirement payment with fully decoupled 
direct payments and a successive phasing out of direct payments. The approach 
followed is to contrast the impact of three policy alternatives, each of which is 
thought to have substantial impact on structural adjustment. Based on the simu-
lation and the analyses of these policy scenarios, the goal is to identify some 
fundamental structural dynamics and adjustment patterns, which are discussed in 
the summary of the chapter. Chapter 8 follows a different intention. Based on 
the elaboration of more fundamental adjustment patterns in chapter 7, different 
ways of decoupling direct payments are analysed. In particular, a fully decoup-
led single farm payment is analysed against a single area payment and partially 
decoupled payments. This set of policy experiments reflects, in a more general 
way, policy concepts that will be introduced in the European Union's common 
agricultural policy from 2005 onwards. At the end of this chapter, simulation 
results are summarised and discussed 
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the thesis. It places the obtained simulation re-
sults in the context of policy analysis as well as of the methodology of agent-
based modelling. Future directions of research are pointed out as well as possi-






Agent-based modelling of regional 
agricultural structures 
2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and 
applications 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, agent-based systems are introduced as an approach to understand 
and to model regional agricultural structures.
7 The chapter provides the theoreti-
cal background for the agent-based model AgriPoliS that will be presented in 
chapter 3. This chapter starts with a motivation for using an agent-based 
approach (section 2.2). The motivation is provided from the point of view of 
economics in general, and, more specifically, from the point of view of agricul-
tural policy analysis. Thereafter, a more formal definition of agents and agent-
based systems is given in section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses three special features 
of agent-based systems in more detail. These features are particularly relevant in 
the context of modelling regional agricultural structures and structural dynamics. 
Section 2.5 presents a commented list of exemplary references to applications of 
agent-based models. Particular focus is put on applications relevant in agricul-
tural and resource economics. Finally, section 2.6 points out some theoretical 
and practical challenges to agent-based modelling. 
It is the aim of this chapter to argue in favour of agent-based models as a suit-
able approach for addressing problems related to regional structural change. 
Agent-based models provide an elegant way to blend concepts and methodolo-
gies from different fields of research. They provide one possibility to approach 
research questions, which would be difficult or even impossible to analyse ex-
clusively with other, more well-known and established, methods. This concerns, 
for example, problems for which analytical solutions do not exist. Nevertheless, 
agent-based models should not be seen as a replacement of more standard eco-
nomic modelling approaches. 
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2.2 Motivation 
2.2.1 General:  agent-based  modelling of economic systems 
Ever since ADAM SMITH'S (1776) writings on the division of labour, economists 
have viewed economic processes as the result of parallel, local interactions 
between large numbers of individuals. Local interactions give rise to macroeco-
nomic regularities such as the shared market protocols and behavioural norms 
that in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions. The resulting 
complex and dynamic system is one in which there are recurrent causal chains 
connecting individual behaviours, interacting networks, and social welfare out-
comes (TESFATSION 2002). Economists have recognised this two-way feedback 
between microstructure and macrostructure as well as the dynamics of economic 
change for a long time, for example, by such prominent economists such as 
SMITH (1776), SHACKLE (1988), or SCHELLING (1978).  
Despite of this long interest in complex phenomena, the economics profession, 
and also agricultural economics, have lacked the means of quantitatively model-
ling complex economic systems and the individual actors and their interdepend-
encies within the system. Many quantitative economic models have followed, 
and still follow, a 'top-down' approach. A common feature of 'top-down'-models 
is their missing or a very limited foundation to the behaviour of individual eco-
nomic agents and local interactions between agents (STOKER 1993). Instead, 
heavy reliance is put on exogenously given coordination devices such as fixed 
decision rules, representative agents, imposed market equilibrium constraints, 
common knowledge, and perfect foresight (TESFATSION 2002).  
However, advances in information technology, and new modelling approaches 
such as agent-based modelling, have been enlarging the possibility set of re-
searchers with regard to quantitative modelling. Agents may be used by 
researchers to more naturally understand and model complex systems 
(WOOLDRIDGE et al. 1999). Agent-based systems offer a possibility to explicitly 
introduce the mentioned feedback mechanism between the micro and the macro 
level, whereas agents at the micro level characterised by different actions and 
attributes.  
The agent-based study of economic systems is one branch of what has come to 
be known as 'Agent-based Computational Economics' (ACE). ACE is the com-
putational study of economies modelled as complex evolving systems of 
autonomous interacting agents (CONTE et al. 1997; EPSTEIN and AXTELL 1996; 
GILBERT and TROITZSCH 1999; AXELROD 1997). In particular, agent-based   2.2  Motivation  13 
models permit researchers to extend existing research on the evolution of 
economies at least in five ways:
8  
1.  Artificial economies can be constructed on the computer that are populated 
with a multitude of heterogeneous agents interacting and developing accord-
ing to defined internal rules. Within this artificial model world, it is possible 
to carry out numerous simulation experiments. 
2.  A broad range of behaviours (e.g. profit maximisation or satisficing) and 
interactions between agents can be defined. There is also the possibility that 
agents adapt their behaviour, i.e. change their rules, in response to interac-
tions with other agents. For example, self-organising structures can evolve 
because behavioural rules defined at the outset of a simulation can change at 
runtime. 
3.  Agents in these artificial economic worlds can co-evolve, i.e., the individual 
performance of an agent depends on the evolving behaviour of other agents. 
4.  Artificial economic systems can grow along a real time-line. This means that 
the modeller sets initial conditions and subsequently observes the develop-
ment of the system without acting upon it. This is similar to growing bacte-
ria cultures in a petri-dish. 
5.  Artificial economies, or agricultural structures, can explicitly be connected 
to space to analyse land use changes due to economic activity (VERBURG et 
al. 2002; PARKER et al. 2002). 
Accordingly, the methodologies of agent-based computational economics offer a 
wide variety of possibilities to study a large number of questions in a controlled 
laboratory surrounding.  
2.2.2 Specific:  agent-based  modelling  in agricultural policy analysis 
and structural change analysis 
The issue of quantitative modelling has been playing a key role in agricultural 
economics research, with a focus on policy impact analysis. The goal of agri-
cultural policy analysis is to study the effect of agricultural policies on a range 
of indicators (e.g. income, efficiency, factor allocation, production, welfare, etc.) 
at different levels of scale (e.g. at the global, national, sector, regional or farm 
scale). Quantitative models typically used are partial or general equilibrium 
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models, econometric models, and mathematical programming models.  
The type of modelling approach chosen depends on the type of policy to be 
analysed and the question of interest. SALVATICI et al. (2001) discuss the advan-
tages and disadvantages of different modelling approaches with respect to dif-
ferent types of policies. Accordingly, partial and general equilibrium models, for 
example, are primarily aimed at the evaluation of trade policies or the market 
impact of coupled domestic price support policies.
9 In particular, trade models 
take a highly aggregate look at agricultural production. With regard to individual 
types of farms, these models resort to the definition of a 'representative farm' to 
represent the behaviour and characteristics of a group of farms. However, if the 
goal is to analyse process-oriented policies, such as direct payments as imple-
mented by the CAP reform in 1992, partial or general equilibrium models tend 
to run into difficulties because the level of aggregation in many models does not 
allow to model land allocation distortions, to give and example.  
Process-oriented policies can more easily be analysed with econometric models 
(e.g. OUDE L ANSINK and PEERLINGS 1996, 2001; GUYOMARD et al. 1996) or 
normative mathematical programming models (e.g., ANGENENDT 2003; 
KAZENWADEL 1999; HANF 1989; JACOBS 1998; SCHLEEF 1999; BALMANN et al. 
1998a, b). With regard to policy analysis, econometric models face the specific 
problem that parameters are estimated for historical data (SALVATICI et al. 
2001). This complicates the modelling of policies that have not existed in the 
past. Above all, structural breaks due to policy reform can hardly be considered. 
Mathematical programming models are, in fact, for the most farm-based models. 
Farm-based models such as individual farm models, representative farm models, 
group farm models, and farm sample models, explicitly view the problem from a 
micro-perspective, that is, the perspective of the individual farm or a group of 
farms. However, the individual farm perspective often creates an inconsistency 
between individual farm behaviour and resulting market effects at higher levels 
of scale. This aggregation problem can be eased by weighting individual farms 
to represent, for example, regional capacities (e.g., BALMANN et al. 1998a,b; 
KAZENWADEL 1999), or by creating group farms. The latter, however, neglect 
the structural heterogeneity of farms in a region. Moreover, normative models 
are 'closed' models in that farms are allowed to adjust within a given possibility 
                                           
9   A comprehensive list to references and applications for these types of models is given in 
HECKELEI et al. (2001) as well as SALVATICI et al. (2001). Examples are ESIM (MÜNCH 
2002), GTAP (HERTEL 1997), SWOPSIM (e.g. RONINGEN et al. 1991), WATSIM-AMPS 
(KUHN 2003), and FAPRI (e.g. FAPRI 2003).   2.2  Motivation  15 
range; many times, these models also disregard changes in farming structure and 
changes in farming technology (BERGER and BRANDES 1998).  
A criticism common to all modelling approaches discussed thus far is that they 
neglect a number of characteristic factors of the agricultural sector. In particular, 
aspects like the immobility of land, heterogeneity of farms, interactions between 
farms, space, dynamic adjustment processes as well as dynamics of structural 
change have not – or in a limited way – been taken into account. In brief, 
modelling the complexity of the system has not been at the centre of interest.  
Nevertheless, agricultural economists have viewed (regional) agricultural struc-
tures as complex dynamic systems already since the early 1960s (e.g., BALMANN 
1995; BERG 1980; BRANDES 1978, 1985; DAY 1963; FINKENSTÄDT 1995; 
HEIDHUES 1966; DE H AEN 1971; LENTZ 1993). With respect to agricultural 
structures, complexity mainly arises due to the following characteristics of 
agricultural structures: 
-  Heterogeneity of farms: An agricultural structure can be understood as a de-
centralised system with heterogeneous, individual farms. Among other 
things, farms differ with respect to their size, type, factor endowment, 
organisational form, managerial ability, and age.  
-  Interdependencies: Farms within an agricultural structure are not independ-
ent from each other. Rather, there are interdependencies between farms via 
institutions such as markets for land and quota, or by way of shared resource 
use. To give an example for local interdependencies, consider the fact that 
farms usually can only increase their acreage if other farms reduce acreage 
or close down. 
-  Dynamic adjustment processes: Farms within an agricultural structure con-
stantly adjust to changing framework conditions set by markets, production 
location, policies, or external shocks. Farm factor endowments, the financial 
and personal situation determine the degree and pace of adjustment. Because 
of individual actions of farms, regional agricultural structures are subject to 
continuous change. Furthermore, macro results such as market prices or 
structural change are the combined effect of individual farm activities. They 
feed back into determining the behaviour of individual farms. 
-  Path dependencies: A system is path-dependent if its development is deter-
mined by its history; the system may be locked-in to a particular state or 
development path (cf. ARTHUR et al. 1997; ARTHUR 1989; BRANDES 1995, 
1978; DAVID 1985). A path once taken can only be left at high costs. Path 
dependencies are often associated with technological change, and in particular, 16  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
with respect to technologies, with positive returns to scale (ARTHUR 1989; 
DOSI 1997). BALMANN (1995) and BALMANN et al. (1996) have shown 
agricultural structures to be path dependent without strong positive returns to 
scale. Regarding agricultural structures, path dependencies can be found 
both at the individual farm level as well as in agricultural policy making. At 
the farm level, path dependencies are caused, e.g. by quasi-fixed production 
factors which may hold up adjustment processes. At higher levels of scale, 
institutional arrangements as well as certain agricultural policies may cause 
path dependencies (cf. BALMANN et al. 1996). 
In terms of modelling complex economic systems, in section 2.2.1 it was argued 
that agent-based models are a suitable approach to quantitatively model and un-
derstand such systems in a more natural way. In the same way, this applies to 
the modelling of agricultural structures. In particular, agent-based models of 
agricultural structures allow for carrying out computer experiments to support a 
better understanding of the complex dynamics of agricultural systems, structural 
change, and endogenous adjustment reactions in response to a policy change. 
With regard to structural change, BALMANN (1997) has pioneered this work in 
Germany by constructing a simulation model in which structural change takes 
place endogenously in response to the behaviour of individual farms.  
This section aimed to provide some motivation and background for the use of 
agent-based models to quantitatively model economic systems. Up to this point, 
the term 'agent-based' was used implicitly, but a formal definition has not been 
given, yet. This is the objective of the next section. 
2.3 Agents  and  agent-based systems 
2.3.1 Definition 
In the literature, there are a multitude of definitions of agents and agent-based 
systems. Currently, the term 'agent' is used in a rather vague way (FERBER 1999) 
and there is no generally agreed definition of what an agent is (GILBERT and 
TROITZSCH 1999).
10 RUSSEL and NORVIG (1995), for example, define agents as 
"…anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors 
and acting upon that environment through effectors". According to this defini-
tion, an agent could equally be a computer programme, which produces output 
                                           
10   See ANDERIES (2002) for a discussion on agent definitions.   2.3  Agents and agent-based systems  17 
from input (cf. JENNINGS et al. 1998), or a gum machine that distributes a certain 
number of gums.  
FRANKLIN and GRAESSER (1997) have compiled different agent definitions and 
based on them they defined agents in the following way: "An autonomous agent 
is a system situated within a part of an environment that senses that environment 
and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to affect what it 
senses in the future." Based on this definition, FRANKLIN and GRAESSER (1997) 
classify agents along a list of properties (Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1:  Agent Properties 
Property Meaning 
reactive (sensing)  responds in a timely fashion to changes in the environment 
autonomous  exercises control over its own actions 
goal-oriented (purposeful)  does not simply act in response to the environment 
temporally continuous  is a continuously running process 
communicative  communicates with other agents, perhaps including people 
learning (adaptive)  changes behaviour based on previous experience 
mobile  able to move in space 
flexible  actions are not given exogenously 
character  credible 'personality' and emotional state 
Source: FRANKLIN and GRAESSER (1997), modified. 
FRANKLIN and GRASSER (1997) consider the first four items in the above list to 
be the minimum requirements for an agent, i.e. an agent should be able to react 
autonomously and goal-directed to signals in their environment. Depending on 
the problem, one or more of the remaining items can augment the definition of 
an agent.
11 Agents are situated in environments in which they interact, co-
operate, and exchange information with other agents that have possibly con-
flicting aims. Such environments are known as agent-based systems (ABS) or 
multi-agent systems (MAS). 
There is, furthermore, no clear distinction whether the terms agent and agent-
based systems refer only to virtual entities, or to any virtual (software compo-
nent) or physical entity (human, robot, aircraft, organisation) fulfilling the crite-
ria mentioned in Table 2-1. On the one hand, some authors (e.g. GILBERT and 
TROITZSCH 1999; LUCK et al. 2003; JENNINGS et al. 1998) associate agents with 
                                           
11   Other authors, e.g. FERBER 1999 or SYCARA 1998, have defined agents in a different way 
with slightly different properties.  18  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
computer programmes, i.e., with virtual entities. On the other hand, FERBER 
(1999) sees an agent as a kind of 'living organism'.  
2.3.2  Origins of agent-based systems 
Agent-based systems have their origins in information technology, and in par-
ticular, in the field of distributed artificial intelligence that started to form in the 
early 1980s. ABS have been one of the most important areas of research and 
development that emerged in information technology in the 1990s (LUCK et al. 
2003). The motivation for an increasing interest in ABS research follows from 
the ability of ABS (cf. SYCARA 1999)  
-  to carry out certain tasks and to solve problems with computer systems and 
computer programmes that are complex themselves. This calls for breaking 
down large complex programmes into smaller parts; 
-  to provide solutions to problems where expertise and knowledge "...is pos-
sessed by individuals who communicate within a group, exchange know-
ledge and collaborate in carrying out a common task." (FERBER 1999);  
-  to provide solutions to problems or explanation of phenomena that can natu-
rally be regarded as a society of autonomous interacting components, like air 
traffic, as well as an economy; 
-  to efficiently use information that is spatially distributed.  
ABS, therefore, represent a reaction to these needs. FERBER (1999, p. 4) con-
cludes: "The approach takes into account the fact that simple or complex activi-
ties, such as problem solving, the establishment of a diagnostic system, the co-
ordination of actions or the construction of systems, represent the fruits of inter-
action between relatively independent and autonomous entities called agents, 
which operate within communities in accordance with what are sometimes 
complex modes of cooperation, conflict and competition in order to survive and 
perpetuate themselves."  
2.3.3 Modelling  procedure 
Research studying economic systems in general, and agricultural structures in 
particular, using agent-based techniques relies on computational laboratories to 
study the evolution of agricultural structures under controlled experimental 
conditions. Accordingly, as in a culture-dish experiment, the researcher starts 
with creating an agricultural structure with an initial population of agents and 
the object which agents act upon. Depending on the agent definition chosen,   2.4  Selected features of ABS applied to economic systems  19 
agents can include both economic agents (e.g. farms, markets) and agents that 
can equally represent other social and environmental phenomena (e.g. politi-
cians, non-farm agents, land). The modeller specifies the initial state of the agri-
cultural structure by specifying the initial attributes of agents and objects. These 
initial attributes can include characteristics, behavioural rules, internally stored 
information about the agent itself and other agents. Finally, the artificial agri-
cultural structure evolves over time without further intervention by the modeller. 
Accordingly, all events that subsequently occur must be the result of historical 
time, interactions between agents, or interactions between agents and the envi-
ronment.  
2.4  Selected features of ABS applied to economic systems 
Three specific features of ABS appear to be of special importance when apply-
ing the agent-based approach to (agricultural) economic systems. The features 
are flexibility, the potential to represent complex emerging structures with 
heterogeneous und individual behaviour, and the integration of spatial aspects. 
2.4.1 Flexibility  with  regard to assumptions 
ABS models belong to the class of so-called 'bottom-up' modelling approaches. 
There is no central planner who controls the system as a whole and to that effect 
controls the behaviour of individual agents at the aggregate level. Instead, regu-
larities at the macro level are the result of local individual actions and interac-
tions between agents. To reflect this, modellers can choose to define agents 
along a broad range of different properties and behaviours.
12 This is in sharp 
contrast to more common 'top-down' approaches, where theory requires axio-
matic assumptions to ensure consistency between the micro and the macro level. 
Examples for such assumptions are fixed decision rules, perfect rationality, 
representative agents, and market equilibrium constraints (TESFATSION 2002). In 
contrast, ABS models can be constructed in a way that makes them more flexi-
ble with regard to making assumptions. It is possible to implement axiomatic 
assumptions given by theory, but assumptions can also be made specific to the 
problem to be studied. Compared to 'top-down' modelling approaches, ABS 
                                           
12   It is not a necessary condition that each individual agent follows a different behavioural 
pattern. Nevertheless, ABS offers the possibility to do so. 20  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
models thus increase the spectrum of possible models.
13 In this regad, the 
flexibility of ABS also extends to the definition of the framework conditions in 
which agents act and interact. It is, for example, possible to define bilateral or 
multilateral exchange relationships.  
To give an example for the flexibility with regard to assumptions consider the 
case of convex production functions. Many analytical models assume convexity 
to assure a unique analytical solution. However, as for ABS, convexity and the 
existence of perfect markets with perfect information are no necessary require-
ments to obtain a unique solution of the model. Non-convexity is less of a prob-
lem since behaviour at the agent level is commonly less complex than an ade-
quate representation of behaviour at the aggregate level.
14  
As advantageous as the greater flexibility with respect to assumptions may be, it 
nevertheless requires the modeller to choose assumptions carefully. A possible 
guideline for making assumptions could be that they should be well founded, 
justified, reasonable, and documented. Although they do not provide a clear-cut 
quality criterion, assumptions, which do not comply with any of these criteria, 
will necessarily make the model and results less credible. The number of 
assumptions also appears to be a critical point. Because of the flexibility just 
mentioned, ABS potentially bear the danger of over-specification, i.e., of mak-
ing models too particular. Over-specified models bear the danger of being more 
complex than the original target system. The more complex and specific a 
model, the more difficult it is to establish a connection between causes and ef-
fects within the model and between the model and the target system. Accord-
ingly, when tracing back the computation for formal causes, the cause frequently 
spreads over the whole system and cannot be attributed to a single factor 
(EDMONDS 2000). 
 
                                           
13   Nevertheless, also ABS models require a certain degree of consistency between the micro 
and the macro level. Section 2.6.1 will deal with this issue. 
14  Because of this aspect, the problem of NP-incompleteness is also less severe. NP-
incompleteness means that with an increasing number of variables or restrictions the 
necessary computing time increases more than polynomial, i.e., exponentially or as a 
faculty. An example for this is the travelling salesman problem, where the necessary 
computing time for an optimisation for n locations to be visited increases by n!.   2.4  Selected features of ABS applied to economic systems  21 
2.4.2  Complex structures and emergence  
A particular feature, yet, of ABS is their ability to generate complex structures 
that change endogenously, or 'from within'. This particular property is known as 
self-organisation, examples of which are chaos, path dependence, or multi-phase 
dynamics (cf. BALMANN 1995; MANSON 2001). A system is called self-
organising if the individual parts of the system interact in such a way that certain 
structures – and possibly even complex structures – arise without external influ-
ence (BRANDES et al. 1997). Self-organisation does not only apply to the struc-
ture of the system, but it extends to the speed of change, which is also deter-
mined from within and not set externally. If the speed of change is slow, then a 
system can potentially remain far away from equilibrium for a long time.
15  
Another property of ABS is what is called emergent structures. Emergence 
briefly describes the property that a system is not equal to the sum of its parts. 
Emergence appears, for example, where developments observable at the macro 
level cannot be explained by the properties and behaviours of the system's indi-
vidual parts in isolation (EMMECHE 1994; SCHELLING 1978). In that case, 
patterns arising at the macro level are rather the result of a very large number of 
interactions and individual actions of the parts of the system. Examples of 
emerging phenomena are the 'invisible hand' that co-ordinates markets, a flock 
of birds, or living organisms in general. However, emergence is a concept which 
is theoretically and practically difficult to handle. AXELROD (1997, p. 4) notes: 
"Emergent properties are often surprising because it can be hard to anticipate 
the full consequences of even simple forms of interaction. (…) Some complexity 
theorists consider surprise as a part of the definition of emergence, but this 
raises the question of surprising to whom?" 
2.4.3 Spatial  representation 
The (agricultural) economics profession has recognised the importance of the 
space and land-use ever since the work of VON THÜNEN and RICARDO. VERBURG 
et al. (2002) underline the potential of ABS in current land use change model-
ling in particular with respect to exploring dependencies between different levels 
                                           
15    The concept of self-organisation originally stems from the natural sciences (cf. e.g. 
HAKEN 1988; KAUFFMAN 1993) and it concerns elementary particles in the first place. 
Concerning this fact, LENTZ (1993) points out that the elements (humans) in social 
systems are not of a particle nature but complex themselves. Unlike elementary particles, 
they are intelligent in that they can 'plan' structures to a certain extent. 22  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
of scale by linking the behaviour of individuals to collective behaviour. Particu-
larly in agriculture, land use takes a central position. Spatial aspects have a 
direct effect on farm decision making and on the economics of the farm. In 
addition to land value and transport conditions, the suitability of land for agri-
cultural production is determined by non-economic factors like soil quality, cli-
matic conditions, and inclination. What could hence make ABS particularly 
attractive is the possibility to link economic models with spatial models to sup-
port a better understanding of interdependencies between agent behaviour and 
space in land use systems.  
2.5  Examples of applications of agent-based systems 
Agent technologies and research span a range of specific techniques and algo-
rithms for dealing with interactions and autonomous actions in dynamic and 
open environments. Researchers from different disciplines use ABS models to 
pursue a variety of objectives. Table 2-2 shows one such exemplary classifica-
tion of applications, according to which applications of ABS models can be dis-
tinguished into problem solving, social systems analysis, and land-use/land-
cover change analysis. 
2.5.1 Problem  solving 
Using agents as problem solvers mainly concerns the solution of complex prob-
lems such as optimisation problems. For this, agents can either work together to 
solve problems that are beyond their individual problem-solving capabilities 
(distributed problem solving). Alternatively, each agent separately solves the 
complete problem (solution rivalry) and the best solution is taken.  
2.5.1.1 Distributed  problem  solving 
In distributed problem solving, a problem is decomposed into smaller sub-prob-
lems each of which is then solved by an individual agent. Tedious and time 
consuming in this context is the question how to decompose exactly a global 
problem into sub-problems and how to specify the relation between the sub-
problem and the global problem. The same applies to the question of allocating 
tasks to agents. Exemplary applications of distributed problem solving are given 
by O'HARE and JENNINGS (1996) and by LESSER (1990). However, it should be 
noted that not all problems can efficiently be solved in a distributed way. With 
respect to some problems, the costs of communication between individual 
problem solvers may be higher than the benefits derived from distribution.  
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 24  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
 
2.5.1.2 Solution  rivalry 
Solution rivalry follows a different approach in that each agent in a population 
of heterogeneous agents solves the same problem. A central control agent then 
collects results and evaluates the individual agents' solutions. The procedure 
selects bad solutions and replaces them with better or new solution. This is, in 
very general terms, the procedure followed in approaches like genetic algo-
rithms (HOLLAND 1975; MITCHELL 1998; GOLDBERG 1989), genetic program-
ming (KOZA 1992), evolutionary strategies (RECHENBERG 1973; SCHWEFEL 
1977), classifier systems (HOLLAND 1995) or ant systems (DORIGO et al. 1996).  
2.5.2  Social systems analysis 
Agent-based systems also find applications in the field of systems analysis 
where they are used to study the behaviour and development of systems of inter-
acting individuals. Table 2-2 distinguishes four groups of exemplary applica-
tions by their solution concept: rule-based, normative, artificial intelligence, and 
role-playing games.  
2.5.2.1 Rule-based  behaviour 
Conway's game of life is one of the simplest examples of the first group. The 
game generates 'emergent phenomena' based on simple rules. A cell located on a 
grid of cells changes its state according to the states of other cells. The player of 
the game can study how elaborate patterns and behaviours can emerge from very 
simple rules that the player defined beforehand. A second example is the work 
by SCHELLING (1978), who studies spatial segregation and aggregation phenom-
ena in different societies. The behavioural foundation of Schelling's agents is 
also very simple and based on simple rules such as 'search for a new home if too 
many neighbours belong to another social class'.
16 Finally, another example of a 
simple rule-based ABS is AXELROD'S (1984) simulation of agents playing in a 
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which playing strategies are implemented 
in a simple simulation programme. The simulation results show that the well-
known 'tit-for-tat' strategy (do whatever your opponent did last) was the most 
successful one. Although this was already proven in the 1950s, Axelrod's model 
nevertheless contributed significantly to the understanding of how social norms 
                                           
16   Educative  agent-based  simulation environments, like StarLogo (RESNICK 1994), give 
many other examples. Users can easily run and modify pre-defined simulations, or create 
new simple applications.   2.5  Examples of applications of agent-based systems  25 
evolve and to how they could be simulated on the computer (BINMORE 1998).  
2.5.2.2  Normative agent behaviour 
In most agricultural economic ABS applications, agents' behaviour is deter-
mined normatively. Early examples of an ABS model based on normative 
behaviour are recursive-programming models (DAY 1963; HEIDHUES 1966; DE 
HAEN 1971) which were applied to analyse and forecast dynamic developments 
in the agricultural sector. The models assume that farms agents representing 
farm types (group farms) or regions (regional farms) interact.
17 The farm agents 
are heterogeneous with respect to factor capacities, technical coefficients and the 
definition of the objective function in the set of linear equations underlying each 
farm agent. In each period, farm production capacities are updated based on pre-
vious experience, results of the last period, and external factors influencing the 
farm (HEIDHUES 1966). In principle, the models by BALMANN (1993, 1997), 
BERGER (2000) – further developments of which can be found in BALMANN et 
al. (2002) – and HAPPE and BALMANN (2002) follow a similar approach.
18 These 
latter models, however, are more complex and consider a multitude of individual 
farms instead of group farms to represent an agricultural region. Individual 
farms plan production using Linear (Mixed-Integer) Programming. The factor 
that differentiates these models most from the earlier models of the 1960s is 
their explicit consideration of space and heterogeneity. 
2.5.2.3 Artificial  intelligence 
In the third group of models, agent behaviour is governed by an artificial intelli-
gence. Axelrod, again, gives a nice example for agents with an artificial intelli-
gence. Whereas in his 1984 tournaments, computer programmes competed for 
the best solution to the prisoner's dilemma, in 1997, Axelrod replaced the com-
puter programmes in the 1984 tournaments with strategies generated by a 
genetic algorithm. For this, he defined a population of so-called genomes each 
                                           
17   Although the field of agent-based systems and the respective terminology did not exist in 
the 1960s, the early recursive programming models of Day and De Haen actually already 
fulfil the criteria for simple agents. 
18   Berger's model approach extends and refines the ideas of Balmann's original approach in 
many respects. Farms follow heterogeneous decision models and they can communicate 
explicitly within communication networks. As water management played an important 
role in the study region, a hydrological module was added to the model in which water 
flows are considered in addition to a trade of water rights. The model was initially used to 
study the adoption of new technologies in a selected region in Chile.  26  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
of which is coded in a binary string consisting of '0's and '1's. If decoded, each 
binary string corresponds to a particular solution or strategy that competes with 
the other genomes for the best solution to the problem. Application of the 
genetic algorithm then replaces poorly performing strategies with better ones. 
This replacement property of a genetic algorithm is comparable to a simple type 
of learning.
19 Sample applications of genetic algorithms in agricultural 
economics are CACHO and SIMMONS (1999) who apply genetic algorithms to 
farm investment behaviour in risky environment, or BALMANN and HAPPE 
(2001a) who use a distributed genetic algorithm to determine equilibrium strate-
gies on a rental market for land. In the latter model, a genetic algorithm deter-
mines the bidding behaviour of farms on the land market, and selects for better 
bidding strategies. BALMANN and MUßHOFF (2001) use genetic algorithms to 
derive equilibrium investment strategies for real options problems with com-
peting agents. In another application, BALMANN and MUßHOFF (2004) use 
genetic algorithms to analyse whether a stronger vertical integration along the 
production chain allows reducing the investment reluctance due to the transmis-
sion of price fluctuations in a production chain. 
2.5.2.4  Human agents and role-playing games 
Another approach developed and applied by the CORMAS (Common Pool Re-
source Multi-Agent System) research group at the CIRAD (Centre de coopera-
tion internationale en recherché agronomique pour le développement) is to 
define agent behaviour in the context of common pool resource use (BOUSQUET 
et al. 1999). The approach is based on field experiments in which researchers 
first survey users of a common pool resource about individual attitudes about the 
use of the resource and the way they use the resource. In a second step, the sur-
veyed information is then transferred into a simulation model developed using 
CORMAS (BOUSQUET et al. 1998), which is then simulated. A specific way of 
carrying out field-work to obtain information on individuals' behaviour is to 
conduct role-playing games with real agents (BARRETEAU et al. 2001). Results 
of role-playing games may give information about the potential behaviour of 
agents in computer programmes. 
                                           
19   CHATTOE (1998), however, notes that 'learning' in this type of models does not 
correspond to human learning. Humans learn at a different speed and according to 
different rules. It is less problematic, though, to view this approach as a way to identify 
Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies (cf. DAWID 1999).   2.6  Potential challenges to agent-based modelling  27 
2.5.3 Land-use/land-cover  change and integrated modelling 
In recent years, the use of agent-based models has become increasingly popular 
in the fields of land-use/land-cover change analysis, as well as in integrated 
modelling. ABS models in these fields are particularly suitable because in most 
cases they aim to integrate spatial models of land use change with economic, 
social, and environmental models (e.g. PARKER et al. 2002; BERGER and 
RINGLER 2002; JANSSEN 2002; BARTH et al. 2003; KRIMLY et al. 2003). 
2.6 Potential  challenges  to agent-based modelling  
2.6.1  Modelling the co-ordination of agents 
Co-ordination of agents is central to ABS. The allocation of scarce resources 
and the communication of intermediate results are two fundamental components 
of a co-ordination problem (MALONE 1990). These components are equally cen-
tral to economic systems, in which a number of actors compete for scarce 
resources. Without co-ordination, individual agent actions may interfere with 
each other because agents have only a limited and imprecise view of the overall 
system. That is, agents are boundedly rational. For instance, if – like in a pro-
duction process – one activity requires as inputs the results of other activities, 
and then co-ordinating the communication of intermediate results is required 
(MALONE 1990). Thus, individual behaviour needs to be compatible and 
coherent. In other words, nothing can be consumed that was not produced 
beforehand. Consequently, ABS models require mechanisms that control for the 
compatibility and consistency of individual agents' actions.  
In practice, modelling co-ordination requires the definition of interdependencies 
between agents. However, the definition of interdependence and its degree is not 
all that easy. In particular, the degree of interdependence needs to be defined. At 
the one end of the spectrum, there are no interdependencies between individual 
agents, i.e., agents base their decisions and actions exclusively on their own 
situation. In economic systems, where resources are scarce this would not be 
possible and lead to the mentioned problem of interference between agent 
behaviour. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the case of strategic deci-
sion making. Strategic decision making represents the highest degree of interde-
pendency because it requires each agent to have a complete model of all other 
agent's decision situations in all future time periods. This is only the case if 
agents are perfectly rational and have complete information about the system. 28  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
Modelling strategic behaviour is not trivial, though, as it requires each agent to 
have a model of all other agents and their environment in which agents have an 
agent-based model of their environment and so on. Whereas in the case of no 
interdependencies the co-ordination problem is easily solved, a solution in the 
case of strategic interaction – if it exists – is not trivial to find and computation-
ally very costly. Potentially, in the latter case computational limits will be 
reached rather quickly. 
As regards the rationality of agents in real economic system, it is most likely 
that neither end of the spectrum provides a feasible and realistic co-ordination 
solution. Rather, real economic agents as well as agents in agent-based models 
of economic systems can be considered boundedly rational (SIMON 1955, 1956, 
1996), that is, agents make decisions based on the information available to them, 
which can possibly even be wrong.
20 As SIMON (1955) writes: "Broadly stated, 
the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of 
rational behaviour that is compatible with the access to information and the 
computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including 
man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisations exist." Accord-
ingly, the rational decision-making of agents is strongly related to the availabil-
ity of information in the environment of agents and the capacity of agents to 
process this information adequately. The concept of bounded rationality can also 
be transferred to agent-based modelling in that agents are explicitly endowed 
with a limited knowledge about other agents and their environment.  
Consequently, two solutions to the co-ordination problem appear to be reason-
able both of which ensure a coherent behaviour of agents. One is to define ad-
hoc rules of interaction which consider some strategic aspects. The second is to 
introduce intermediate co-ordination institutions, such as markets, standards, or 
direct supervision (MINTZBERG 1979). This could be implemented by providing 
the group of agents with another agent – e.g., a market agent – that has a wider 
perspective of the system. This intermediate agent could gather selected infor-
mation from individual agents and co-ordinate their activities. For example, with 
regard to an agricultural land market, the agent could organise a land rental 
market by way of an auction (chapter 3). 
                                           
20   See, e.g., RUBINSTEIN (1998) and SIMON (1996) for a discussion on bounded rationality 
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2.6.2  Verification and validation  
ABS modelling efforts have to cope with a number of practical problems that 
range from model design, the required labour and time input, the dissemination 
of results, to acceptance with an audience. In the end, the way to solve these 
practical problems may contribute significantly to the success and meaningful-
ness of the model approach. Validation and verification aspects are particularly 
relevant in the context complex models of social or economic systems, which do 
not provide many hard and measurable facts. In this respect, the general question 
to be asked of all models is how well the model represents the underlying target 
system in its structure and behaviour.  
Verification is generally associated with the process of testing the software 
model to ensure the proper functioning of the programme (GILBERT and 
TROITZSCH 1999; KLEIJNEN 1995; MANSON 2001). Possible sources of errors are 
the programme syntax but also the programme logic. Powerful debugging 
environments, graphical interfaces, or the application of standardised data analy-
sis methods such as regression analysis help in detecting logical errors is. But 
most of all, it is experience and familiarity with the subject itself, which avoids 
most logical errors. The verification process is similar to sensitivity analysis in 
that the programme is tested for different parameter constellations. 
Validation, on the one hand, is concerned with the question whether the simula-
tion is a good and suitable representation of the target system (GILBERT and 
TROITZSCH 1999). On the other hand, there is the view that a model's validity 
can be measured by the model’s ability to make good predictions and retrodic-
tions (MOSS 2000). Regarding ABS models, the need for validation depends on 
the degree to which the model is to be used for theoretical reasoning or in 
applied research. For example, if an ABS model is of conceptual, theoretical, or 
didactic nature it is difficult to validate such an artificial model against real 
systems or real data. Hence, the more applied the ABS model, the higher is the 
need for thorough validation. But, there is also no single straightforward valida-
tion procedure available as the validation of complex simulation systems gener-
ally is a difficult task (cf. WEINSCHENCK 1977; ODENING and BALMANN 1997; 
BRANDES 1985). Following MANSON (2002), the key caveat is the effect of com-
plexity or non-linear relationships. This is because complex models can generate 
complex and often surprising model results. Outcomes in any case must be vali-
dated along the greatest possible number of benchmarks. Hence, complexity is 
not an excuse for results that cannot be explained. Unfortunately, there is no 
standardised validation procedure for ABS models. Currently, validation of 
ABS-models requires use of multiple, complementary methods. MANSON (2002) 30  2  Agent-based modelling: motivation, definition, and applications 
presents different validation and verification techniques such as statistical 
methods, comparison of model patterns to patterns of real systems, or spatial 
validation techniques. In fact, the general question asked of all models is: how 
well does a model characterise the system to be modelled? In this regard, 
KWAŚNICKI (1999) proposes a list of (subjective) criteria along which to evalu-
ate a simulation model:  
-  Correctness – consequences of the model ought to be very close to the 
results of experiments and/or observations;  
-  Consistency – the model ought to be consistent not only internally, but also 
with other commonly accepted theories used to describe similar or related 
phenomena;  
-  Universality – consequences of the model ought not to be confined to 
individual cases;  
-  Simplicity; 
-  Fecundity – the model ought to throw new light on well-known phenomena;  
-  Usefulness.  
As written in KWAŚNICKI (1999), the 'Turing Test', which was originally estab-
lished to test for intelligent behaviour of a computer algorithm, can also be ap-
plied in the context of ABS and complex simulation models. This test evaluates 
the level of similarity between simulation results and real systems (LAW and 
KELTON 1991). For example, people with a deep knowledge and understanding 
of a system (i.e., regarding agricultural structures these are researchers, farmers, 
and administrators) are asked if the results they are shown correspond to phe-
nomena known from their experience. However, the experts do not know 
whether the presented results are real or simulated. In this way, it is not only 
possible to derive valuable insights for improving a model but also to evaluate 
the degree of similarity between a model and reality. 
 
 
 3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents AgriPoliS (Agricultural Policy Simulator), which is a spa-
tial and dynamic agent-based model of regional agricultural structures, 
developed in collaboration with Konrad Kellermann and Alfons Balmann. 
Central elements of AgriPoliS such as the conceptual framework, the data 
structure, and the variables build upon previous work by BALMANN (1995, 
1997). The model's name, AgriPoliS, refers to its main application, the impact 
analysis of agricultural policies on structural change.
21 The chapter is structured 
as follows: Section 3.2 introduces a conceptual framework of an agent-based 
model of regional agricultural structures. Following this, section 3.3 presents the 
implementation of the conceptual framework as an object-oriented computer 
programme. The computer programme mainly consists of three types of objects: 
general purpose objects, agents and data management objects. These objects will 
be described in detail in sections 3.4 through 3.6. Finally, in section 3.7, data 
output is described. 
3.2 Conceptual  framework 
The core of AgriPoliS is the understanding of a regional agricultural structure as 
a complex evolving system. This regional agricultural system is shown sche-
matically in Figure 3-1. The figure shows the interactions between the three cen-
tral components of agricultural structures: farms, markets, and land. This repre-
sentation can be considered typical for family-farm dominated regions in Ger-
many where production cannot take place entirely independent of land. A num-
ber of individual farms evolve subject to their actual state and to changes in their 
                                           
21   Based on AgriPoliS, KELLERMANN (2002) has developed the interactive policy simulation 
game 'PlayAgriPoliS'. The game can be used, for example, for instructive purposes in the 
classroom. It allows the player to take the position of an agricultural minister and to set a 
variety of policies and policy combinations. 32  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
environment. This environment consists of other farms, factor and product mar-
kets, and space, which are again all embedded within the technological and 
political environment. Farms, land, and markets either directly depend on each 
other or they exert influence on each other. A direct dependence implies that one 
component cannot exist without another. The mutual dependence between 
farms, land, and markets results from the fact that farms require land to produce 
on the on hand. Farm management practices in return influence the state of the 
land the quality of which is characterised, for example, by soil fertility. On the 
other hand, the mutual interdependence between farms and markets takes place 
because farms can purchase production inputs on factor markets and sell 
products to product markets.  
Figure 3-1: A static conceptual model of a regional agricultural system 
policy technology
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Source:   Own figure. 
Representing this system using the abstraction of an agent-based system it is 
appealing to interpret farms as individual agents, not only because the descrip-
tion in Figure 3-1 suggests this. Also markets – be it product or factor markets, 
and in particular the land market – can be interpreted as agents that bring 
together and co-ordinate market activity. Before translating the conceptual 
model into a computer simulation programme in the following, the core contents 
will be sketched in more detail along the following questions:    3.2  Conceptual framework  33 
-  What are the agents involved and what makes them heterogeneous? 
-  How do agents behave and what actions are driving the system? 
-  Which factors comprise the individual agent's spatial, technical, and political 
environment? 
-  How do interactions between agents, and agents and the environment take 
place in the model? 
3.2.1 Agents  involved 
For the purpose of AgriPoliS, an agent is defined as an entity that acts individu-
ally, senses parts of its environment and acts upon it.
22 In the context of regional 
agricultural structures, it is useful to differentiate between two kinds of agents: 
the farm agent and the market agent.
23 The agents in AgriPoliS are acting enti-
ties that actively carry out defined actions.  
There are two types of agents in AgriPoliS, farm agents, and market agents. Of 
the two kinds of agents considered, the farm agent is the most important one. In 
the context of AgriPoliS, one farm agent corresponds to one farm or agricultural 
holding. In accordance with the above agent definition, a farm agent is an inde-
pendently acting entity that decides autonomously on its organisation and 
production to pursue a defined goal (e.g. farm household income maximisation). 
Furthermore, a farm agent reacts to changes in its environment and its own state 
by adjusting its organisation in response to available factors endowments and 
observable actions of other farm agents.  
The second kind of agent, the market agent, coordinates the working of markets. 
It is the responsibility of the market agent to bring together supply and demand 
of goods (products, production factors) and to determine a price of the good. 
More specifically, in AgriPoliS, there is a land market agent, the auctioneer, and 
a product market agent. Unlike the farm agent that meets all the criteria men-
tioned in the agent definition given in Table 2.1 in chapter 2, the market agents 
can only be considered as very basic agents, whose sole objective is to co-ordi-
nate the actions of farm agents on the markets for products, land, capital and 
labour. 
                                           
22   See chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of agents and agent-based systems. 
23   In fact, there is also a third kind of agent that manages the course of actions of the other 
agents in the actual simulation programme. This management agent is responsible for 
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3.2.2  Farm agent actions and behaviour 
Farm agents can produce a selection of goods. In order to produce, farm agents 
utilise buildings, machinery, and facilities of different types and capacities. With 
respect to this, AgriPoliS implements economies of size as with increasing size 
of production, unit investments costs decrease. Moreover, labour is assumed to 
be used more effectively with increasing size. AgriPoliS also aims to mimic the 
effect of technological progress. More specifically, it is assumed that with every 
new investment, unit costs of the product produced with this investment 
decrease by a certain percentage.  
Farms can engage in rental activities for land, production quotas, and manure 
disposal rights. Labour can be hired on a fixed or on a per-hour basis; vice versa 
farm family labour can be offered for off-farm employment. To finance farm 
activities and to balance short-term liquidity shortages, farm agents can take up 
long-term and/or short-term credit. Liquid assets not used within the farm can be 
invested with a bank. Farm agents quit production and withdraw from the sector 
if equity capital is zero, the farm is illiquid, or if opportunity costs of farm-
owned production factors are not covered.
24 
Farm agents are assumed to act autonomously and to maximise farm household 
income. For this, production and investment decisions are made simultaneously 
based on a recursive linear programme including integer activities (cf. HAZELL 
and NORTON 1986). From the solution of the linear programme, shadow prices 
of production factors can be derived. Farm decision making is myopic or bound-
edly rational (SIMON 1955, 1956, 1996), that is, agents make decisions based on 
the information available to them, which can possibly even be wrong. Because 
of this, the decision problem of the model farms is highly simplified compared 
to that of real farmers in that strategic aspects are not included. Except for the 
price information on rents as well as product and input prices, individual farms 
in AgriPoliS do not know about other farms' production decisions, factor en-
dowments, size, etc. On the contrary, unbounded rationality would imply that 
farms take account of all interactions between farms, and the technical and 
political framework conditions now and in future periods and that would include 
these into the individual decision problem.
25 Farm agents are also boundedly 
                                           
24   As investment costs are assumed to be sunk, only opportunity costs for land and labour 
are considered. 
25   For a discussion, see also chapter 2. Currently, this cannot be implemented because of 
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rational with respect to expectations. In the majority of cases, farm agents follow 
adaptive expectations. Merely policy changes are anticipated one period in ad-
vance and included into the decision making process. 
New investments affect production capacities for the operating lifetime of the 
investment. This implies investment costs to be sunk. A farm agent is handed 
over to the generation after a given number of periods. In case of such a genera-
tion change, opportunity costs of labour increase. Accordingly, continuation of 
farming can be interpreted as an investment into either agricultural or non-agri-
cultural training. Finally, farm agents differ not only with respect to their spe-
cialisation, farm size, factor endowment and production technology, but also 
with respect to the person of the farmer, and with respect to managerial ability.  
3.2.3 The  spatial,  technological and political environment 
Land is an essential input for most kinds of agricultural production activities, be 
it for plant production, as fodder ground, or as manure disposal area. Hence, 
space is a factor that cannot be neglected if agriculture is concerned. Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) provide a way for organising spatial data and 
assigning certain properties to space. A common way to organise space in GIS is 
to define a grid of cells. A grid, or layer, categorises land with respect to attrib-
utes of the cells. For example, this could be the soil type, ownership, or ecologi-
cal parameters like the nitrogen load. A GIS-like representation could also be 
used in the context of an agent-based model of agriculture to achieve an explicit 
spatial representation as some recent examples show (e.g., BERGER 2004; 
PARKER et al. 2002). AgriPoliS, follows a more basic approach in that it does 
not implement a spatially explicit GIS in which the exact location of farms and 
land as found in a real region is modelled. AgriPoliS models space in a stylistic 
way to implement some, but not explicit, spatial relationships. In the current ver-
sion of AgriPoliS, space is represented by a set of cells/plots assembled into a 
grid to form a kind of cellular automaton (Figure 3-2).  
One individual plot represents a standardised spatial entity of a specific size that 
can take different states. In this idealised representation, all factors not directly 
relating to agriculture and land use (roads, rivers, etc.) were eliminated. The 
coloured cells represent agricultural land that is either grassland or arable land. 
Plots not used in agriculture are black. On some of the cells, farmsteads are 
located. They are marked with an X. The total land of a farm agent consists of 
both owned and rented land. All plots of land belonging to one farm agent are 
marked with the same colour; cells, which are owned, are surrounded by a box.  36  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
Figure 3-2: An idealised grid representation of an agricultural region 
 
Source: Own  figure. 
The technological environment is given by technologies of different vintages 
and technological standards. Over time, technology is assumed to underlie a 
constant technological progress created in the up-stream sector, but not on the 
farms themselves. Farm agents are assumed to benefit from technological pro-
gress by way of realising additional cost savings when adapting new technolo-
gies. The political environment represents the third building block of a farm 
agent's external environment besides space and technology. Agricultural (and 
environmental) policies affect the farm at different instances such as prices, 
stocking density, direct payments, or interest rates.  
3.2.4 Agent  interactions 
The concept of interaction between agents is central to agent-based systems. 
Interaction takes place when two or more agents are brought into a dynamic 
relationship through a set of reciprocal actions. Interactions develop out of a   3.2  Conceptual framework  37 
series of actions of agents whose consequences in return effect the future be-
haviour of agents (FERBER 1999). Interactions between agents take place either 
directly or indirectly, whereby an indirect interaction occurs through another 
agent (see chapter 2).  
At this development stage, agents in AgriPoliS interact indirectly by competing 
on factor and product markets. Interaction is organised by market agents that 
explicitly coordinate the allocation of scarce resources such as land or the trans-
action of products. Direct interactions between agents, for example for directly 
negotiating on rental contracts, are not considered at this stage of the model 
development.  
In AgriPoliS, the land market is the central interaction institution between 
agents. In reality, the land market is of particular relevance, as farms very often 
cannot develop independently of land. In the case of Germany, livestock pro-
duction is directly linked to the provision of land for fodder production or ma-
nure disposal. In this sense, land is a central prerequisite for farm growth. In 
Germany, farms predominantly grow by renting land additional. Because of this, 
AgriPoliS considers a land rental market, but does exclude a sales market for 
land. With regard to land, the ownership structure consists of family farms 
owning some land and external land owners. The latter are not modelled 
explicitly but farm agents rent their land. When AgriPoliS is run, land available 
for rent on the rental market stems from two sources: one is farms that have quit 
production and withdrawn from the sector, the other is land released to the mar-
ket due to the termination of rental contracts.  
In brief, the land allocation process works as follows.
26 To allocate this free land 
to farms, in AgriPoliS an iterative auction is implemented in which an auction-
eer (market agent) allocates free plots to farm agents intending to rent additional 
plots of land. Farm agents' bids for particular plots of land depend on the 
shadow price for land, the number of adjacent farm plots and the distance-
dependent transport costs between the farmstead and the plot. The auctioneer 
collects bids, compares them, and allocates free plots to farm agents. The auc-
tion terminates when all free land is allocated or if bids are zero. As both arable 
land and grassland are considered, the auction process alternates between these 
two land qualities.  
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3.2.5  Central modelling assumptions 
As with every model, AgriPoliS rests on a number of assumptions. Two kinds of 
assumptions can be differentiated. On the hand, there are assumptions that 
represent central characteristics of an agricultural system. These form the corner 
stones of the model. BALMANN (1995) has listed the central characteristics of 
agricultural systems and structures, which shall be mentioned here again. 
-  The evolution of agricultural structures follows a dynamic process; 
-  Agricultural structures are path dependent, i.e. the history of the system 
determines its present state significantly and certain events are irreversible; 
-  For the most, decision making follows goal-oriented economic considera-
tions; 
-  Certain activities, decisions and actions are indivisible; 
-  There are feedback mechanisms, particularly on the local scale, between the 
actions of individuals and between the results of individual actions. 
On the other hand, there are assumptions that are model specific and are neces-
sary to make the model operational and to keep it tractable and clear. Assump-
tions in particular concern farm behaviour, expectation formation, the definition 
of the planning period, and the representation of markets and the interaction 
with other sectors. These assumptions will be mentioned and discussed in this 
and later chapters where applicable. 
3.3 Implementation  of  the conceptual model 
3.3.1 Object-oriented  structure and design 
A natural way of transferring the conceptual framework presented in section 3.2 
into a computer programme is to use an object-oriented programming language 
such as C++, Java, or Smalltalk.
27 Object-orientation provides away to break a 
problem into components. In brief, object-orientation describes a system of enti-
ties in terms of elements called objects. Objects consist of data (or attributes) 
and actions (or methods). The data represent the state of the object. The actions 
operate on an object's data and change it. For example, a farm agent's investment 
                                           
27   This section on object-oriented design is largely based on REISS (1999) who gives an 
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activity (action) changes the agent's capital endowment (data). In other words, 
an object provides functionality in terms of data and actions.  
A programme built using an object-oriented design usually contains a large 
number of objects, of which many are the same. For example, in an agricultural 
structure all objects representing farms will be treated in the same way. When 
designing a computer programme such as AgriPoliS using objects it is therefore 
sufficient to describe the behaviour of sets of similar farms as a whole. A group 
of objects with the same data and actions is called a class. Because of this, it is 
actually more common and useful to define the functionality of classes instead 
of individual objects in the design of object-oriented computer programmes. To 
summarise, object-oriented programmes thus consists of a set of classes, he data 
associated with these classes and the set of actions the classes can be asked to 
undertake.  
One key to understanding object-oriented design is to view the objects as living, 
intelligent entities of various types (REISS 1999). They are living in the sense 
that their properties change over time. Objects are intelligent in that they can 
undertake actions and know how to perform them. To visualise and document 
the design of an object-oriented computer programme it is convenient to use a 
standardised language such as the 'Unified Modeling Language' UML (BOOCH 
et al. 1999). UML simplifies the representation of complex software design. 
Accordingly, a representation of a class based on UML is given in Figure 3-3. 
The upper part the class representation shows the class name. The middle and 
lower parts list the attributes and the methods that the class can be asked to un-
dertake.  





Source:   Own figure. 
When building an object-oriented programme, one is first concerned with identi-
fying the individual classes, then with defining the data and actions of these 
classes, and finally with describing the connection between classes. Figure 3-4 
shows the object-oriented class design of AgriPoliS. Class names, as used in the 
C++ programme are in parentheses. The grey shaded classes are agent classes. 40  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 




































Note:  Names in brackets denote the class names used AgriPoliS' C++ programme code. For rea-
sons of clarity, the figure does not show attributes and methods. The complete model code 
can be provided by the author upon request. 
Source:   Own figure. 
For the model to perform its task, it is not necessary that all classes are related 
with each other and can invoke each other's methods. In the figure, lines are 
used to express different kinds of relationships between classes. In general, a 
line between two classes denotes an association relationship. Properties of this 
line, such as the arrowhead, are used to specify the character of the association 
further. For example, the relationship between classes Farm and LP/MIP is 
implemented as a one-way association by using an arrow. This indicates that a 
Farm object can invoke the methods of the LP/MIP object, but not the other 
way around. Likewise, a Farm object determines its location by querying the 
Region object to return the position of the farm in the region, but the reverse is 
not possible. Another type of association is aggregation, denoted by a diamond. 
For example, the line from Region to Plot starts with a diamond, which 
denotes an aggregation. In this case, the region contains a set of plots. Similarly, 
each list of production contains a set of products.  
From the classes shown in Figure 3-4, four kinds of objects can be derived: ob-
jects representing agents (Farm, Auctioneer, ProductMarket), objects   3.3  Implementation of the conceptual model  41 
representing production inputs and outputs (Product, ProductList, 
Labour, InvestObject, InvestList, Plot, Region), results and 
data management objects (SectorResults, DataOutput, DataInput, 
LP/MIP) and the Manager which controls the programme flow.
28 Accordingly, 
agent objects use the functionality embodied in input and output objects to 
achieve their respective goals. Results and data management objects offer some 
auxiliary functionality in that they provide optimisation methods on the one 
hand, and functions to summarise farm data on the other hand. 
3.3.2 Model  dynamics 
Whereas Figure 3-4 presents the static structure of the AgriPoliS model, Figure 
3-5 illustrates the dynamics which are implemented and controlled by the 
Manager objects. As can be seen, the Manager essentially includes two model 
phases, the initialisation phase, and the simulation phase. In the initialisation 
phase, the model structure, as described in section 3.2, is created. This includes 
the creation of objects based on the class definitions, and assigning values to the 
respective attributes of the various objects. The initialisation phase ends with 
further individualising farms with respect to attributes for which empirical data 
is not available or difficult to obtain.  
Following the initialisation phase, the simulation phase starts with setting the 
political framework conditions that is valid during the subsequent simulation 
period. Following this, the Manager invokes the Auctioneer agent to carry 
out the land auction to allocate unused land to farm agents. After the land auc-
tion has finished, farm agents have the possibility to invest in new machinery, 
buildings, or equipment, and following this to produce using the available pro-
duction factors. After production, the Manager invokes the Market agent to 
bring together production of all farm agents in the respective region and to 
determine a price for each type of product produced by the farm agents.  
                                           
28   As mentioned in section 3.2.1, the Manager can also be interpreted as an agent. 42  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 




























Source:   Own figure. 
At the end of each simulation period, farm agents assess their economic per-
formance during that particular period. Based on this assessment and given 
prospective policy changes, the farm agents form expectations about the next 
production period to decide on whether to continue or stop farming. For this 
decision, farm agents take into account all possible adjustment options such as 
off-farm labour opportunities, selling excess quota, and terminating land rental 
contracts. Fixed assets cannot be disinvested due to the mentioned sunk cost 
assumption. Results for each individual farm agent and the sector as a whole are 
written to an output file. The simulation terminates when the number of speci-
fied simulation periods is reached. 
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3.4  Input and output objects 
In AgriPoliS, input and output objects subsume all those objects that are 
necessary for agents to transfer inputs into outputs in the case of the farm agents 
or to organise a market. Each of these will be described in the following. Table 
3-1 lists the AgriPoliS data structure and variable names used in the following. 
Table 3-1:  AgriPoliS data structure and variable names 
Farm agent (k=1,…,K)    Farm agent (continued) 
Z  Utilised agricultural area of farm    TC  Transport costs 
LU
a)   Stocking density per farm    IC  Interest paid 
MP  Manpower hours    HW  Wages paid 
m  Managerial ability factor    W  Off-farm income 
A (l=1,...,L)  Fixed assets     WD 
Aec(l=1,...,L)  Equity financed share of assets     
Withdrawal for consump-
tion 
nc  Vintage of asset    WDmin  
LA Land  assets    ε   Additional consumption 
L Liquidity     
EC Equity  capital     
 
BC Borrowed  capital       
MR  Minimum equity capital reserve    Investment I (h=1,…,H) to produce i 
Y  Farm household income    d (d=1,…,D)  Investment type 
Y
e  Expected farm household income    v Equity-finance  share 
GMA  Gross margin agriculture    A  Investment costs 
IR  Interest on working capital    AC  Average annual costs  
BIDy,z  Bid for wanted plot Py,z   N  Useful  life 
RE  Rent paid    MC  Maintenance costs p.a. 
S  Support payments     l 
MC  Current upkeep (maintenance)     
Technical change factor 
machinery 
D Depreciation    f  Technical change factor 
buildings and equipment 
OV Farming  overheads    LS  Labour substitution 
Capital     Production activities 
CRF  Capital return factor    x (i=1,...,I)  Production activity 
iec  Interest on equity capital    c (i=1,...,I)  Variable prod. cost 
ibc  Interest on borrowed capital    c
e (i=1,...,I)  Expected variable costs 
ibcs  Interest on short-term borrowed 
capital 
  p
e (i=1,...,I)  Expected product price 
Plot Py,z  Plot at grid position y,z    γ   Price trend 
β   Bid adjustment    b (j=1,...,J)  Factor capacities 
Ry,z  Rent paid for plot Py,z   q (j=1,…,J)  Shadow price of b 
AP  Average number of  
adjacent plots per farm 
  r (j=1,...,J)  Factor demands 
R  Average rent in region       
TCy,z  Transport costs between farmstead 
and plot 
    
T  Number of adjacent plots       
DIy,z  Distance between plots       
Note:
  Bold letters denote vectors;
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3.4.1 Production  factors 
Production factors in AgriPoliS primarily concern the classical production fac-
tors land, labour, and capital, whereby the factor capital includes both money 
and assets for production.  
3.4.1.1 Land 
The spatial representation in AgriPoliS is organised by way of cells (see Figure 
3-2), called plots (class Plot) of equal size. Taken together, the plots make up 
the entire region (class Region). Plots differ with respect to three aspects: land 
quality, usage structure, and ownership. Regarding land quality, AgriPoliS con-
siders two qualities: arable land and grassland. Land of either quality is assumed 
to be homogeneous. Regarding the usage structure, agricultural utilised area 
classifies as either managed land or abandoned land. And finally, at the outset of 
the model, agricultural utilised area is either owned by farm agents or rented. All 
land not owned by farm agents is assumed to belong to external land owners 
which are not explicitly modelled. The individual plots in AgriPoliS are charac-
terised by a number of attributes defining the plot's state, its location on the grid 
of plots, and its location relative to the location of the farm interested in renting 
the plot or the farm agent managing the plot already. A plot of either land qual-
ity can take different states: 
-  no agricultural use 
-  abandoned land currently not managed 
-  grassland or arable land 
-  plot rented by farm agent k 
-  plot is farmstead 
-  plot is owned by farm agent k. 
3.4.1.2 Labour 
Labour is supplied in three forms (class Labour). The first is labour supplied by 
the farm family. The amount of farm family labour is derived from accountancy 
data; it is expressed in labour units.
29 Furthermore, farms can hire additional 
workers either on a fixed contract basis or on an hourly basis. Hiring fixed la-
bour is treated as an investment for a period of one year. The total labour 
                                           
29   One labour unit corresponds to the annual labour input in hour provided by one worker.   3.4  Input and output objects  45 
capacity is determined in the mixed-integer programme, where variable labour 
and fixed labour are activities. 
In addition to hiring labour, farms can also offer their own farm family labour 
on the labour market. This offers the possibility for non-professional farming, on 
the one hand, and reducing the overall farm labour if necessary on the other. 
Corresponding to hiring labour, fixed and variable off-farm labour activities are 
introduced as activities in the mixed-integer programme. 
3.4.1.3 Capital 
To produce, a farm agent needs capital both in the form of liquid funds to pay 
running costs, and in the form of fixed asset capital (investments), which deter-
mine a farm agent's productive capacity.  
Investments are introduced into AgriPoliS by way of an investment catalogue 
(class InvestList). This catalogue depicts a list of investment objects con-
taining investment possibilities and production technologies typical for the 
region under investigation. The investment catalogue is available to all farm 
agents and it provides the basis for investment decisions by the farm agents. The 
individual objects in the catalogue differ with respect to the type of investment 
(e.g. dairy, fattening pigs, machinery), as well as the size of the investment 
reflected in the production capacity. For each type of investment, the catalogue 
contains a variety of sizes. Differently sized objects affect a farm agent in three 
ways: First, the effect of a larger scale of production is reflected in lower 
average annual unit costs compared to an object of the same type, but of smaller 
size. Second, larger investments are also considered to have lower labour 
requirements relative to smaller investments. 
Third, over time, the technology underlying investment objects is assumed to 
improve, whereby larger investment objects are assumed to be technologically 
more advanced. Although technological change is not modelled explicitly by 
way of changing the technical coefficients of production, AgriPoliS nevertheless 
aims to mimic two effects of technically more advanced production technolo-
gies. On the one hand, AgriPoliS assumes that with every new investment, unit 
production costs of the product produced with this investment decrease. The 
extent of this cost-saving effect depends on the technical standard of the invest-
ment (see section on cost expectations).  
Stated more formally, each investment object  d i h I , ,  (h=1,…,H) to produce prod-
uct i (i=1,…,I) is defined by the set of attributes in Table 3-2.  46  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
Table 3-2:  Investment attributes 
Investment attributes 
-  ID-number 
-  Type of investment (d) 
-  Investment costs (€) 
-  Production capacity (heads or hectares) 
-  Maximum useful life (periods) 
-  Labour substitution (hours) 
-  Maintenance cost (% of investment costs) 
-  Technological change factor (%) 
 
In particular this is the investment's type d  (d=1,…,D), investment costs, 
production capacity, maximum useful life, labour substitution in hours, mainte-
nance costs, and a factor representing the impact of technological change.
30 
Maintenance costs are expressed as a percentage of total investment costs.  
The maximum time that an investment can be used in production is given by its 
useful life. Before any investment object has reached its maximum useful life, 
the object cannot be sold. Accordingly, an object's salvage value at the end of 
the useful life is zero such that it is non-tradable. This particular assumption has 
important consequences for the decision making of farm agents because it im-
plies that investment costs are fully sunk once an investment is made. Because 
of this, depreciations not variable and treated as fixed costs in any case.  
Capital required for production and investments is considered in three forms: 
short-term credit, long-term credit, and liquid equity capital.
31 Short-term credit 
is taken up by farms in the case of short-term liquidity shortages. The amount of 
short-term credit is not explicitly limited but interest is higher than for long-term 
credit, which therefore sets a kind of natural limit for borrowing in the short-
term. 
Long-term borrowed capital can be used to part-finance investments. It is 
assumed that a maximum share  ) 1 ( v −  of investment costs is part-financed with 
borrowed capital with the remaining share v representing the equity financed 
share. Borrowed capital for investment is supplied by an annuity credit that runs 
for the entire useful life of the investment. The maximum amount of borrowed 
capital is also not directly restricted. Nevertheless, it is assumed that a farm only 
                                           
30   For more clarity subscripts i, and d will be omitted in the following. 
31   Liquid equity capital is defined as total equity minus land assets minus equity bound in 
asset capital.    3.4  Input and output objects  47 
invests if the equity financed share of total investment costs does not exceed a 
minimum equity reserve threshold MR  value given by  
∑ ∑
= =
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That is, there is a limit on the maximum equity capital that can be used for in-
vestment. The limit is introduced to prevent putting the substance of the farm at 
risk.
32  
3.4.2 Production  activities 
Production activities in AgriPoliS are distinguished into livestock production 
(e.g. fattening pigs, turkeys), plant production activities (e.g. crops, sugar beets, 
grassland), short-term capital activities (e.g. short-term borrowing), short-term 
labour activities (e.g. short-term hiring), and 'additional' activities. Most live-
stock and plant production activities are consist of the production of marketable 
products. Exceptions are grassland production activities and silage maize, which 
serve as intermediate products for livestock production. Additional activities 
relate to those activities besides capital and labour which are needed to balance 
capacities in the short-run. This includes, for example, manure disposal, 
machinery contracting, or milk quota lease. Similar to investment objects, each 
individual production activity is characterised by a set of attributes (Table 3-3).  
In the simulation, products are managed by the farm agents in a product list that 
keeps track of the total units produced as well as the gross margins associated 
with each product. Product prices change in response to developments on 
product markets (see section 3.6.2). Variable unit production costs are affected 
by technological change, on the one hand, and by the individual managerial 
ability of a farm agent. 
 
                                           
32   This means that 70% of land assets LA and 30% of total equity-financed fixed assets 
have to be covered by total equity capital  1 − t EC  at all times. The parameters 0.3 and 0.7 
produced the most plausible results in a set of try-out simulations with AgriPoliS. 48  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
Table 3-3:  Product attributes 
Product attributes  
ID-number 
Production branch (e.g. sows for breeding, dairy production) 
Product produced with investment Io of type d 
Price (€/unit) 
Variable unit production costs (€/unit) 
Price flexibility 
Price trend (% change per period) 
Support payment (direct payment) (€/unit) 
 
3.5  The farm agent
33 
To characterise the farm agent, it is useful to first describe why farm agents do 
what they do and based on what. That is, this section will first describe a farm 
agent's behaviour and the goal of its actions before describing the farm agent's 
actions.  
3.5.1 Behavioural  foundation 
3.5.1.1 Farm  planning 
To model the behaviour of farms it is necessary to make assumptions about 
goals, expectations, managerial ability, and the variety of actions that a farm 
agent can pursue. AgriPoliS assumes each farm agent to maximise farm family 
household income in any one planning period. One planning period corresponds 
to one financial year. That is, a farm agent aims for maximising the total house-
hold income earned by farm family members either on or off the farm.
34 The 
action space given to farm family members is defined by on-farm factor 
endowments (land, labour, fixed assets, liquidity), the situation on markets for 
production factors and products, the vintage of existing fixed assets, technical 
                                           
33   In this section, subscript k is omitted to increase clarity. All formulae concern one farm 
agent only. 
34   The assumption of household income maximisation is reasonable in the current version of 
AgriPoliS as it is applied to a region with only family farms, where the majority of the 
workload is done by unpaid farm family labour. If other organisational forms such as 
corporate farms would be considered, this particular assumption would probably need to 
be reconsidered to reflect potentially different goals of corporate farms.   3.5  The farm agent  49 
production conditions, overall economic framework conditions (work opportu-
nities outside the farm, interest rate levels, access to credit), and the political 
framework conditions.  
In order to maximise household income, farm factor endowments, production 
activities, investment possibilities, and other restrictions need to be brought 
together and optimised simultaneously. A suitable setting for this is a mixed-
integer optimisation problem, the solution to which gives the optimal combina-
tion of action possibilities subject to the given framework conditions. Figure 3-6 
shows matrix of the optimisation problem.  
In this scheme, investments and fixed labour are considered non-divisible. They 
are therefore introduced as integer activities. The set of constraints consists of 
on-farm production capacities, but some constraints also reflect political frame-
work conditions, such as the set-aside requirement, the limit on livestock den-
sity, or the nutrient balance. In more formal terms the mixed-integer optimisa-
tion problem is expressed as (abbreviations are given in Table 3-1)  
) , , , , , , , ( max K IC BC L RE D MP Y
e r I, A, c, , p x,
e  
with
HW IC TC OV D MC RE W S IR Y
e − − − − − − − + + + − ′ = ) ( c p x
e  
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(3.2)
This optimisation problem produces the vector q of shadow prices for scarce 
resources. Particularly the shadow price of land  Land q  is of interest because it 
provides the basis for the production of bids in the land auction (see section 
3.5.2). 
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    c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  i  i 
  Objective function  Gross margin 
Liquidity (€)  x x x x x     x  x
Min. equity capital reserve (€)  x x x     x  x
Labour (h)  x x x x x    x  x
Utilised agricultural area (ha)  x x     
Winter fodder (ha) x      



















Machinery (ha)  x x x     x 
Organic N-balance (kg N/ha)  x x      
Rape seed max. (% of UAA)        x    x         
Sugar beet max. (% of UAA)        x             
Set aside (% of UAA)        x    x         
Milk quota (litres)          x      x     




















Stocking density (LU/ha)        x  x  x         
Notes:   c = continuous activities, i = integer activities. 
Source: Own  figure.
35 
3.5.1.2  General remarks about expectation formation 
Production planning, investment, but also the decision to continue or quit farm-
ing is based on expectations about future developments of prices, costs, tech-
nologies, investment possibilities, and policies. In AgriPoliS, farm agents can 
form short-term expectations about the next planning period. However, farm 
agents are not capable of forming long-term expectations. With respect to all 
                                           
35   Compared to highly differentiated and detailed farm-based linear programming models 
(e.g., KAZENWADEL 1999; MÜLLER 2002), the optimisation model in AgriPoliS is 
aggregated. In view of a very detailed representation of the farm organisation the chosen 
aggregation can be considered to be a rather crude simplification compared to the actual 
planning situation and question faced by real farms. Yet, with respect to the objective of 
AgriPoliS it is not the specific farming system which is of interest in this study but rather 
a basic representation of central organisational characteristics as well as financial/ 
economic considerations.   3.5  The farm agent  51 
other future periods, they expect prices and costs to remain constant.
36 By doing 
so, dynamic effects resulting from expectations about the development of mar-
kets and demand developments are neglected. Farm agents also follow the same 
pattern of expectation formation, i.e. there is no differentiation between opti-
mists and pessimists.  
3.5.1.3 Price  expectations 
Regarding prices, a farm agent follows adaptive expectations defined in terms of 
the weighted geometric average of actual and expected prices.
37 A farm agent 
bases all planning decisions on expected prices because actual prices are only 
determined at the end of a production period as a result of farm activity. The 
expected price of production activity i in period  1 + t  is determined as  
I , 1, i for 0 and 1 0 with ) (
1 ) 1 (
, , 1 , K = > ≤ ≤ ⋅ ⋅ =
− −
+ p p p p i
e
t i t i
e
t i α γ
α α
  (3.3)
The coefficient γ  controls for a price trend of production activity i, whereby 
prices increase (decrease) if  1 < γ  ( 1 > γ ). In AgriPoliS the actual price and the 
expected price in period t are equally weighted, i.e.,  5 . 0 = α .  
3.5.1.4 Cost  expectations 
A farm agent also forms expectations about production costs. With regard to 
cost expectations, livestock and plant production activities defined in section 
3.4.2 are treated differently from additional production activities. 
For the group of additional production activities, a farm agent forms cost 
expectations in the same way than price expectation, however, without the price 
trend. Accordingly, expected costs of additional production activities are calcu-
lated as the weighted geometric average with equal weights 
                                           
36   This assumption has some implications in particular for investment activity because farm 
agents make long-term investment decisions on the basis of short-term expectations. If 
farm agents would be able to articulate medium or long-term expectations, some 
investments probably would not be made. The introduction of long-term expectations 
might be desirable but currently it is limited by practical problems. It appears to be 
particularly difficult to consider short-term and long-term expectations simultaneously. 
The problem would be even more complex if expectations would also be made with 
respect to the behaviour of other farm agents.  
37   Unlike the more common definition as the weighted arithmetic mean, the chosen 
definition tones down expectations for period t+1 if expected prices and actual prices in 
period t differ (cf. BALMANN 1995).  52  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
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Cost expectations for livestock and plant production activities are determined in 
a different way in order to introduce the cost-saving impact of technologically 
more advanced production technologies (see discussion on technological 
change). With respect to this, it is necessary to distinguish between plant 
production activities and livestock production activities.  
As mentioned above, it is assumed that the technological standard of production 
technology improves with time. Thus, with every new investment into livestock 
production, the expected production costs 
e
t i c 1 , +  of livestock production activity i 
produced with investment object I  are computed as 
I , 1, i for   1 0 with , , , 1 , K = < ≤ ⋅ − = + l c f c c t i i o t i
e
t i ,  (3.5) 
whereby factor  f  represents the size of the investment. The factor is higher for 
larger investments. 
On the subject of plant production activities, cost savings can only be realised as 
a combination of larger machinery together with larger field sizes.
38 Expected 
costs of plant production activities 
e
t i c 1 , +  are thus a function  
I , 1, i for 1 0 with 0 , 0 , 1 , K = < ≤ ⋅ − = + l c l c c i i
e
t i   (3.6)
of costs at the outset of the simulation in period t=0, adjusted by a factor l, 
which is a function of the average number of adjacent plots and the size of the 

























Figure 3-7 shows values of l  for different farm sizes and average numbers of 
adjacent plots. Accordingly, a farm agent with initially little and scattered land 
can realise large cost savings if it considerably increase its acreage. The poten-
                                           
38   KUHLMANN and BERG (2002) quantify the cost difference between a 1 ha plot and one of 
60 ha at 250 €/ha which corresponds to about a third of the current revenue for wheat.   3.5  The farm agent  53 
tial cost effect is much lower if a farm agent's acreage is already high and if the 
plots are in the neighbourhood. 
Figure 3-7: Expected cost savings for machinery investments depending on 





















































Source: Own  figure. 
3.5.1.5  Expectations about policy changes 
When forming expectations about the next planning period, policy changes have 
to be taken into account as well, particularly if changes are expected to be 
strong. It is assumed that a farm agent knows about major policy changes one 
period before the policy becomes effective. This influences decision making 
primarily when it comes to evaluating the farm agent's profitability at the end of 
a planning period (see section 3.5.2). In AgriPoliS, no general expectation 
formation with regard to policy changes is implemented. Rather, depending on 
the policy setting to be simulated, specific assumptions and expectations have to 
be formulated and introduced into the model. 
3.5.1.6  Managerial ability 
In real world agriculture, the economic performance of farmers can differ sub-
stantially even if they operate under more or less the same production conditions 
using the same production technologies. These differences in the economic 
performance of farmers are often attributed to differences in the managerial 
ability of farmers (NUTHALL 2001; ROUGOOR et al. 1998). Managerial ability 54  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
can be understood as the ability of a farm agent to use its technology to realise 
all potential cost savings. Accordingly, production costs are lower if managerial 
ability is higher. In AgriPoliS, the managerial ability of a farm agent is intro-
duced by a factor m, which is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution at 
start-up. The factor affects production costs of all products in the initial period 
according to  
0 , 0 , i
new
i c m c ⋅ =  .  (3.8)
In the current version of AgriPoliS, farm agents cannot learn to improve mana-
gerial ability. 
3.5.2 Farm  actions 
During one planning period, a farm agent passes through a number of steps, 
shown in Figure 3-8. Each step describes an action.  















  Rent land
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Source:   Own figure based on BALMANN (1995). 
Based on the figure, the most important actions undertaken by a farm agent are 
renting land (renting additional land and disposing of unprofitable land),   3.5  The farm agent  55 
investment, production, farm accounting, and the decision whether to quit 
farming or stay in the sector.  
3.5.2.1 Renting  land 
As mentioned at several points during this chapter, the land market is of par-
ticular relevance. As farms predominantly grow by renting land, AgriPoliS only 
considers a land rental market. As shown in Figure 3-2, in AgriPoliS, all farm-
land is categorised as plots of the same size. Plots are not divisible, and their 
size is fixed during one simulation run. Accordingly, the size of a plot defines 
the smallest unit by which farm acreage can change. Initially, each farm agents 
is endowed with a certain amount of land consisting of owned and rented land. 
Regarding the duration of a rental contract, no formal contract length is intro-
duced in AgriPoliS. Instead, it is assumed that a farm agent can terminate 
unprofitable rental contracts at the end of each planning period. Rental contracts 
for profitable plots remain valid.
39 Accordingly, land is available for rent either 
because a farm agent withdraws entirely from agriculture or because rental 
contracts are terminated.  
In each period, land available for rent is allocated to farms in an iterative auc-
tion. In order to be eligible for renting one additional plot a farm agent is asked 
by the auctioneer agent to make a bid for a particular plot in the region. 
Assuming that transport costs and the exploitation of economies of size for 
machinery (see section 3.5.1) influence the renting behaviour, a farm agent aims 
at renting a free plot which is closest to the farmstead and next to other plots 
belonging to the same farm agent. The maximum price, or bid,  z y BID ,  for plot 
z y P ,  of either land quality is a function of both transport costs  z y TC ,  between the 
farmstead and the plot, and the number of adjacent plots T . It is defined as: 
0 for ) (
2 0 for ) (
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39   This assumption is quite different from rental contracts in reality, which usually involve a 
long-term commitment for a number of years.  56  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
Parameter  β  reduces the bid to reflect other costs associated with leasing land 
such as taxes, administrative costs, labour costs and fees as well as the farm 
agent's additional rent derived from renting this plot. Accordingly, β  represents 
the proportion of the shadow price of an additional plot remaining with the farm 
agent. The higher the value of β  – and therefore the higher the bid – the larger 
the proportion of the shadow price of land that is eventually passed on to the 
land owner. A higher bid also increases the probability of a farm agent to 
receive the plot it wishes. In this respect, the difference 
) ( ,z y Land Land TC q q − ⋅ − β  can also be interpreted as a kind of security mark-up. 
Moreover, if the desired plot is next to other farm plots, a surcharge δ  is added 
to the bid. If the bid is highest compared to other farms, the farm agent receives 
the plot.  
An obvious problem with this procedure is related to the fact that the shadow 
price of land is only determined for one additional plot at a time. In fact, because 
of the indivisibility of investment options, the shadow price for land derived 
from the optimisation model may potentially change rapidly if calculated for 
more than one plot at a time. For that reason, it would be reasonable if farm 
agents could bid for more than one plot at a time. This poses computational 
difficulties, though, as different bundles of plots would need to be tested to 
derive the maximum shadow price from a combination of plots. Therefore, in 
addition to the shadow price for only one plot the average shadow price for 
renting eight plots at a time is calculated. The maximum shadow price of one 
additional plot and of eight additional plots is then taken as the basis for the bid. 
Similar considerations apply when a farm gives up rented land to increase its 
overall profitability (see section on farm accounting).
40 In this case, a farm 
would give up the rented plot  z y P ,  if the shadow price does not cover the plot's 
costs consisting of the rent  z y R ,  and transport costs  z y TC , , that is if 
) ( max , ,
,
z y z y
z y
Land TC R q + < .
41  (3.10)
After giving up a plot, the farm recalculates the shadow price of land. The 
procedure is repeated until the shadow price of land is at least equal to the costs 
of a plot. Unless a farm agent withdraws from agriculture altogether, it is not 
                                           
40   Here, the number of adjacent plots is not taken into account. 
41   Adjacent plots are not considered when rental contracts are terminated.   3.5  The farm agent  57 
possible to let owned land in order to be rented by other farm agent.  
In AgriPoliS, the rent paid for a plot is not equal to the bid given in the land 
auction. This has two reasons. The first is that shadow prices can vary signifi-
cantly between farms. Hence, rents would differ significantly between farms, 
which would affect the farm agent's competitiveness. The second reason is that 
an equality of bids and rental prices is rather unrealistic. In reality, most new 
rental contracts include a passage that places rents in the context of an average 
regional rent. To reflect this, the actual rent paid for a newly rented plot is 
calculated as  
R BID R z y z y ⋅ = , , ,  (3.11)
i.e., is it derived from the weighted geometric average of the bid  z y BID ,  given in 
the auction and the average regional rent R  with equal weights. Figure 3-9 
shows this relationship graphically.  
Figure 3-9: Rent adjustment for new rental contracts 
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Source:   Own figure. 
As it is often the case in reality, also the rent fixed in older rental contracts is 
adjusted. Frequently, such an adjustment is due to strong product price changes, 
policy changes, or changes in the regional reference rent. In AgriPoliS, the 58  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
adjusted rent 
new
z y R ,  for old contracts is the weighted geometric average of the 
average rent in the region and the previous rent of the plot  
) 1 (
, ,
λ λ − ⋅ = z y
new
z y R R R ,  (3.12)
whereby the weight λ is given by the share of newly rented land in the entire 
region. Depending on λ and the average regional rent, the adjusted rent 
develops close to the initial bid. This is plotted in Figure 3-10. 





























Source:   Own figure. 
3.5.2.2 Investment 
Farm investment activity is typically concerned with the purchase of machinery, 
buildings, facilities, and equipment. As investment and production are mutually 
interdependent, they are considered simultaneously in the mixed-integer plan-
ning programme presented in section 3.5.1.  
Investments in AgriPoliS take place in two steps, investment planning and the 
actual investment. In the first step, the farm carries out planning calculations 
based on the farm planning problem presented in section 3.5.1. During the plan-  3.5  The farm agent  59 
ning calculations, be it in the context of renting land or for production, a farm 
agent takes investment opportunities into account. However, during all planning 
calculations the agent does not invest in real terms but plans 'as if' he invested, 
i.e. production capacities are not actually changed. The number, kind, and 
combination of investments are not restricted. In principle, a farm agent only 
invests in one object or a combination of objects if the expected average return 
on investment, determined in the farm-planning problem, is positive, i.e. if total 
household income increases. For investment-planning purposes, all expenditures 
and payments related to an investment are distributed equally over the invest-
ment's useful life and considered in the optimisation. Accordingly, the average 
annual costs  h AC  of investment  i h I ,  considered in the objective function of the 
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Maintenance costs  h MC  are expressed as a percentage of total investment costs. 
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Only in the second step, based on the planning calculations, the actual invest-
ment activity takes place (see Figure 3-8) resulting in a change of production 
capacities. After investment, depreciation and repayment are determined as 
shown further down in Table 3-5. 
3.5.2.3 Production 
Each farm agent is assumed to optimise production in any one planning period 
subject to available production capacities using the planning approach described 
in section 3.5.1 above. All production activities enter the optimisation as 
continuous activities. That is to say, products are assumed to be fully divisible.  
In addition to fixed assets (buildings, machinery, equipment), production 
requires liquidity to cover running costs in the short-run. Products produced 
continuously throughout the year (mostly livestock production) have a constant 
demand of working capital, which in AgriPoliS is defined as liquid assets. Other 
products such as crops are seasonal products and therefore require working 
capital only during parts of the year. To overcome short-term liquidity short-60  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
ages, farm agents can take up loans to finance working capital.  
3.5.2.4 Farm  accounting 
The financial year of a farm agent ends with an annual financial statement. This 
statement produces indicators on incomes and profits, the stability and financial 
situation of the farm agent, and the remuneration of fixed factors. Table 3-4 lists 
central indicators and how they were derived; Table 3-5 shows a list of selected 
variables in the financial statement.  
Table 3-4:  Indicators calculated in the financial statement 
Indicator (end of period t)  Calculation 
Profit (farm income) (t) =   Gross margin 
+ Interest on working capital 
+ Subsidies  
- Rent paid 
- Current upkeep of machinery and equipment 
- Depreciation 
- Farming overheads 
- Transport costs 
- Interest paid 
- Wages paid 
  
Household income (t) =  Profit  
+ Off-farm income 
  
Farm net value added (t) =  Profit  
+ Rent paid 
+ Interest paid 
+ Wages paid 
  
Equity capital (t) =   Equity capital (t-1) 
+ (Household income - Withdrawal) 
  
Change in equity capital is an indicator of a farm agent's economic stability. A 
farm is economically more stable the higher the equity-debt ratio of the farms, 
i.e. the higher the share of equity capital in total capital. Consequently, it would 
be reasonable for a farm to stop farming if equity capital is less than zero. In this 
case, all own resources, which could be used, for example, as credit security are 
used up.  
Accumulation of equity capital is the result of balancing total farm income with 
living expenses. In AgriPoliS, the equity capital stock increases because total 
household income is greater than withdrawals. Regarding withdrawals, it is   3.5  The farm agent  61 
assumed that each family labour unit working on the farm consumes at least 
min WD  per year. A share ε  of the remaining farm household income after 
deducting  min WD  is consumed in addition to the minimum withdrawal. The 
remaining share  ) ( ) 1 ( min WD Y − ⋅ −ε  is then charged to the farm agent's equity 
capital. Table 3-5 shows this.  
Table 3-5:  Definition of variables used in financial statement (selection) 
Variable (at end of period t)  Definition 
Equity capital  WD Y EC EC t − + = −1  
Withdrawal  min min min ) ( WD WD Y WD WD + ⋅ − ≤ ≤ ε with 
1 0 ≤ <ε  
Gross margin   ) ( c p x − ′ = GMA  
Interest on borrowed capital   ) , f( BC i BC IC =  
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Rent paid  ∑∑ =
yz
z y R RE ,  
Transport costs  ) f( ,z y DI TC =
   Liquidity
a)  ec t A LA EC L − − = −1  
Interest on working capital  L i IR ec ⋅ =  
Note:  a) Liquidity is updated throughout the accounting year whenever the total equity capital 
stock changes due to investment or disinvestment. 
Lasting farm profitability requires that all farm-owned production factors (own 
land, family labour, liquid equity capital, and quota) receive an adequate pay-
ment when used on-farm. To assess farm profitability, all on-farm production 
factors have to be valued at their opportunity costs (Table 3-6). Since costs of 
fixed assets are assumed sunk, they are not considered in this calculation. In the 
case of handing over the farm to the next generation, opportunity costs of labour 62  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 
are also higher if a farm is handed over to the next generation. This reflects the 
comparable industrial salary a successor could potentially earn if he/she would 
not take over the farm. Accordingly, a successor would only take over the farm 
if the farm were able to generate income that is at least as high as the opportu-
nity costs. 
A decision on whether to quit is necessary subject to the expected household 
income in future periods. As mentioned above, the planning horizon of a farm 
agent is one period. Hence, the calculation of expected household income takes 
account of investment possibilities and off-farm employment possibilities in the 
next period. Moreover, expected household income rests on the assumption that 
a farm agent's land endowment does not change. The resulting expected house-
hold income is contrasted with the opportunity costs of all on-farm production 
factors.  
Table 3-6:  Opportunity costs of production factors 
Factor valued  at 
Farm family labour  Off-farm income 
Labour of farm successor  Comparable industrial salary 
Working capital  Long-term savings rate 
Owned land  Average regional rent 
Milk quota  Quota price 
  
If expected household income does not cover opportunity costs, it is rational for 
the farm to quit and use all production factors outside the farm. This decision 
rule defines a clear threshold between quitting and staying. In some instances, it 
may be reasonable to blur this threshold, for example, by introducing a tolerance 
margin in which farms stay in business despite of higher opportunity costs.  
3.6  Factor market agents 
3.6.1 Land  auctioneer 
Compared to a farm agent, the auctioneer is a very basic kind of agent. The auc-
tioneer to co-ordinates the auction of free plots by collecting bids from farm 
agents; it then compares the bids, and finally allocates a free plot to the highest 
bidder. The auctioneer acts on behalf of land owners who are not engaged in 
farming, but receive all rent payments. The exact auction process is illustrated in 
Figure 3-11 using UML notation.  
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According to this figure, the order of events is the following: Triggered by the 
Manager class, the auctioneer carries out an iterative auction of free plots. It 
does so by asking each farm agent intending to rent additional land to produce a 
bid for one plot. As discussed in section 3.5.2, the farm does so by first search-
ing for a free plot closest to the farmstead. It then determines a bid for that plot 
based on a combination of the shadow price of land, the number of plots adja-
cent to the desired plot, and transport costs. Following, the auctioneer ranks the 
bids and allocates the desired plot to the highest bidder. As farm agents can only 
bid for one plot at a time, the bidding procedure continues until all plots are 
allocated or the highest bid is zero. In a final step, the auctioneer determines the 
actual rental price that is to be paid for the plots just allocated. In addition to 
setting the price for new rental contracts, the auctioneer also initiates the price 
adjustment of old rental contracts by applying the rent adjustment procedure 
shown in section 3.5.2. This ends the land allocation procedure. 
3.6.2 Product  market 
The product market agent determines a market price for all produced outputs in 
any one period. For this, the market agent makes use of a number of price func-
tions. The demand function for agricultural products in AgriPoliS assumes nei-
ther a fully elastic nor a fully static demand. In analogy to the function for gross 
margins developed in BALMANN (1995), it is assumed that for most products of 




























0 , , γ with  K k , , 1K = ,
 
(3.15)
where  0 , i p denotes the initial price of product i at the outset of the simulation 
(period t=0), the coefficient  i γ  controls for a price trend over time, and the last 
term allows for price variation in depending on the cumulative quantities 
produced by K farm agents. The parameter  t i b ,  represents price flexibility which 
is equivalent to the inverse demand elasticity (cf. BALMANN 1995).  
The price function differs for selected products. In particular this is:  
- Piglet production: Piglets are assumed to be used as intermediate inputs in 
fattening pig production. For this reason, the total quantity of piglets   3.7  Data input, results preparation and data output  65 
produced is reduced by the quantity of piglets used for fattening pig produc-
tion.
42  
- Milk quota: Since the year 2000, prices for milk quota in Germany have been 
determined in quota auctions. Implementing such an auction would be a 
complex matter (comparable to the land auction). Regarding quota, 
AgriPoliS therefore implements a highly simplified quota market in that it 
reflects only the results of quota auctions. In principle, farms can buy and sell 
quota indefinitely. But, to keep milk production within realistic limits, the 
price of quota is related to a regional reference quota.
43 If milk production is 
above (below) the regional reference level plus a 10% tolerance, the quota 
price rises (falls) by a given percentage. The quota market as implemented in 
the model resembles a quota leasing market. To prevent quota from leaving 
the region, the marginal revenue of selling quota is less than the marginal 
revenue of buying additional quota. 
- Manure trading: Regarding manure trading, farm agents generally pay to dis-
pose of excess manure, on the one hand. On the other, farm agents receive 
payments for taking excess manure up to a given limit. Manure trading is not 
limited to the region. That is why in the simulation there may be more farms 
taking up manure than farms disposing of manure and vice versa. Similar to 
the market for milk quota, the price of disposing manure rises the more ex-
cess manure is offered.  
3.7  Data input, results preparation and data output 
AgriPoliS has an interface to a spreadsheet file that includes data on the regional 
agricultural structure to be studied to initialise the model. The file contains data 
on individual farm agents (family labour, machinery, buildings, production 
facilities, land, production quota, liquid assets, and borrowed capital) as well as 
regional data (number of farms, farm types, total land). Figure 3-12 illustrates 
the procedure of reading data into AgriPoliS in a schematic way.  
                                           
42   At the current development stage, there is no interdependence between the price of piglets 
and the gross margin of pig fattening. 
43   The regional reference quota is calculated as the total number of dairy cows in the region 
to be modelled times the average milk yield in that region. A tolerance range of ±10% 
around the regional reference quota is assumed, so that it does not function as the exact 
threshold value for price changes. 66  3  The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) 














Source:   Own figure. 
On the input side, data – broadly speaking - input consists of farm accountancy 
data, regional statistics, and stylised data on technical coefficients, prices and 
costs. On the output side, AgriPoliS compiles aggregate data at the sector level 
(class  SectorResults), on the one hand, and individual farm data, on the 
other hand. More specifically, data output at sector level and at farm level (class 
DataOutput) include data listed in appendix A-2. Based on these indicators it 
is possible to draw conclusions with respect to production, economic perform-












 4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the agent-based model AgriPoliS, which was 
designed to simulate the structural development of regional agricultural struc-
tures. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, it presents a methodology for 
coupling AgriPoliS with data of an existing regional agricultural structure. Sec-
ond, this chapter presents an adaptation of AgriPoliS to the agricultural structure 
of the region Hohenlohe in southwest Germany. Adapting AgriPoliS to 
Hohenlohe (as well as to any other region) requires the representation of key 
regional indicators such as the number of farms, the specific farm size distribu-
tion, farm specialisation, income sources, and production in a reference year.
44 
Moreover, farm agents need to be initialised based on real farm-data, for exam-
ple, on production activities, capital endowment, farm specialisation, labour en-
dowment. The adaptation and the model calibration focus primarily on matching 
the starting conditions of AgriPoliS with Hohenlohe's structure in the financial 
year 2000/2001.
45 The political framework conditions are given by Agenda 
2000. 
The adaptation of the starting conditions is done in two steps. The first step is to 
represent the structure of Hohenlohe based on a number of typical farms. The 
second step is to represent the internal organisation of each of these typical 
farms, that is to say, their specialisation, main production activities, asset and 
                                           
44   The specific methodology to couple AgriPoliS with real data that is presented in this 
chapter was originally developed and tried out for the purpose of this study. It involves 
the replication and representation of a single reference year. The original idea to replicate 
a historical reference period to identify the model's parameters (as intended in the project 
proposal) was not followed because it proved to be very demanding (see also the discus-
sion in section 4.9). The back-casting of previous development will be the subject of fur-
ther research.  
45   Calibration is the simulation of a model with different parameter values such that simu-
lated data and real data correspond in the best way (GREGORY and SMITH 1990). 70  4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
capital endowments. As this chapter builds upon work by KLEINGARN (2002) 
and SAHRBACHER (2003), a detailed description of the calibration procedure, 
selection of data, and discussion of parameter values can be found in these refer-
ences. The following summarises the most important results of these studies. 
4.2  Study region 'Hohenlohe' 
The federal state of Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany is subdivided 
into homogeneous regions of similar natural production conditions ('Gebiete 
gleicher landwirtschaftlicher Ertragsfähigkeit') (MLR 2002). This differentiation 
takes into account the different geological, topographical, and climatic condi-
tions in Baden-Württemberg. Accordingly, 21 such regions are defined for Ba-
den-Württemberg. The choice of the study region was guided by this subdivision 
of Baden-Württemberg. In particular, the region Hohenlohe proved to be suit-
able for this study as it is characterised by a diverse agriculture with intensive 
livestock production (fattening pigs, sows for breeding, and turkeys) on the 
plains, and dairy and forage production in the valleys. Although soils are heavy 
on the plains, crop and forage production dominate (MLR 2002).
46 Table 4-1 
gives an overview of the natural production conditions in Hohenlohe. 
Table 4-1:  Natural production conditions of region Hohenlohe 
Altitude   350-500 m 
Average annual temperature  7-8° Celsius 
Average annual precipitation  650-750 mm 
Soil quality
a) 30-50 
Share of arable land  50-60 % of utilised agricultural area 
Note:  a) Soil quality measured on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 100 (very good). 
Source: MLR  (2002). 
In the year 1999, Hohenlohe comprised about 73,439 ha of agricultural area, 
managed by approximately 2869 farms (STATISTISCHES L ANDESAMT B ADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 1999).
47 Approximately half of the farms were run as profes-
sional (full-time) farms, with the remaining farms being non-professional (part-
                                           
46    The majority of available data (number of farms, livestock numbers, and agricultural 
area) is classified according to administrative entities such as municipalities, or counties. 
Unfortunately, the definition of administrative entities does not correspond with regions 
of homogenous production conditions.  
47   Full agricultural surveys are conducted every five years. The most recent agricultural sur-
vey available was from 1999. For the reference year 2000/2001 no data was available.   4.2  Study region 'Hohenlohe'  71 
time) farms.
48 Professional farms, due to their larger average farm size (average 
farm size of professional farms 36.4 ha, non-professional farms 11.3 ha), have 
cultivated 66% of the agricultural area in Hohenlohe. All farms have the legal 
form of a family farm. More than 97% of the work on farms is done by farm 
family members (KLEINGARN 2002). Table 4-2 shows the agricultural structure 
in 1999 in Hohenlohe differentiated by professional and non-professional farms 
and by farms types.
49  
Table 4-2:  Farm structure in Hohenlohe in 1999 
Farm types  All farms  Professional farms   Non-professional farms 













Total 100  100  100  66    100  44 
Specialised crop   15  12  7  4    25  9.5 
Grazing livestock   30  29  30  20.5    30  9.2 
Spec. granivore   34  38  41  26.4    24  9.9 
Mixed   17  20  20  14    14  5.1 
Permanent  crops 5  0.4 1.6  0.2   8 0.3 
Note:  a) UAA = utilised agricultural area in hectares. 
Source: STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG (1999). 
It shows that among professional farms, grazing livestock farms and specialised 
granivore farms (pig/poultry) take the largest share with 40% and 30%, respec-
tively.
50 This indicates that livestock production plays an important role in 
                                           
48   The term 'part-time farming' may cause some confusion because it can include both the 
'part-time farmer' and the 'part-time farm' (FENNELL 1997). Whereas the former suggests 
that the farmer has another occupation, the latter suggests that the farming operation is too 
small to provide full-time employment for at least one labour unit. In the context of this 
thesis, the latter concept is meant. To avoid confusion, in the following the terms 'non-
professional' and 'professional' are therefore used instead of 'part-time' and 'full-time'.  
49   Specific natural production conditions will not be further discussed since structural data is 
at the centre of interest. 
50   The classification of farms by farm type and income sources in this table is based on the 
system valid in Germany at the time of the survey (1999). Farms are classified in either 
class if farm standard gross margin of the most important production line exceeds 50% of 
total gross margin. Professional and non-professional farms are differentiated based on 
annual work units and standard farm income (see e.g. MLR 2002). In 2002, classification 
of farms was changed according to EU rules. According to the 'new' EU classification a 
professional farm is defined by an economic size of at least 16 ESU and employs at least 
one labour unit (HESSENAUER 2002; LANDESAMT FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND LAND-
WIRTSCHAFT BRANDENBURG 2003). Whereas the EU classification differentiates between 
professional and non-professional farms solely based on economic size units, in Germany 
 72  4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
Hohenlohe and less so arable farming. Approximately a quarter (26.5%) of total 
UAA is farmed by professional, specialised granivore farms, and 20% of the 
total UAA is farmed by grazing livestock farms. Specialised crop farms are gen-
erally of minor importance, in particular when professional farming is con-
cerned. According to REISCH and ZEDDIES (1992), the concentration of intensive 
livestock production in Hohenlohe is due to the fact that particularly in the 
1980s pig production as a land-independent production activity was considered 
to have a high growth potential.  
4.3 Representing  Hohenlohe's  agricultural structure based on typical 
farms 
For calibrating AgriPoliS to Hohenlohe, the agricultural structure of Hohenlohe 
in the reference year 2000/2001 is represented based on typical farms, i.e., farms 
one could typically find in the region. SAHRBACHER (2003) developed a proce-
dure, based on BALMANN et al. (1998a,b), to simultaneously select typical farms 
and scale them up to represent a range of regional capacities. The approach iden-
tifies typical farms of different types and sizes, on the one hand. On the other, it 
generates a scaling factor for each typical farm. This factor denotes the number 
of times a typical farm has to be located in the region such that the agricultural 
structure of the region is represented best.  
This particular approach requires two kinds of data: first, data about the region 
representing aggregate regional capacities, and, second, data about the organisa-
tion as well as economic indicators of individual farms in the region from which 
to select typical farms. Regarding the first requirement, regional statistical data 
sources were available (e.g. STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG, 
2003). As for individual farm data, farm accountancy data (as collected in the 
FADN network) compiling information about farm organisation and economic 
indicators, provided a suitable data source. Although farms in the farm accoun-
tancy data sample are not representative, the sample nevertheless covers the 
most important farm types in the region (ANGENENDT 2003).  
For Hohenlohe, farm accountancy data from 101 professional and 20 non-pro-
fessional farms were available in the reference year 2000/2001. Considering that 
about 50% of all farms in the region are non-professional farms, they are heavily 
underrepresented in the accountancy data sample. Because of this, data on 20 
                                           
the labour restriction was introduced in addition.    4.3  Representing Hohenlohe's agricultural structure based on typical farms  73 
non-professional farms from regions similar to Hohenlohe were added to the 
farm sample to provide a more suitable basis for selecting typical non-profes-
sional farms. Furthermore, these small farms are predominantly specialised crop 
farms.  
Applying the mentioned up-scaling procedure to the farm data sample resulted 
in the identification of 24 typical farms (Table 4-3). Of these, 19 farms operated 
as professional, and five as non-professional farms. The last row gives each 
farm's scaling factor. The selected farms match the characteristics of agriculture 
in Hohenlohe quite well as Table 4-4 shows. In most cases, deviation is below 
5%. For instance, in the model professional farms manage 57,350 ha land, in 
reality it is 57,464 ha. The deviation between the adapted model and real re-
gional statistics is largest for specialised crop farms and farms with less than 10 
hectares of land. The reason behind is that very small farms are underrepre-
sented in the underlying accountancy data sample. Larger differences exist only 
when smaller farm sizes and livestock capacities are concerned. On the one 
hand, this is because of a sample error in the German farm accountancy data 
sample in which particularly small farms are underrepresented in the sample. 
Thus, it is particularly difficult to represent the many small non-professional 
farms. Furthermore, these small farms are predominantly specialised crop farms. 
This explains the deviation with regard to this farm type.  
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Table 4-4:  Comparison of regional statistics and up-scaling results 
Indicators Regional   
statistics 
Initial structure  
AgriPoliS 
Deviation 
Farms 2,869  2,857  -0.42% 
Incl.: Specialised crop farms  459  521  13.56% 
Grazing livestock farms  906  873  -3.66% 
Specialised granivore farms  988  951  -3.74% 
Mixed farms  516  512  -0.82% 
Professional farms  1,553  1,607  3.50% 
Non-professional farms  1,316  1,250  -5.05% 
Agriculturally used area (ha)  73,439  73,587  0.20% 
Incl.: Arable land  57,468  59,034  2.72% 
Grassland 15,971  14,553  -8.88% 
Agriculturally used area by farm type (ha)      
Incl.: Specialised crop farms  9,569  9,143  -4.45% 
Grazing livestock farms  21,683  23,408  7.95% 
Specialised granivore farms  27,766  26,774  -3.57% 
Mixed farms  14,421  14,261  -1.11% 
Professional farms  57,464  57,350  -0.20% 
Non-professional farms  16,276  16,237  -0.24% 
Agricultural holdings (holdings) with an agriculturally used area of … to under … ha  
1-10 828  712  -14.04% 
10-30 981  1,042  6.22% 
30-50 630  666  5.71% 
50 and over  430  437  1.68% 
Production structure (head) number of livestock kept in stocks of … to under … head  
Fattening pigs  106,008  106,074  0.06% 
under 100  9,541  10,007  4.89% 
100-200 9,541  9,519  -0.23% 
200-400 22,262  21,635  -2.81% 
400-600 25,442  25,531  0.35% 
600 and over  39,223  39,382  0.41% 
Sows 101,122  104,452  3.29% 
under 30  6,067  10,643  75.41% 
30-50 8,090  8,022  -0.84% 
50-100 25,281  24,740  -2.14% 
100 and over  61,684  61,047  -1.03% 
Dairy cows  17,667  17,562  -0.59% 
under 20  4,063  3,942  -2.99% 
20-29 3,533  3,502  -0.90% 
30-39 3,003  3,032  0.94% 
40-59 4,417  4,445  0.64% 
60 and over  2,650  2,641  -0.33% 
Beef cattle  50,902  48,006  -5.69% 
Turkeys 450,000  461,227  2.49% 
Livestock units (LU)
a) 117,839  120,146  1.96% 
Note:   a) One livestock unit corresponds to about 500 kg of alive weight.  
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG  
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4.4 Product  prices 
Prices of products and means of production are taken from data collections on 
gross margin calculations published by various German government agencies 
and organisations (e.g. Kuratorium Technik und Bauwesen in der Land-
wirtschaft, Regierungsbezirk Mittelfranken, Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft 
Brandenburg, STMLF – Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten). Prices taken from these data source may not necessarily reflect the ac-
tual price situation in the reference year. Nevertheless, they represent averages 
calculated over a number of years. Accordingly, Table 4-5 lists product prices 
and prices of produced means of production assumed for this study. Crop and 
grassland yields are calculated based on averages from the accountancy data 
sample for Hohenlohe (MLR 2002). 
Table 4-5:  Yields and product prices 
Product  Yield  Market price per unit 
a) 
Arable/grassland    
  Cereals   65 dt/ha  13.40 €/dt 
  Sugar beet   675 dt/ha  5.43 €/dt 
  Rape seed  35 dt/ha  21.91 €/dt 
  Protein plants  35 dt/ha  11.43 €/dt 
 Silage  maize 
b) 165  dt/ha 
c) - 
 Intensive  pasture
b) 70  dt/ha 
c) - 
 Extensive  pasture
b) 50  dt/ha
c) - 
Livestock    
  Sows (piglets)  21 piglets/year  55 €/piglet  
  Fattening pigs   94 kg   1.46 €/kg 
d) 
 Beef  cattle  660 kg   3.16 €/kg 
d) 
  Suckler cows (calves)   235 – 265 kg  1.97 €/kg 
e) 
  Dairy cows (milk)  5,700 kg/cow  0.35 €/kg 
  Turkeys  rooster: 19.4 kg  
hen: 9.5 kg 
rooster: 1.06 €/kg 
hen: 0.96 €/kg 
Notes:   a) prices including value added tax; b) not sold on market, used on-farm; c) dry matter; d) 
carcass weight; e) alive weight.  
Sources:  Own calculations based on SAHRBACHER (2003), KTBL (2000), REGIERUNGSBEZIRK  
MITTELFRANKEN (2001), LFL BRANDENBURG (2001), MLR (2002), STMLF (2003),  
STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG (2001b), LEL (2003a). 
4.5 Production  activities 
In this section, the main arable, grassland and livestock production activities in 
Hohenlohe are described. Altogether 13 production activities are considered.   4.5  Production activities  77 
The data was collected and adjusted to Hohenlohe by SAHRBACHER (2003) and 
KLEINGARN (2002). All production activities are defined in a very general way, 
by including only one intensity level.  
4.5.1  Arable and grassland production activities 
Regarding arable production activities (Table 4-6), gross margins, variable costs 
and labour requirements are calculated mainly based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK 
MITTELFRANKEN (2000), and the Bavarian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(STMLF 2003). These data sources prove to be useful because of the proximity 
of the region Mittelfranken to Hohenlohe and the similarity in natural produc-
tion conditions.  



















  €/ha  €/ha  h/ha  ha  kg N  % UAA 
Cereals
 b) 360  324  10.0  1.00  221  75 
Sugar beets  2,628  -  12.0  1.20  221  2.4 
Rape seed  230  324  8.5  1.00  221  30 
Protein plants  57  384  8.8  0.88  221  5 
Silage maize  -670  459  12.0  1.00  221  - 
Intensive grassland  -290  -  6.0  0.60  273  - 
Extensive pasture  -82  -  1.7  0.20  100  - 
Set aside land  -32  333  4.0  0.30  221  10-33 
Notes:   a) dry matter; b) subsuming winter wheat and barley. 
Sources:  SAHRBACHER (2002) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2000), LFL BRANDEN-
BURG (2001), STMLF (2003), KTBL (2000), MLR (2002), STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG (2003), LEL (2002), HAPPE et al. (2001). 
Variable costs are assumed to contain the costs of seeds, fertilisation, plant pro-
tection, variable machinery costs of farm-owned machinery, and other yield-
dependent costs such as drying and crop insurance. Variable costs are not further 
disaggregated but taken directly from the respective data sources. Costs of fer-
tilisation are assumed to correspond to the expenditure on the mineral fertilisers 
phosphate and potassium. Nitrogen requirement is met by animal manure. Ma-
chinery costs include only variable costs of farm-owned machinery, plus con-
tracted machinery for harvesting. Fixed machinery costs and transport costs are 
treated separately (Table 4-9).  
Grassland is differentiated into intensive grassland and extensive pasture. It is 78  4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
assumed that two thirds of the intensive grassland area is used for silage, the 
other third for hey. Data for intensive grassland is taken from LFL BRAN-
DENBURG (2001).  
Based on averages from the accountancy data sample and empirical experiences 
(KAZENWADEL 2003), restrictions on crop rotation are implemented introducing 
limits on the maximum percentage of agriculturally used area to be planted with 
a specific crop. Sugar beet area is restricted to 2.4% of the UAA. This corre-
sponds to the average observed in the reference year 2001.  
As a reaction to the EU Nitrate Directive 91/676 and the German Fertiliser De-
cree (BGBl, 26/01/1996), upper limits for the total nitrogen application from 
animal manure are introduced at the farm level. These limits are fixed to 170 kg 
total N/ha on arable land and 210 kg total N/ha on grassland. Considering losses 
during storage (5.5%) and fertilisation (20%), this corresponds to a nitrogen 
production of 221 kg N/ha and 273 kg N/ha (HAPPE et al. 2001).
51 For extensive 
grassland, a maximum nitrogen uptake of 100 kg N/ha is assumed. 
4.5.2  Livestock production activities 
Intensive livestock production is the most important production branch in 
Hohenlohe. In recent years, turkey production has gained importance in addition 
to pig fattening and piglet production (ALLB ÖHRINGEN 2002). Unlike suckler 
cow production, the importance of dairy production has declined steadily over 
the past decade.  
Table 4-7 gives an overview of the livestock production activities considered in 
AgriPoliS. To reduce the computing time of simulations with AgriPoliS, farm 
production activities are aggregated as much as possible by considering only one 
activity per product type. This applies to livestock production activities as well 
as to arable and grassland production activities alike. Different performance and 
intensity levels for one product type are thus not considered. Details of each 
livestock production activity on annual revenue, variable costs, performance, 
and premium payments are given in appendix A.1. Gross margin is calculated as 
product prices given in Table 4-5 less variable costs.  
Dairy cows, suckler cows, and beef cattle require silage maize, intensive and 
extensive grassland as fodder base. Extensive grassland is exclusively used for 
grazing. Manure from livestock production is used as nitrogen fertiliser up to the 
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limits given in Table 4-6. Regarding dairy production, costs of replacement are 
included in the gross margin. Hence, it is assumed that all calves are sold.   













Fodder requirement  Nitrogen 
excretion 







 €/year  €/year  h/year kg/year  ha/year ha/year ha/year kg/year 
Sows   468  -  20.0  - -  -  -  30 
Fatt. pigs  57  -  2.1  - -  -  -  10 
Beef cattle  264  223  12.0  - 0.12  0.09  -  50 
Suckler cows  368  317  28.0  - -  0.33  0.54  50 
Dairy cows  1,380  -  52.0  5,700 0.17  0.34  -  100 
Turkeys
6) 7.15  -  0.134  - -  - -  1.4 
Sources: SAHRBACHER (2003) based on KLEINGARN (2002), REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN 
(2000), STMLF (2003), KTBL (2001), LEL (2003b). 
4.5.3 Additional  activities 
To cover short-term capacity bottlenecks or to reduce over-capacities, a number 
of additional activities are considered. These activities include hiring labour and 
offering farm-owned labour outside the farm, buying and selling milk quota, 
machinery lease from a private contractor, and animal manure import or export. 
Table 4-8 lists additional activities and their effect on farm factor capacities.  
It is assumed that a farm exporting excess manure pays the importing farm. 
However, the importing farm is assumed to cover the costs of transport and 
spreading. A farm short of machinery capacity can hire additional machinery 
capacity offered by a private contractor. Moreover, farms have the possibility to 
hire labour or offer family labour on a short-term per hour basis. In addition, or 
alternatively, labour contracts can also be made on a fixed basis. Regarding 
fixed contracts, one annual work unit (AWU) is assumed to correspond to 2000 
hours. To bridge liquidity shortages, farms can take up short-term credit at 8 % 
interest rate. Likewise, the savings interest rate on excess liquidity is 4 %.
52 To 
keep the model simple, milk quota is introduced as quota lease (cf. chapter 3).  
                                           
52   Since the model assumes no inflation, real average interest rates derived from the German 
Federal Bank (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 2003) are adjusted downwards by an assumed 
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Table 4-8:  Additional activities 














  € h  €  ha  kg  LU  kg 
Manure import (1 ha)  170  5  -  -0.5  221  -  - 
Manure export (1 ha)  -180  -  -  -  -221  -  - 
Machinery lease (1 ha)  -307  -  -  1  -  -  - 
Hire labour (1 h)  -12.3  1  -  -  -  -  - 
Offer family labour (1 h)  9.2  -1  -  -  -  -  - 
Hire 0.5 fix labour (h)
b) -12,300  1,000  -  -  -  -  - 
Offer 0.5 fix labour (h)
b) 9,715  -1,000  -  -  -  -  - 
Interest on short-term  
borrowed capital (1 €)  -0.08  -  1  -  -  -  - 
Savings interest (1 €)   0.04  -  -1  -  -  -  - 
Buy milk quota (1 kg)  -0.051  -  -  -  -  -  1 
Sell milk quota (1 kg)  0.046  -  -  -  -  -  -1 
Add livestock unit (1 LU)   -175  -  -  -  -  1  - 
Notes:   a) Costs have a negative sign; b) one year contract assumes labour trained in agriculture. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on SAHRBACHER (2003), KLEINGARN (2002), KELLERMANN (2003), 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2003), HAPPE et al. (2001). 
Specific measures of the agri-environmental programme MEKA (Marktentlas-
tungs- und Kulturlandschaftsausgleich) are not explicitly considered. Others 
have modelled their impact in detail (see e.g., KAZENWADEL 1999; BAUDOUX 
2000). However, in the past, the great majority of farms in Hohenlohe has taken 
part in one or more measures of this programme. Accordingly, as a proxy for 
participation in the programme, a maximum livestock density of 2.5 livestock 
units (LU) per hectare is introduced. In fact, a stocking density of 2.5 LU/ha is a 
prerequisite for taking part in the programme (ALLB BIBERACH 2002). If a 
farm's livestock density is above the threshold, the farm incurs a 'fine' of 175 € 
per additional livestock unit.
53  
4.6 Investments 
Farm accountancy data in general includes no information on livestock produc-
tion technologies, machinery endowments of farms, and the respective vintages 
of assets. To define investment options, data on the type, size, and vintage of 
investments were required. Based on expert information from local farmers and 
                                           
53   The fine was introduced somewhat artificially to offer the possibility to farm agents in the 
optimisation (see chapter 3) to exceed the threshold.   4.6  Investments  81 
the agricultural administration in Hohenlohe, a set of investment options typical 
for Hohenlohe is defined based on data from KTBL (2001, 2003) and ALLB 
ILSHOFEN (2001). The list of investment options, shown in Table 4-9, includes 
the most important production branches. For each production branch, different 
investment sizes are defined.  
In the context of AgriPoliS, the list serves two purposes. On the one hand, based 
on this list, the typical farms' endowment with production technology and ma-
chinery is defined, as no information on this is available from accountancy data. 
On the other hand, the list provides a catalogue of possible investments for fu-
ture re-investments or additional investments by farm agents during the simu-
lation of AgriPoliS. 
The capacity column shows the size of the respective investment options. For 
livestock production activities size corresponds to the number of places in a sta-
ble. As for machinery, this is introduced as a pool containing all machinery on a 
farm. Machinery capacity thus represents the total acreage that can be managed 
with the respective machinery investment is shown. For example, a farm can 
manage 85 ha of land with investment option 'Machinery 3'. The useful life of an 
investment option includes also equipment and facilities, even though the useful 
life of equipment and facilities is often shorter than that of animal housing. But, 
to keep things simple and limit the number of investment options, housing and 
equipment are not treated separate.
54 
Investment options of the same type differ with respect to capacity, investment 
costs, labour requirements, and technological standard. More specifically, larger 
investment options have advantages compared to smaller ones in that investment 
costs per unit and labour requirement per unit produced are lower (see chapter 
3).The labour saving effect of larger investments are calculated relative to what 
can be considered a typical technology in the reference year. For example, tech-
nology 'Sow housing 1' requires 2.5 hours per unit produced less than the typical 
technology in the reference year ('Sow housing 3'). Labour saving per unit pro-
duced together with technological advances in equipment defines the technical 
standard of livestock investment options. Based on this classification, larger in-
vestment objects are associated with a higher technical standard than smaller 
objects, resulting in efficiency gains by way of lower production costs.  
                                           
54  Considering that each investment option represents one integer activity in the mixed-integer 
optimisation problem, differentiating between animal housing and facilities would add an in-
crease computing time at least 23 columns. This would increase computing time significantly. 82  4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
Table 4-9:  Catalogue of investment options 












   €/unit  Unit  years h/unit   
1  Sow housing 1  Places  2,100  252  20  -2.50  High 
2  Sow housing 2  Places  2,200  170  20  -1.17  Moderate 
3  Sow housing 3*  Places  2,300  128  20  0.00  Low 
4  Sow housing 4  Places  2,500  64  20  0.78  Old 
5  Sow housing 5  Places  2,600  40  20  0.78  Old 
6  Fatt. pig sty 1  Places  350  1,000  20  -0.25  High 
7  Fatt. pig sty 2  Places  360  600  20  -0.13  Moderate 
8  Fatt. pig sty 3*  Places  420  400  20  0.00  Moderate 
9  Fatt. pig sty 4  Places  510  200  20  0.05  Low 
10  Fatt. pig sty 5  Places  560  100  20  0.05  Old 
11 Cattle  barn  1  Places  2,100  200  25  0.00  Moderate 
12 Cattle  barn  1  Places  2,400  100  25  0.00  Low 
13 Cattle  barn  1*  Places  2,600  40  25  0.00  Old 
14  Suckler cows 1  Places  790  40  25  0.00  Low 
15  Suckler cows 2*  Places  1,053  10  25  0.00  Old 
16  Turkey house 1  Places  54.20  15,000  20  -0.02  High 
17  Turkey house 2  Places  56.75  10,000  20  -0.01  Moderate 
18  Turkey house 3*  Places  57.78  5,000  20  0.00  Low 
19  Dairy barn 1  Places  3,680  480  25  -20.83  High 
20  Dairy barn 2  Places  3,780  240  25  -8.33  Moderate 
21  Dairy barn 3  Places  4,160  120  25  -1.67  Moderate 
22  Dairy barn 4*  Places  5,470  60  25  0.00  Low 
23  Dairy barn 5  Places  5,800  30  25  2.50  Old 
24 Machinery  1  ha  771  350  12  -6.36 
25 Machinery  2  ha  1,107  150  12  -3.64 
26 Machinery  3  ha  1,235  85  12  -1.82 
27 Machinery  4*  ha  1,302  55  12  0.00 
28 Machinery  5  ha  1,527  30  12  0.36 
29 Machinery  6  ha  2,107  15  12  0.55 
dependent 
on farm size 
and adjacent 
plots 
Notes:   a) typical technology in reference year is marked with an asterisk (e.g. 'Sow housing 3'); b) 
Defined relative to capacity of typical technology in reference year.  
Sources:  SAHRBACHER (2003) based on KLEINGARN (2002), KTBL (2001, 2003), ALLB ILSHOFEN 
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4.7 Initialising  AgriPoliS 
Figure 3-5 in chapter 3 showed the model dynamics of AgriPoliS. The figure 
distinguished between two model phases: the initialisation phase and the simu-
lation phase. One important step in the initialisation phase is to supply AgriPoliS 
with the type of data specified in this chapter. More specifically, farm agents, 
production activities, plots, and investments are initialised with the data col-
lected for Hohenlohe. Another step in the initialisation process of AgriPoliS is to 
individualise farm agents further.  
The initialisation phase is visualised in Figure 4-1 using the example of a hypo-
thetical region. To simplify things, the figure considers three exemplary typical 
farms. Of these, farm 1 (triangle) has a scaling factor of two, farm 2 (square) has 
a scaling factor of three, and farm 3 (circle) has a scaling factor of one. The scal-
ing factors sum up to the total number of farms n in the hypothetical region. The 
initialisation phase includes four steps: up-scaling, individualising farms with 
respect to managerial ability, individualising farms with respect to farm age and 
vintage of investments, and allocating farms in space. With each step, the het-
erogeneity of farm agents increases.  
Before the start of the actual simulation, a number of global model parameters 
need to be specified default values of which are listed in Table 4-10. They are 
called global, because they apply to all farms alike. Where possible, these pa-
rameters are based on available standard data sources (e.g., DEUTSCHE BUNDES-
BANK 2003, or KTBL). Due to a lack of specific data, some parameter values 
could only be based upon expert knowledge, reasoning, and careful estimation. 
This applies in particular to the specification of managerial ability, technological 
change, and the bid adjustment. In the next chapter a set of simulation experi-
ments are carried out that specifically explore the impact of these parameters on 
simulation results. These simulation experiments help in deciding whether the 
assumptions about parameter values are reasonable or not. 84  4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
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Source: Own  figure. 
The way in which technological change is introduced was mentioned several 
times in this and previous chapters. According to Table 4-9 and Table 4-10, a 
high, moderate, and low technological standard of an investment object is asso-
ciated with cost savings of 1.5%, 1.25%, and 1% respectively.    4.7  Initialising AgriPoliS  85 
Table 4-10: Default values of global parameters 
Description Notation
a) Parameter  value 
Cost saving effect due to technological standard (% of 




High   1.5% 
Moderate   1.25% 
Low   1% 
Managerial ability (% of standard variable costs) 
c)     
High managerial ability   mmin  95% 
Low managerial ability  mmax  105% 
Interest rate level      
Long-term borrowed capital   ibc 5.5% 
Short-term borrowed capital  ibcs 8% 
Equity capital interest   iec 4% 
Overhead costs (administration, taxes, professional asso-
ciation etc.) plus current upkeep  MC + OV  150 €/ha 
Bid adjustment 
d)  β   0.75 
Surcharge on bid for adjacent plots  ∂   10 €/plot 
Plot size    2.5 ha 
Farm is handed over to next generation    every 25 periods 
Minimum withdrawal of farm household labour unit   WDmin  15,300 €/AWU 
Opportunity cost increase when generation change    15% 
Equity finance share  v  0.5 
Milk quota price adjustment    2% 
Labour hours of annual work unit (AWU)  h  2,000 
Max. permissible stocking density (LU/ha) in region    2.5 LU/ha 
Annual transport costs e)  TC  50 €/km 
Notes:   a) For abbreviations see Table 3.1; b) Cost saving due to investment differentiated by size of 
investment; c) Heterogeneity of farms regarding cost structure as deviation from average 
(value < (>) 100% corresponds to low (high) cost producer); d) Factor determining the share 
of bid which is actually paid as rent for a plot (see chapter 3); e) based on 10 rides from a 
farmstead to plot. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2003), KTBL (2001), MLR (2002), 
BALMANN (1995), KTBL (2003), ALLB BIBERACH (2002). 
On the subject of managerial ability, it is assumed that total production costs of 
farms with high managerial ability and farms with low managerial ability differ 
by at most 10%. In AgriPoliS it is assumed that managerial ability remains con-
stant throughout the entire simulation. This means, farm agents cannot improve 
their ability of managing the farm. Furthermore, managerial ability is also not 
related to farm size – although this may make a difference in reality. One way to 
compensate for low managerial ability and realise additional cost savings is to 
invest in new labour-saving technology.  86  4  Adapting AgriPoliS to the region Hohenlohe 
4.8 Further  assumptions 
In the dynamic setting of AgriPoliS, the following assumptions are particularly 
relevant. Technological change is assumed to affect the model exclusively 
through the technical standard of investment options, which in return affects 
production costs (see chapter 3). In fact, lower production costs in arable pro-
duction could equally be attributed to yield increases through breeding progress 
instead of better machinery technology. In the current version of AgriPoliS this 
would be difficult, though, because arable production activities are modelled in 
a rather aggregate way that does not differentiate between varieties and inten-
sities. Therefore, yields are assumed to remain constant throughout the entire 
simulation.  
Because of the relatively small size of the region and the family farm-dominated 
structure, it can be expected that farms are price takers.
55 Moreover, in AgriPo-
liS farm agents are price takers and therefore face the same product prices. With 
regard to Hohenlohe, prices therefore do not change in response to quantities 
produced. This implies that price flexibility  t i b , , introduced in equation 3-14 in 
chapter 3, is zero. Nevertheless, for certain products a low annual price increase 
or price decrease was introduced to reflect pressure on prices that could be ob-
served in reality. Price trends assumed in AgriPoliS are shown in Table 4-11.  
Table 4-11: Assumed price increase/decrease 
Product/variable/activity  Annual price increase/decrease 
Labour (fix and variable)   + 0.50 % 
Machinery lease  + 0.20 % 
Cereals, sugar beet, silage maize, protein plants  - 0.20 % 
Fattening pigs, piglets  - 0.06 % 
Turkey  - 0.06 % 
Source:   Own calculations. 
There is no downward price trend for milk because the milk premium granted 
under Agenda 2000 from the year 2004 onwards is not considered explicitly.  
                                           
55   This assumption should be reconsidered if large scale farms with a high production share 
are concerned, as these farms are more in the position to negotiate about prices of inputs 
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4.9 Definition  of  the  reference scenario 
The analysis and evaluation of the various policy scenarios in part III of this the-
sis is accomplished by comparing them to a reference scenario. The initial con-
ditions of the reference scenario are given by the data and parameters presented 
in this chapter. Agenda 2000 as implemented at the end of 2002 defines the pol-
icy environment. Agenda policies implemented after 2002 are not considered. 
After the start of the simulation, no further changes are made to the reference 
scenario. Hence, during simulation run-time of the reference scenario – except 
for the assumed price changes – are endogenous to the system.  
In chapter 2, the difficult issue of validating agent-based models and complex 
system models in general was addressed. The argument was put forward that an 
exact validation of such a model is a difficult and challenging undertaking. 
Rather, with regard to these models there has been a shift away from statistical 
tests toward more qualitative and subjective tests, which are mainly tests of the 
model's structure and model behaviour tests (KWAŚNICKI 1999). A first attempt 
to testing the model's structure is presented briefly in the following. Testing 
model behaviour will be the topic of chapter 5. 
In the context of this thesis, a test of the model's structure is understood in a way 
that the model should be able to reproduce some developments of indicators ob-
served in the real world. Although no formal back-casting of a historical refer-
ence period is undertaken, selected key structural development indicators ob-
tained from simulation runs can still be compared.
56 In particular, the annual rate 
of farms leaving the sector as well as the change in average farm size can be 
compared to past developments 'in the real world'. Table 4-12 compares results 
of the initial simulation period (optimised initial situation) with real data.  
In the optimised initial situation, nearly all of the land is farmed, only 5% of the 
grassland was not farmed. This is also reflected in the significantly lower num-
ber of cattle in the region. If farm organisation is optimised, merely 12% of the 
actual number of beef cattle is produced. This significant deviation suggests two 
things. On the one hand, it suggests that gross margins from beef production are 
too low to be profitable despite of direct payments coupled to the production of 
beef. 
                                           
56   SAHRBACHER (2003) undertakes a first, limited, attempt at replicating the structural de-
velopment of a reference period. However, a formal and detailed back-casting would have 
been a very challenging task to do, as it would have gone beyond the financial and time 
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Table 4-12: Comparison of optimised initial situation with region 
   Region  based 
on typical 
farms 
Optimised initial  
situation AgriPoliS 
Fit 
Farms Number  2,855  2,850  99.82% 
Total area  ha  73,585  73,225  99.51% 
Arable land  ha  59,035  58,737  99.50% 
Grassland ha  14,555  13,646  93.75% 
Fattening pigs  Number  106,075  101,543  95.73% 
Sows Number  104,450  126,644  121.25% 
Dairy cows  Number  17,562  16,580  94.41% 
Beef cattle  Number  48,006  6,075  12.65% 
Turkeys Number  461,227  425,000  92.15% 
Source:   STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG (2004), MLR (2002). 
On the other hand, since AgriPoliS explicitly allows farm household labour to 
be used off-farm, total farm household income of farms producing beef cattle 
was higher if labour was used outside the farm, even at the expense of leaving 
beef production facilities unused. Regarding the remaining livestock production 
activities, the deviations shown in Table 4-12 indicate that some production ca-
pacities were not fully used. Structural change in the reference scenario is very 
similar to real structural change observed in the past (Table 4-13).
57  






  1981 – 2001  20 time periods 
Average farm size   6.4 %  6.37% 
Number of farms  -7%  - 6% 
Note:  a) Statistical data is only issued every two years. 
Sources: STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG (2004), MLR (2002). 
In reality, every two years or time periods, average farm size increased by 6.4 % 
and 6.37%, respectively. Change with respect to the total number of farms was 
stronger for the whole of Baden-Württemberg than in AgriPoliS. This is because 
the data for Baden-Württemberg includes all farms greater 1 ha. AgriPoliS only 
considers farms with at least 10 ha of land. In the past, change has been particu-
larly strong in the group of small farms with less than 10 ha of land (STATISTISCHES 
                                           
57   A further possible indicator would be the volume of land transferred. However, this indi-
cator proves to be very unreliable as only a fraction of actual land transfers are reported to 
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LANDESAMT  BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG 2004). Moreover, compared to other re-
gions in Baden-Württemberg (e.g. Black Forest), Hohenlohe's farm structure is 





5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
5.1 Introduction 
At the end of chapter 4, it was shown that a simulation of the reference scenario 
with AgriPoliS led to outcomes that were in fact similar to some key indicators' 
developments in Hohenlohe. In chapter 4, the comparison of model results with 
reality was referred to as a test of the model's structure. In this chapter, three 
simulation experiments are carried out to elucidate different facets of AgriPoliS' 
behaviour when applied to the Hohenlohe data set described in the previous 
chapter. The goal of the chapter is to gain insights into the simulation behaviour 
of AgriPoliS in the reference scenario. Such insights relate to the sensitivity of 
the model to parameter changes, the identification of important factors (parame-
ters) and their interactions, and to finding a robust configuration (e.g. framework 
conditions, policies).  
AgriPoliS maps some key components of the agricultural structure in 
Hohenlohe, but as with any model, it cannot capture the complexity of the agri-
cultural system of Hohenlohe in full extent. Inevitably, guesses and assumptions 
about the true nature of the region (the region will also be referred to as the tar-
get system) have to be made and implemented into AgriPoliS. In this sense, the 
particular focus of this chapter is on the behaviour of AgriPoliS when frame-
work conditions change. In AgriPoliS, framework conditions refer to all parame-
ters that are not directly affected by policy measures such as interest rates, 
managerial ability assumptions, region size, labour costs, and technical change 
assumptions. Default values were already shown in Table 4-10 in chapter 4. The 
reason behind the simulation experiments presented here is to devise ways of 
revealing how the target system would behave if the guesses and assumptions 
regarding framework conditions were correct. 
An important step in simulation modelling is sensitivity analysis which can be 
thought of as the systematic investigation of the reaction of a simulation model 
to (extreme) values of the model's input or drastic changes of the model's struc-
ture (KLEIJNEN 1999). Sensitivity analysis can be used to determine whether 
simulation output changes significantly, when one or more inputs are changed 92  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
(LAW and KELTON 1991). Sensitivity analysis is one form of validation as the 
analysis shows whether input factors have effects that agree with prior knowl-
edge about the system. With respect to simulation models of complex systems, 
the importance of validation and therefore sensitivity analysis is emphasised, for 
example, by MANSON (2002), who discusses validation and verification of 
agent-based systems, or LEMPERT et al. (1996), who apply parameter variation 
strategies to derive robust climate change policies. 
With complex simulation models, sensitivity analysis often occurs in an un-
structured way by varying some parameters, but not doing so systematically 
(KLEIJNEN et al. 2003). A widely used approach in sensitivity analysis is to vary 
one parameter at a time, while leaving all other parameter values constant. How-
ever, as agent-based systems are meant to act as complex systems, the model is 
often not amenable to traditional testing methods that rely on changing only one 
input parameter at a time (Manson 2002). The 'one-at-a-time' approach leaves 
out possible interactions between input parameters, i.e. whether the effect of one 
factor depends on the level of one or more parameters. Hence, the 'one-at-a-time' 
approach can be a too crude simplification of the underlying model (VONK 
NOORDEGRAAF et al. 2002). The statistical techniques of Design of Experiments 
(DOE) and metamodelling provide a way to carry out simulation experiments 
systematically that takes account of parameter interactions (e.g., BOX et al. 
1978; KLEIJNEN and VAN GROENENDAAL 1992).  
In this chapter, first a straightforward and textbook-like DOE will be applied to 
study results from simulations of the reference scenario (section 5.2). Section 
5.3 gives an example of the sensitivity of selected output variables of AgriPoliS 
in response to random model initialisations. Finally, in section 5.4 the impact of 
heterogeneous managerial ability on structural development will be analysed. At 
the centre of this particular investigation is a more disaggregated analysis of the 
impact of different assumptions about managerial ability with respect to groups 
of farms. 
5.2  Design of experiments  
Design of experiments provides a way to investigate some aspects of a simula-
tion model systematically and to bring statistical aspects into the analysis of re-
sults. It represents a way to understand relationships between some parameters 
in the model. DOE originates from real world experimentation, but the tech-
niques can be transferred to experiments with artificial computer worlds. KLEIJNEN 
et al. (2003) have found DOE to be a useful technique also in the context of   5.2  Design of experiments  93 
agent-based models because it can uncover details about model behaviour, help 
to identify the relative importance of inputs, provide a common basis for dis-
cussing simulation results, and help to identify problems in the programme 
logic. SANCHEZ and LUCAS (2002), on the other hand, argue that there are quite 
some differences between assumptions made conventionally in DOE and agent-
based modelling. For example, traditional DOE assumptions involve only one 
response variable, whereas an agent-based model such as AgriPoliS includes 
many performance measures of interest. In the view of Sanchez and Lucas, a 
straightforward application of DOE to agent-based models may therefore not 
always be appropriate. Nevertheless, an application of DOE should provide at 
least some information about model behaviour that would not be known without 
DOE. 
In DOE terminology, model input parameters, variables and structural assump-
tions are called factors, and model output measures are referred to as responses. 
Factors can be either quantitative or qualitative in nature. The choice of factors 
depends primarily on the goal of the experiment.
58 Suppose that there are k (k>2) 
factors in the model and that each factor takes two factor levels. The simplest 
way to measure the effect of a particular factor would be to fix the level of all 
other k-1 factors and simulate for varying levels of the remaining factor. This 
procedure of varying only one factor at a time (OAT) is rather inefficient as it 
allows identifying only main effects (KLEIJNEN and VAN GROENENDAAL 1992); 
it is not possible to identify interactions between factors. A more efficient way 
that also allows computing interaction effects is what is called full factorial de-
sign. Assuming that each factor takes two levels, a full factorial design involves 
k n 2 =  factor setting combinations, or scenarios. This procedure is, however, 
only useful for a small number of factors as the number of runs increases expo-
nentially with the number of factors and factor levels considered. In such case, 
so-called fractional factorial designs are more efficient to use.
59 
After simulating the 2
k possible parameter constellations, it is common to ana-
lyse simulation results by applying a regression model. In simulation terminol-
ogy, the regression model is also called a metamodel. A metamodel establishes a 
functional relationship between sensitivity and various factors. Often, a meta-
model is defined as a regression model where the independent variables are factor 
                                           
58   Key references for this section are LAW and KELTON (1991), VONK NOORDEGRAAF et al. 
(2002), BOX et al. (1978) and KLEIJNEN and VAN GROENENDAAL (1992).  
59   See LAW and KELTON (1991), KLEIJNEN and VAN GROENENDAAL (1992), and BOX et al. 
(1978) for more information on fractional factorial designs. 94  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
levels and the dependent variable is the simulation response. Assuming white 
noise, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) yields the best estimates (best linear unbi-
ased estimates) of the regression model. An important step in metamodelling is 
the validation of the metamodel, i.e. determining the degree to which the meta-
model represents the underlying simulation model correctly. This can be done 
either by running additional simulation scenarios and comparing results with 
metamodel predictions, or by analysing residuals.  
5.2.1 Experimental  design and data output 
5.2.1.1 Experimental  design 
Five factors are selected for the DOE analysis of the reference scenario.
60 The 
factors determine the framework conditions of production. In particular, they 
concern the following parameters: 
- Technological change (TC), 
- Interest rate levels (I),  
- Managerial ability across farms (MF), 
- Proportion of the shadow price of land which is given as a bid (RAC), 
- Size of the region simulated (RS). 
Interest rates were chosen because they affect AgriPoliS at many instances (see 
chapter 3), e.g., investment, opportunity cost calculations. It was mentioned in 
chapter 4 that default parameter values for technological change, managerial 
ability, and the bid adjustment (RAC) could only be based on reasoning and ex-
pert knowledge. Because of this, it is interesting to explore the impact of these 
parameters on simulation results. Besides factors TC, MF, and RAC, a further 
'critical' factor is the size of the region. The parameter is critical because a simu-
lation of the full region, i.e. with initially 2800 farms reaches limits with respect 
to computing time and data management capacities.
61 Output files including data 
                                           
60   As the previous chapter indicated, AgriPoliS contains more than just five factors. How-
ever, the particular interest of this chapter was to study the behaviour of AgriPoliS in re-
sponse to different framework conditions, which were expected to have strong impact on 
results. Because of this, key factors determining framework conditions were included in 
the experimental design. Admittedly, this is a rather subjective selection of factors, and it 
is acknowledged that possibly strong interactions between the selected factors and factors 
not considered here are neglected. 
61   In that case, simulating all 2800 farms over 25 time periods requires about 10 hours of 
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on individual farms easily reach a size that does not allow for data analysis with 
standard software packages. One alternative to simulating the full region is to 
simulate only a fraction of the region while preserving the farm structure of the 
full region. This can be achieved by dividing the number of farm agents accord-
ing to the scaling value by a certain factor. Selected factor settings are presented 
in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1:  Factors in the experimental design of the reference scenario 




Description  -1 (low)  +1 (high) 
TC  Technological change: cost saving fk,i 
a)    
 High  0%  2% 
 Moderate  0%  1.5% 
 Low  0%  1% 
MF  Heterogeneity in managerial ability 
b)    
  Lower boundary (mmin) 100%  90% 
 Upper  boundary (mmax) 100%  110% 
I  Interest rate level      
  Long-term borrowed capital (ibc) 0%  7% 
  Short-term borrowed capital (ibcs) 0%  10% 
  Equity capital interest (iec) 0%  6% 
RAC  Bid adjustment (β ) 
c)  0.65 0.85 
RS  Region size (in % of full region)  10%  100% 
Policy setting  Agenda 2000 with modest price trend 
Notes:   a) Cost saving due to investment differentiated by size of investment; b) Heterogeneity of 
farms regarding cost structure as deviation from average (value < (>) 100% corresponds to 
low (high) cost producer); c) Factor determining the share of bid which is actually paid as 
rent for a plot (see chapter 3) 
Source:   Own figures based on Table 4-10. 
All selected factors are quantitative in nature. Two out of five factors represent 
parameter bundles (I, TC). These factors as well as factors RS, and RAC enter 
AgriPoliS as single values. The factor MF (managerial ability) enters AgriPoliS 
as limits of a rectangular probability distribution. From this distribution, values 
are assigned to each farm agent at the beginning of the simulation. All initialised 
factor levels are assumed to remain constant during the following simulation 
experiments. For each factor, a low and high level was defined, reflecting 
                                           
computing time on a 2.8 MHz Intel Pentium 4 processor. 96  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
uncertainty about these factors in real life. The low and high values were based 
on expert opinion, statistical data and plausibility arguments. Obviously, the low 
interest rates, i.e. zero interest rates, is less realistic, if the goal is to set factor 
settings corresponding to what could happen in reality. But, it was chosen in or-
der to examine how AgriPoliS behaves at the extreme of zero interest rates. 
These factor levels determine the relevant experimental framework for the DOE 
analysis. Factors not included in the DOE are assumed to remain fixed during 
the simulations. Table 5-2 presents the complete design matrix for the 2
5 full 
factorial design. The design requires 32 design points or scenarios. To compare 
factor effects by relative importance, factor levels were set at "-" (low value) and 
"+" (high value) (LAW and KELTON 1991). 
5.2.1.2 Data  output 
Although AgriPoliS produces a multitude of responses, only one response vari-
able, namely average economic land rent per hectare in the region, is chosen for 
analysis.
62,63 Economic land rent is a central indicator for the economic perform-
ance of farms, and in particular for the efficiency of farming in the region (see 
chapter 6 and BALMANN 1995) as it provides information about allocation of 
production factors in the region. As AgriPoliS includes some stochastic ele-
ments, a tactical issue involves the number of replications for each simulation 
scenario. Earlier trials with the model as well as the analysis presented in section 
5.3 indicated that results varied only within a comparatively small range be-
tween initialisations, although this cannot be regarded as a 'fix rule'. To draw 
statistically valid conclusions one would have to run a large number of repeated 
simulations. Furthermore, none of the many simulation experiments carried out 
in previous studies (e.g., BALMANN 1997; BALMANN et al. 2002; HAPPE and 
BALMANN 2002) produced results showing implausible irregularities between 
initialisations. Since computing time is the limiting factor, all scenarios are rep-
licated only twice, which is a crude but necessary simplification.
64  
                                           
62   To calculate the economic land rent, long-term opportunity costs of labour are valued at 
the comparative salary of an industrial worker. In this chapter, a constant value of 22,400 
€ per AWU is assumed throughout all simulation periods are assumed. 
63   In the following the word 'average' will be dropped. For a definition of economic land 
rent see chapter 6, section 6.2. 
64   Scenarios 17 through 32 involve simulations of the full region. A single run lasts for 
about 10 hours on a 2.8 GHz Pentium IV PC. Running all 32 scenarios took about a week 
on two PCs.   5.2  Design of experiments  97 
Table 5-2:  Design matrix for the 2
n (n=5) full factorial design  
Scenario Factors 
 TC  MF  I  RAC  RS 
1 -  -  -  -  - 
2 +  -  -  -  - 
3  -  + - - - 
4  + + - - - 
5 -  -  +  -  - 
6 +  -  +  -  - 
7  -  + + - - 
8  +  + + - - 
9 -  -  -  +  - 
10 +  -  -  +  - 
11 -  +  -  +  - 
12 +  +  -  +  - 
13 -  -  +  +  - 
14 +  -  +  +  - 
15 -  +  +  +  - 
16 +  +  +  +  - 
17 -  -  -  -  + 
18 +  -  -  -  + 
19  -  + - -  + 
20  + + - -  + 
21 -  -  +  -  + 
22 +  -  +  -  + 
23  -  + + - + 
24  +  + + - + 
25 -  -  -  +  + 
26 +  -  -  +  + 
27 -  +  -  +  + 
28 +  +  -  +  + 
29 -  -  +  +  + 
30 +  -  +  +  + 
31 -  +  +  +  + 
32 +  +  +  +  + 
Notes:  Low (-), and high (+) values. 
Each simulation scenario in the DOE analysis is simulated for 25 time periods. 
Simulation output consists of a panel data set of indicators for each individual 
farm in each time period and an aggregate data set for the whole region in each 
time period. Since the following analysis uses average economic land rent as the 
response variable, altogether 1600 observations could potentially be considered 
in the analysis (25 time periods times 32 scenarios times two replications). 98  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
5.2.1.3  Analysis of results and definition of the metamodel 
A range of graphical techniques is applied to analyse simulation output of the 
DOE specification given in Table 5-2. In addition to the graphical analysis of 
results, a metamodel is defined to obtain some information about the statistical 
significance of factor effects, and in particular factor interactions. The meta-
model is specified as an additive polynomial  






i h i h hi h h x x x y
11 0 ε β β β   (5.1) 
with the k factors as independent variables, where  y is the simulation response. 
The intercept is  0 β ,  h β is the main effect of factor h,  hi β  are two-factor interac-
tion effects between factors h and i. The x's denote settings of factor scenario n, 
and finally there is an error term ε . Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the 
metamodel was fitted to data from the simulation experiment. To include only 
significant factors in the estimation, a stepwise procedure is chosen that ex-
cludes all factors with p ≤ 0.05. The fit of the model is evaluated by the adjusted 
2 R  and an analysis of residuals.  
5.2.2 Results 
5.2.2.1 Graphical  analysis 
A plot of the response variable average economic land rent (mean of two repli-
cations) against all 32 scenarios and time periods shows some evidence for 
structure in the data (Figure 5-1). The figure has to be read from bottom to top 
for each scenario as this describes the development of economic land rent over 
time. The upwards pointing arrow shows the direction in which the simulation 
response develops over 25 simulation periods, i.e. each column contains 50 
boxes (2 replications x 25 periods).    5.2  Design of experiments  99 
Figure 5-1: Scatter plot of individual and mean simulation response of two rep-


















































Source:   Own figure. 
In particular, three aspects can be identified: 
-  There is a strong and consistent pairing of the response variable: four high 
responses, followed by four low responses. Looking at the design matrix in 
Table 5-2, this pattern follows the level changes of factor I, which is the 
overall interest rate level. Higher interest rates therefore cause a decrease in 
economic land rent. This corresponds to what could have been expected to 
happen, namely that at zero interest rates economic land rent is high because 
of no capital costs.  
-  Within each block of four scenarios, one can observe that at high interest 
rates (e.g. scenarios 5 through 8) neither heterogeneous managerial ability 
nor technical change by themselves lead to a strong increase in economic 
land rent. But, if both factors are at their "+" level, then the effect is large. In 
other words, heterogeneous managerial ability together with higher techno-
logical change leads to a substantial increase in economic land rent. The 
same line of reasoning holds for the low interest rate level (e.g. scenarios 1 
through 4). However, if interest rates are low, heterogeneous managerial 100  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
ability taken on its own also increase economic land rent. Hence, there ap-
pears to be some interaction between factors TC, MF, and I. 
-  Within each block of 16 scenarios (factor level change of RS), it shows that 
the spread of results decreases if the region size is large and interest rates 
low. But, at high interest rates, there is hardly any difference between a 
small and a large region. 
The following figures shall retrieve some more information on the relative im-
portance of individual factors. Already in Figure 5-1, it could be seen that there 
are clear differences in results between factor level combinations. Figure 5-2 
shows a so-called mean plot (see NIST/SEMATECH 2003) which represents a 
simple way to identify important factors. The vertical axis shows the mean re-
sponse for a given setting ("-" or "+") of a factor calculated across all scenarios, 
for each of k factors. The horizontal axis shows the k factors with two factor set-
tings. For example, mean economic land rent across all scenarios with factor set-
ting TC"-" is approximately 400 €/ha. This increases to about 680 €/ha if techno-
logical change is higher. In view of that, the difference between mean responses 
when moving from the "-" setting to the "+" setting of a factor is most obvious 
for factor I, followed by factors TC and MF.  











































Source:   Own figure.   5.2  Design of experiments  101 
Figure 5-3 gives some additional information on factor importance.
65 A factor is 
considered important if it leads to a significant shift in either the location or the 
change in variation (spread) of the response variable as one goes from the "-" 
setting to the "+" setting of the factor. On the one hand, a large shift with only 
little overlap in the body of the data between the "-" and the "+" setting (such as 
for factor I) would imply that the factor is important with respect to location. On 
the other hand, a small shift with much overlap would imply that the factor is 
not important.  
Accordingly, Figure 5-3 shows a large difference between the degree of overlap 
between factors TC, MF, I, on the one hand, and factors RAC and RS, on the 
other. These latter factors do not seem important because they lead to no consid-
erable shift in location or variation of the response variable. Using the overlap 
criterion, factor I is the most important factor, followed by TC and MF. 
Figure 5-3: Main effects scatter plot  
 
Source:   Own figure. 
                                           
65   See NIST/SEMATECH (2003) for an in-depth discussion of graphical analysis of DOE 
simulation results. The plots were generated using the free software DATAPLOT.  
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Finally, the block plot shown in Figure 5-4 wraps up the graphical analysis of 
effects. In addition to scatter and mean plots, block plots are useful to establish 
the robustness of main effects, and to determine factor interactions. The vertical 
axis shows the response variable, average economic land rent. The horizontal 
axis of each sub-plot shows all 2
k-1 possible factor combinations of the (k-1) non-
primary factors ('robustness' factors). For example, for the block plot focussing 
on primary factor I, the horizontal axis consists of all 2
5-1=16 combinations of 
factors MF, I, RAC, and RS. To read the figure correctly it is important to note 
that a block's height determines factor importance.  
Figure 5-4: Block plot of main and interaction effects 
 
Source:   Own figure. 
Hence, factor I is most important because all bar heights in plot 3 (target factor 
I) are greater than bar heights in all other plots. Also, bar heights in plots 1 and 2 
(target factors TC and MF) are slightly greater than bar heights in plots 4 and 5 
(target factors RAC and RS), indicating that factors TC and MF are more important   5.2  Design of experiments  103 
than factors RAC and RS. A clear ranking of factor importance is not possible, 
though. Plot 3 (target factor I) has the consistently largest block heights along 
with a consistent arrangement of within-block +'s and –'s. This indicates that 
factor I also was the most robust factor of all five factors considered. Factors TC 
and MF were not robust across the whole range of factor variations, but robust 
across variations of factors RAC and RS. 
5.2.2.2 Metamodel  analysis 
To derive some statistical conclusions about factor effects, the linear regression 
metamodel defined in equation (5.1) is applied in which the average economic 
land rent of 25 simulation periods is regressed on factor level settings and two-
factor interactions. As Figure 5-1 showed, the means display differences be-
tween scenarios quite well. Because each simulation scenario is replicated twice, 
altogether 64 data points enter the regression analysis. 
Results are presented in Table 5-3, which only lists factors significant at the 1% 
level. Accordingly, three out of five factors are highly significant at p<0.01 (I, 
TC, and MF).  
Table 5-3:  Factor effects based on OLS regression
66  







Constant 682.410    12.781  0.000  53.393 
I   -773.819  -0.884  8.073  0.000  -95.730 
TC 277.290  0.317  8.073  0.000  34.304 
MF 203.521  0.232  8.073  0.000  25.178 
TC x I  -168.267  -0.192  8.073  0.000  -20.816 
TC x MF  127.144  0.145  8.073  0.000  15.729 
I x RS  -19.275  -0.022  8.073  0.021  -2.385 
RAC 18.353  0.021  8.073  0.027 2.270 
MF x RS  16.694  0.019  8.073  0.044  2.065 
RS 16.265  0.019  8.073  0.049  2.012 
adj. R
2 0.995  N=64       
Note:  The dependent variable is the average economic land rent across all periods. 
Source:   Own estimation. 
                                           
66   The standard errors on estimates are the same for all independent variables except for the 
intercept. The reason for this is that the model was estimated for a full-factorial design in 
which 50% of the observations for each factor had a high and a low value. If a fractional 
factorial design was estimated, standard errors would differ. 104  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
The estimates reproduce what already could be seen in the graphical analysis 
when changing a factor from its "-" to its "+" setting. In other words, a factor 
level change of factors I, TC, and MF significantly change the development of 
economic land rent. The regression model appears to account for almost all the 
variability in the response, achieving an adjusted R
2=0.995. The results under-
line the strong effect of factor I. As was expected already from the analysis of 
Figure 5-1, factors TC, MF, and I, and interactions between these factors are 
most important. Results also support the finding that these factors are more im-
portant than, for example, the size of the region if economic land rent is taken as 
the response variable. To further test the validity of the metamodel, regression 
residuals are analysed. Figure 5-5 (a) shows studentitised deleted residuals plot-
ted versus standardised predicted values of cumulative economic land rent (cf. 
SPSS 1999).  
Figure 5-5: Residual plots. (a) Scatter plot of studentitised deleted residuals 
versus standardised predicted values; (b) Q-Q normal probability plot  
(a) 
Standardised predicted value
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Source:   Own figure.   5.2  Design of experiments  105 
Approximately four out of 64 data points lie outside the interval between -2 and 
+2 indicating that the model could be accepted on the grounds of this plot (see 
SPSS 1999). The normal probability plot in Figure 5-5 (b) shows that the distri-
bution of residuals deviated in parts from a normal distribution underlying the 
metamodel. Accordingly, results of the metamodel have to be treated with care. 
At most, they point out a general direction. The results on the other hand do not 
provide strong enough evidence to reject the model as a whole, particularly, 
since results are supported clearly by the graphical analysis. 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Although the selection of factors is somewhat arbitrary and based upon reason-
ing, the size of the impact of the significant factors shows that a deeper analysis 
is indeed meaningful, in particular with respect to the identification of factor in-
teraction effects. The applied methodology and the metamodel provide a more 
systematic analysis of results of complex simulation models. When summarising 
the results, it becomes clear that interest rates, technical change and managerial 
ability influence average economic land rent the most. The size of the region has 
a much lower impact on economic land rent than expected beforehand. Other 
analyses in which farm incomes, rental prices, and farm size were taken as re-
sponse variables confirm this. Due to limited space, these results are not re-
ported here. In addition, factor RAC has no significant impact on results.  
A problem of DOE is that no defined rules for appropriate factor level settings 
are given. Because of this, the importance of factors is partly based on what is 
defined in the experimental setup. In the extreme, if a narrow range is imposed 
on an important factor, but a wide range on an unimportant factor, then the latter 
could turn out to be more important than the former (VONK NOORDEGRAAF et al. 
2002). Therefore, the fact that interest rates had such an immense influence on 
model outcomes could partly be explained by the fact that a wide range for the 
parameter setting was assumed. However, the wide range imposed on factor RS 
did not lead to an overestimation of the effect of region size. Nevertheless, the 
procedure presented here reveals some information about the importance and 
interactions of factors that would not have become as apparent if other designs 
such as varying only one factor at a time had been chosen. 106  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
5.3  Impact of random initialisations 
5.3.1 Experimental  design and data output 
The next set of experiments observes the behaviour of AgriPoliS in response to 
varying initial conditions. Regional averages of three response variables are ana-
lysed: economic land rent, farm size, and investment expenditure. Even though 
for the most part, AgriPoliS is a deterministic model, there are four instances of 
randomness: farm agent age, asset vintage, managerial ability (see section 5.2.1 
above), and the spatial arrangement of farmsteads in the region, all of which are 
set at the outset of the model. To test the sensitivity of AgriPoliS to different 
random initialisations, 20 independent simulation runs were carried out. The ex-
perimental setup assumes the default parameter values listed in chapter 4.  
5.3.2 Results 
Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7 summarise results of 20 models runs of 25 periods 
each. The figures show 95% confidence intervals indicating the range that 95% 
of model runs lie within.  
Figure 5-6: Evolution of the average economic land rent and 95% confidence 
intervals for 20 simulation runs of 25 periods  
period




































Source:   Own figure.   5.3  Impact of random initialisations  107 
Figure 5-7: Evolution of average farm size and 95% confidence intervals for 20 
simulation runs of 25 periods 
period

























Source:   Own figure. 
On average, the agricultural structure in the region gradually changes towards a 
larger average farm size and higher average economic land rent. In each figure, 
the vertical axis represents the average economic land rent per ha in the region. 
Whiskers are upper and lower boundaries of the confidence interval.  
The figures show a similar pattern in that the spread of results increase over 
time. Confidence intervals are largest after about 20 periods. One reason for this 
is the investment-specific pattern that can be observed in the simulations (Figure 
5-8). Accordingly, in the first period and period 20 investment expenditure is 
particularly high. The investment boost in the first period can be explained by 
the fact that in this period farm agents optimise their respective organisations 
subject to the parameter values specified for Hohenlohe. It corresponds to the 
optimised initial situation mentioned in section 4.8 of chapter 4. The second up-
swing after 20 periods consists of investments replacing assets purchased 20 pe-
riods before, and net investments which account for the larger part of total in-
vestment expenditure in period 20. Why after 20 periods? The reason is twofold. 
On the one hand, the majority of investments are assumed to have a useful life 
of 20 periods (see Table 4-9 in chapter 4). On the other hand, investment costs 
are sunk costs, meaning that, once an investment is made, its opportunity costs 
are zero such that the fixed asset is irrelevant for further decision making. This, 
first of all, prevents some farms from liquidating fixed assets such as buildings 108  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
at an earlier stage. These farms continue farming at least until the useful life of 
the respective assets is reached in spite of relatively high opportunity costs for 
labour and land. 
Figure 5-8: Time evolution of expenditure on new investments 
period










































Source:   Own figure. 
5.3.3 Discussion 
Although this analysis only presented a very limited analysis of the effect of ran-
dom initialisations, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, in the simula-
tions carried out for this section, different random initialisations show to have 
only limited influence on results, and in particular on confidence intervals. The 
size of confidence intervals increase over time, i.e., effect of random ini-
tialisations transfers to later periods, but not to a large extent. Nevertheless, this 
has consequences, if, for example, results from different policy simulations are 
to be compared. Furthermore, the analysis does not allow drawing general con-
clusions for the behaviour of AgriPoliS in response to different initialisations 
under different parameter settings. This can only be tested if a large number of 
replications for different parameter constellations were carried out. In view of 
the time spent on the DOE analysis, the computational limits of a large number 
of repetitions, particularly of simulations with RS = 100%, are obvious. BAL-
MANN et al. (2002), however, present simulations results for five different model 
initialisations.   5.4  Structural impact of heterogeneous managerial ability  109 
5.4  Structural impact of heterogeneous managerial ability 
In real world agriculture, the economic performance of farmers can differ sub-
stantially even if they operate under more or less the same production conditions 
using similar production technologies. These differences in the economic per-
formance of farmers are often attributed to differences in the managerial ability 
of farmers (cf. NUTHALL 2001; ROUGOOR et al. 1998 for a review of studies on 
managerial ability). In this thesis, managerial ability is understood as the ability 
of a farm agent to use its technology to realise cost savings and produce rela-
tively more efficient (see chapter 3). In particular, the managerial ability of a 
farm agent is introduced by a factor, which alters a farm agent's production 
costs, such that a farm agent with high (low) managerial ability is assumed to 
produce at lower (higher) costs. 
The set of simulations and subsequent analyses in this section aims to answer 
the question whether farm agents with higher managerial ability are more suc-
cessful than farm agents with lower management skills under different exoge-
nously given framework conditions. The hypothesis behind this question is that 
managerial ability is a key factor when it comes to surviving unfavourable over-
all (economic and political) framework conditions. In this sense, farm agents 
with better management skills are considered more robust in withstanding unfa-
vourable situations. Moreover, farm agents with high managerial ability are ex-
pected to better exploit economies of scale, and cost-saving opportunities to 
produce more efficiently. These aspects will be addressed in the subsequent 
analysis, which follows two steps: The first is to investigate the effect of homo-
geneous managerial ability versus heterogeneous managerial ability of agents, 
the second step analyses differences between agents with high managerial ability 
as compared to agents with low managerial ability. The analysis at each step is 
placed in the context of different economic framework conditions. 
5.4.1 Experimental  design and data output 
The simulation experiments are carried out for three different overall economic 
framework conditions. Three interest rate scenarios stand as a proxy for overall 
economic framework conditions. In the first scenario (i-1) all interest rates are 
close to zero.
67 The second scenario (id) assumes interest rates that approxi-
                                           
67   The notation follows that introduced in section 5.2, where "-1" corresponds to a low fac-
tor level, "+1" to a high factor level, and "d" to the default factor level.  110  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
mately correspond to a five-year average (1997 to 2003) of real interest rates in 
Germany (5.5%). The third scenario (i+1) assumes interest rates above average 
real interest rates.  
To model the variety of managerial ability across farm agents, two scenarios are 
considered, one in which all agents have homogenous managerial ability, and 
one in which managerial ability differs across agents. Table 5-4 gives an over-
view. Unless stated differently, all assumptions in the reference scenario remain 
valid. Scenarios are replicated only once using the same random number seed. 
Table 5-4:   Simulation scenarios 
 Level  Definition 
i-1 - zero  iec=0%, ibc=0%, ibcs=0% 
id – medium (default)  iec=4%, ibc=5.5%, ibcs=8% 
Interest rate levels 
i+1 - high  iec=6%, ibc=7%, ibcs=10% 
Managerial ability     
 Homogeneous    mmax=100%, mmin=100% 
 Heterogeneous    mmax=110%, mmin=90% 
Notes: iec: interest on equity capital, ibc: interest on long-term borrowed capital, ibcs: interest on 
short-term borrowed capital.  
Source:   Own calculations based on DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2003). 
In AgriPoliS, it is assumed that managerial ability becomes evident in variable 
production costs (chapter 3). Accordingly, farm agents with higher managerial 
ability will realise lower variable production costs than farm agents with lower 
managerial ability. To implement this, at start-up each farm agent receives a 
managerial ability factor m. The factor affects variable production costs of each 
farm agent. The closer the value of m is to mmin (mmax), the higher (lower) is the 
farm agent's managerial ability. For example, if m=0.9 (m=1.1) then the farm 
agents works at 90% (110%) of the average variable production costs calculated 
across all farm agents. The values assumed for the case of heterogeneous mana-
gerial ability are derived from an analysis of bookkeeping data and expert opin-
ion. Managerial ability of each farm agent is assumed fixed for an entire simula-
tion run. Hence, agents have no capability of learning. Moreover, managerial 
ability is considered independent of farm-size and technology. In this way, also 
small farms or farms using older technology could have high managerial ability. 
   5.4  Structural impact of heterogeneous managerial ability  111 
5.4.2 Results 
5.4.2.1  Homogeneous vs. heterogeneous managerial ability 
Figure 5-9 shows the evolution of average farm size for different interest rates 
and homogeneous and heterogeneous managerial ability. It shows that farm size 
growth is positively related to heterogeneous management abilities. This result 
is plausible and it corresponds to what was expected because lower production 
costs generally improved the competitive position of a farm agent on markets. 
Due to this, rental price for land increase significantly, as farm agents with 
higher managerial ability can place higher bids, therefore obtain more land, and 
grow faster. Furthermore, Figure 5-9 illustrates that increasing overall interest 
rates reinforce structural change in terms of the average farm size in hectares.  
Figure 5-9: Evolution of average farm size for (a) zero interest rate level, (b) 
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Source:   Own figure. 
This is not surprising as under the assumption of zero interest rates, opportunity 
costs of capital are zero, i.e., there is no incentive for moving capital out of 
farming. Assuming that production in the region does not have significant influ-
ences on product prices and factor prices and that the supply of labour and capital 112  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
is unlimited, it is rational for farms to stay in business as they could invest and 
engage in capital-intensive production activities almost free of charge. In this 
case, farms almost exclusively invest into intensive livestock production. 
Figure 5-10 reveals that stocking density in the region is significantly higher 
than in the other scenarios, with a strong increasing trend. Taking into account 
that farm agents incur a 'fine' of 175 € for every livestock unit above a threshold 
of 2.5 livestock units per hectare, this result indicates that under zero interest 
rate conditions the levy does not hold up the intensification of production. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that in spite of this, rental prices for land are still 
considerably high and even increase (Figure 5-11).  
This suggests two things: On the one hand, it suggests that for some farm agents 
in the region growing via renting land, as far as this is possible, is more profit-
able than incurring a levy. On the other hand, it suggests that even though farm 
agents do not leave the sector, there is heavy movement on the land markets be-
cause farm agents let unprofitable plots to the market, plots which are then 
rented again at higher prices. 
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Source:   Own figure. 
Figure 5-12 shows the evolution of the number of farm agents differentiated by 
farm size classes in hectares and managerial ability. In accordance with the pre-
vious analysis, in the case of zero interest rates, the distribution of farm size 
classes hardly changes during 25 simulation periods. The higher the interest rate 
level, the greater the tendency towards larger farm sizes. Note, that there is a 
dichotomy of results in that the group of farms of 10-30 hectares almost van-
ishes completely, but the number of very small farms as well as larger farms in-
crease or – in the case of very small farms with less than 10 hectares – decreases 
to a much lower extent. The presence of farms with heterogeneous managerial 
ability does reinforce the effect just mentioned.  
The relative persistence of very small farms with less than 10 hectares was at 
first a rather unexpected outcome. But, assuming that off-farm labour opportu-
nities are not limited, converting into a non-professional farm is a reasonable 
adjustment reaction to maximise total household income. Once a farm in the 
model has turned into a non-professional farm, further development possibilities 
are either to remain in the sector and keep up farming at a very low level or to 
leave altogether. Only in a few cases, farms switch back to operate as a full-time 
farm. 114  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
Figure 5-12:  Evolution of the total number of farms by farm size classes for 
(a) zero interest rates, (b) medium interest rates, (c) high interest rates, and het-
erogeneous costs 
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Source:   Own figure.   5.4  Structural impact of heterogeneous managerial ability  115 
5.4.2.2 High  managerial  ability vs. low managerial ability 
To tackle the question whether farm agents with a higher managerial ability are 
persistently more successful across different interest rate scenarios, farm agents 
in the scenario 'heterogeneous management ability' are grouped according to 
their managerial ability. The first group consists of farm agents with 'high 
managerial ability'. These are farm agents operating at 90-95% of standard vari-
able production costs. The second group includes farm agents with 'low manage-
rial ability'. This group includes only farm agents that operate at 105-110% of 
average variable production costs. Other farms are not considered. As Figure 
5-13 shows, there is in fact a clear difference between the two groups in terms of 
the percentage of farms quitting.  
Figure 5-13:  Percentage of farm agents leaving relative to first period for (a) 
























Source:   Own figure. 
More than 80% of the farms with low managerial ability quit in the course of the 
simulation as compared to a maximum of 18% in the case of the better group. 
This is one indicator for a link between managerial ability and the performance 
of farms. The same relationship also holds when the cash flow, i.e. the ability of 
a farm agent to build up equity capital, is concerned. The same patter becomes 116  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
apparent for the change of equity of farms remaining in the business for either 
group (Figure 5-14). The figures show farms in the respective sub-sample with 
either low or high managerial ability that do not quit the sector during a simula-
tion run. In case of farms with a low managerial ability, the potential to accu-
mulate equity is very low; it grows only slowly over time. These farms are mar-
ginal farms continuously on the verge of quitting. On the opposite, equity capital 
of farms with a high managerial ability increases strongly over time. Note that 
with respect to equity capital accumulation, the advantage of farms with high 
managerial ability is most obvious; the average equity capital build-up across all 
farm agents is much lower.  
Figure 5-14:  Evolution of average equity capital change of farms remaining in 





























































Source:   Own figure. 
5.4.3 Discussion 
Summarising the results of this simulation experiment, it becomes clear that 
farm agents respond quite differently to different interest rate levels if manage-
rial ability is heterogeneous (which is the case in real world agriculture). Despite   5.5  Conclusions from the analyses  117 
of this comparatively strong result, the shortcomings of the chosen approach 
should be mentioned. First, it was assumed that farm agents could not learn, i.e. 
their managerial ability could not improve (or decrease) in the course of a simu-
lation run. Accordingly, a farm initialised as a farm with low managerial ability 
will remain so during the entire simulation.  
Second, the definition of managerial ability and the way of operationalising it 
are admittedly very simple and it is questionable whether it is possible and ad-
missible to narrow down such a diverse concept to only a single factor and a 
single effect. Measuring managerial ability real systems is in fact an ambitious 
task that often involves such diverse subjects as psychology as well as produc-
tion frontier approaches. Furthermore, the interpretation of managerial ability as 
the ability to realise costs and produce more efficiently is certainly not generally 
applicable although there is some evidence that management contributes more to 
the efficiency of production than for example organisational structure (GA-
LUSHKO and BRÜMMER 2003).
68 However, factors like the motivation of em-
ployees or personnel management play a role as well. However, as for family 
farms in the region Hohenlohe considered in this study, the chosen interpretation 
of managerial ability seems more appropriate. 
5.5  Conclusions from the analyses 
The simulations in this chapter underline the importance of analysing the sensi-
tivity of a model from different points of view. This chapter followed three dif-
ferent approaches to exploring the reference situation given by the Agenda 2000. 
The first approach applied the DOE methodology and a simple regression 
metamodel to observe the impact of parameters expected to have significant ef-
fects on the simulation outcome. It showed that, for example, the size of the re-
gion has no significant effect on results whereas interest rates, on the other hand, 
together with technological change and managerial ability significantly influ-
ence model results.  
The second approach analysed the effect of multiple random initialisations on 
simulation results. Results of 20 independent model replications did not show 
any significant abnormalities or extreme values, although these can never be ex-
cluded fully if more replications are made or parameter values changed.  
                                           
68   See BALMANN and LISSITSA (2003) for a collection on the topic of large farm manage-
ment, or BALMANN and CZASCH (2001). 118  5  Exploring the behaviour of AgriPoliS 
Third, an analysis of the effect of heterogeneous managerial ability was under-
taken which focussed on the adjustment of different groups of farms. From this 
analysis, it becomes apparent that different farm agents follow different adjust-
ment strategies depending on their individual situation regarding managerial 
ability, but also with regard to aspects like factor endowment, farm type, or lo-
cation, which were not analysed further. Adjustment strategies will differ across 
farm agents. Hence, it can be expected that some policies will lead to more ad-
justment processes in one group of farm agents than in another. A policy change 
thus is expected to affect different farms in different ways. This could be an in-
teresting result for policy makers because it shows that policies made based on 
an average farm do most likely overestimate or underestimate the effect of the 
policy on a particular group of farms or even individual farms. 
Furthermore, results show that different and important insights can be gained 
from simulating different possible framework conditions such as for different 
interest rate scenarios. Most of these framework conditions could be interpreted 
as possible futures of the target system. Although, in this chapter, only interest 
rates were considered, the merit of analysing the effect of different framework 
conditions becomes obvious. First, this procedure allows the modeller to get a 
feeling for how the model behaves under different (plausible) conditions, which 
may eventually make it easier to detect errors. Second, it suggests that the model 
reacts quite differently under different conditions. As for policy analysis, it 
could therefore be interesting to carry out simulations not exclusively for one 
plausible parameter constellation, but also for other plausible constellations. 
This may be of interest if the introduction of new policy measures is concerned 
as it is certainly in the interest of policy makers to introduce policies that are 









   
6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring 
policy impacts 
6.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to set the general analytical framework for the policy 
experiments presented in chapters 7 and 8. In particular, this chapter provides 
the reader with information on the tools used to analyse results from policy ex-
periments (sections 6.3 and 6.4). General assumptions underlying the policy 
experiments are presented (section 6.5). The analytical framework for policy 
analysis is presented in Figure 6-1. Three steps can be distinguished in setting up 
the policy experiments: definition of experiments and setting of assumptions, 
simulation, and the analysis of simulation output representing policy impact.  
Figure 6-1: Framework for analysing the effect of agricultural policies on re-
gional agricultural structures  
Experimental design
(assumptions) Simulation







Source:   Own figure. 
Results are investigated mainly from four perspectives: structural development, 
efficiency, income, and budgetary effects. The analysis of structural develop-
ment is based on a range of indicators of which the most important are defined 
in section 6.2. An important analysis tool to investigate differences between 
farms and to show the distribution of results is Kernel density estimation, which 
is explained in section 6.4. The second perspective focuses on analysing 
Hohenlohe's agricultural structure with respect to efficiency (section 6.3). To 
measure individual efficiency differences between farms, a Data Envelopment 
Approach (DEA) is applied. Economic efficiency is measured based on the con-
cept of economic land rent. To investigate income and equity issues, income 122  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
distribution among farms is analysed using Gini indexes and the Lorenz curve 
(section 6.4).  
6.2 Performance  indicators 
Along the lines of the European Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), 
AgriPoliS produces a data set for each farm in each time period providing in-
formation – among others – on production, factor endowment, farm size, finan-
cial situation, balance sheet, incomes, and production intensity (see appendix 
A.2 for a listing). AgriPoliS calculates these at the aggregate regional level, but 
also at the individual farm level. In the following analysis, AgriPoliS generates 
data that is used to study the development of selected indicators over time. For 
the purpose of this study, key indicators are the acreage and economic size of a 
farm, economic land rent, farm income, and household income.
69 Figure 6-2 
demonstrates definitions of the income indicators used in the policy analysis.
70 
In addition to these income indicators, there are a number of indicators used for 
the analysis of structural effects such as farm size in hectares, economic farm 
size, and land rental prices, which are compared between different policy sce-
narios. The economic size of a farm, measured in European Size Units (ESU), is 
an important measure of farm size employed within the European Union. It is a 
measure of the economic importance of arable and livestock production and the 
calculation is based on standard gross margins, whereby a standard gross margin 
of 1,200 € corresponds to one ESU. In this thesis, standard gross margins corre-
spond to the gross margins defined in chapter 4. These gross margins further-
more provide the basis for the specific classification of farm types used in the 
following chapters. In principle, if the share of gross margin from a production 
branch (field crops, grazing livestock or granivore production) is greater than 
two thirds of total gross margin, a farm is specialised in either one of these pro-
duction branches. All other farms are classified as mixed farms.
71  
                                           
69   Household income refers to the total income earned by all members of the farm family 
either on or off the farm. 
70   In Germany, the term 'farm income' is used interchangeably with the term 'value added'. 
In this thesis, the term 'farm income' is used as in OECD (2003), where farm income 
refers to all profit earned from agricultural production.  
71   See also chapter 4.   6.3  Measuring production efficiency of agricultural structures  123 
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Source:   OECD (2003), modified based on MLR (2002). 
6.3 Measuring  production  efficiency of agricultural structures 
6.3.1  Starting points for measuring efficiency  
The goal of the methodology proposed in this section is to derive a measure of 
the production efficiency of agricultural structures, which is based on empirical 
observations. The question of empirical efficiency measurement has been an 
important topic in applied economics in the past 50 years. Already in 1957, 
FARRELL (1957) introduced a measure of economic efficiency (EE) consisting of 
two components: technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). Tech-
nical inefficiency relates to the comparison of maximum attainable output to ob-
servable output. Allocative inefficiency reflects the firm's inability to use pro-
duction factors in optimal proportions given their respective factor prices 
(COELLI et al. 1999; LOVELL 1993). 124  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
Questions central to efficiency measurement are: what is the definition of out-
put? What is efficiency measured against? Here, these questions will be 
addressed only briefly and in relation to the application in this study. Any fur-
ther explanation would require a deeper theoretical discussion of efficiency and 
its normative implications as well as limitations.  
Regarding the first question, efficiency is understood exclusively in terms of 
production efficiency, i.e., the ratio of maximum attainable output to observable 
output. In the model presented below, output is defined as revenue, but it could 
equally be defined in non-value terms. As for the second question, in this thesis, 
efficiency is measured against a best-practice production frontier established by 
a group of relatively successful firms (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1991; CANTNER 
and HANUSCH 2003). Thus, the frontier is not based on a normatively defined 
opportunity set, but usually constructed from empirical data.
72 Data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) is one way to estimate a best-practice frontier based on empiri-
cal data. This study uses simulated data generated from applying AgriPoliS to 
the Hohenlohe data set. 
Within the context of this study, one could envisage differentiating between two 
levels at which conclusions about efficiency could be drawn: the individual farm 
level, and the structural or regional level. Regarding the farm level, individual 
farms in AgriPoliS are assumed to maximise farm household income. From a 
comparative static point of view, i.e. looking at each period individually, and 
employing the definition of efficiency given above, a farm is efficient if it 
achieves the maximum attainable output in the given period with given inputs. 
In AgriPoliS, the farm optimisation problem combines production factors with 
production activities to maximise farm household incomes (see chapter 3). 
Because of this, an individual farm agent as defined in AgriPoliS is efficient 
with respect to itself at individual points in time.
73  
More interesting in the context of this study is to find out about a farm's effi-
ciency relative to all other farms in a group as well as to investigate the aggre-
gate or structural efficiency of all farms in the region. In AgriPoliS, inefficiencies 
                                           
72   Regarding normative implications of agricultural policy analysis see e.g. HENRICHSMEYER 
and WITZKE (1994), BULLOCK and SALHOFER (2003). For a critical account of the 
efficiency concept in particular with respect to agricultural policy analysis see BROMLEY 
(1990), BOGGESS (1995), or BONNEN and SCHWEICKHARDT (1998).  
73   Viewed over time, a farm agent, however, can get more or less productive. That is, the 
input-output ratio can change because a farm has the possibility to invest in new 
technology, realise size effects and thus produce at lower unit costs.   6.3  Measuring production efficiency of agricultural structures  125 
can potentially arise because farms are heterogeneous with respect to size, 
labour input, production technology, managerial ability and the fixity of assets. 
Furthermore, individual farms in AgriPoliS are boundedly rational, meaning that 
individual farms pursue the goal of individual farm income maximisation, but do 
not include other farm's objectives and behaviour into their planning and deci-
sion-making. Except for the price information on rents and product and input 
prices, individual farms in AgriPoliS do not know what other farms in the region 
are doing, what they produce, what specialisation they follow, what their size is, 
etc. Because of this, it is possible that a farm following successfully its maximi-
sation objective produces efficiently with respect to itself, but is inefficient rela-
tive to other farms in the region. 
The following sections introduce the various efficiency concepts and ways of 
measuring them. To measure individual farm efficiency, a DEA-based model is 
defined. In particular, the concept of structural efficiency is introduced. This is 
followed by the specification of the DEA model used in the policy analyses in 
chapter 7 and chapter 8. The average economic land rent in the region is em-
ployed as an appropriate indicator to assess the overall economic efficiency of 
agriculture in the region (see section 6.3.6).  
6.3.2  Traditional efficiency measures of individual firms 
Figure 6-3 depicts the technical relationship between two inputs x1 and x2 under 
the condition of a technology displaying constant returns to scale. The isoquants 
represent technically possible combinations of inputs to produce output. The 
figure shows that a firm operating at point C produces the output quantity y1 as 
firm A and B; hence, firm C is technically inferior to firms A and B. A firm pro-
ducing at point A uses less of both inputs to produce the same output quantity 
than firm C. Firm B uses less of input x2, but more of input x1 to produce y1. If 
the same output cannot be produced with any less inputs than used by firm A 
and B, firms A and B are technically efficient. In other words, farms A and B lie 
on what is called the best-practice frontier defining the current state of 
technology. The technical efficiency of firm C can be measured by the distance 
QC. This is equivalent to the amount by which all inputs could be reduced to 
produce the same output; hence the term input-oriented efficiency measures. 
Based on this, the input-oriented measure of technical efficiency of firm C is 
defined as  OC OA TEC / = . Whenever  1 = C TE , the input-output set is called 
fully efficient. If  1 < C TE , i.e., the distance OC is greater than OA, the 
technology is inefficient with inefficiency score given by  C TE .  126  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
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Sources:  TOMICH et al. (1995); COELLI et al. (1999), modified. 
To show the concept of allocative efficiency, input price relationships are shown 
in the figure by the straight lines. If all firms face prices of inputs x1 and x2 indi-
cated by the solid lines, then the slope of the line identifies the allocatively effi-
cient input proportions. In this sense, point C is allocatively efficient, but not 
technically efficient. Point B, on the other hand, is technically efficient but not 
allocatively efficient. Only point A is economically efficient, i.e. it is both tech-
nically and allocatively efficient. If prices change as depicted by the dashed 
price line, efficiency evaluations change. Now, point B is economically effi-
cient, i.e., it is both technically and allocatively efficient. Point C is both techni-
cally and allocatively inefficient. Point A is no longer allocatively efficient. 
Using the distance measure, allocative efficiency of the firm C is then defined as 
OA OD AEC / = . The distance DA represents the reduction of production costs 
that would occur if production were at the allocatively and technically efficient 
point B instead of A. Following Figure 6-3, it means that allocative inefficiency 
raises production costs by using other than the cost-minimising input combina-
tion (CURTISS 2002). Overall economic efficiency is defined by the ratio 
C C C AE TE OD OD EE × = = /.   
The input-oriented efficiency measure addresses the question by which quantity 
inputs can be reduced to produce the same level of output. Alternatively, the   6.3  Measuring production efficiency of agricultural structures  127 
question could be asked from an output-oriented point of view, namely, by how 
much output could be increased using the same quantities of inputs. The 
following Figure 6-4 depicts a simple one-input, one-output production frontier.  

















Source:   COELLI et al. (1999), modified. 
Consider the inefficient firm operating at point C. The Farrell input-oriented 
measure of technical efficiency would be equal to the ratio  C Y D Y TE C
i
C ′ ′ = / 
under constant returns to scale which is depicted by production frontier Pc. The 
equivalent output-oriented measure would be measured as  C x B x TE C
o
C ′ ′ = /.  
Accordingly, in the output-oriented framework, an efficient firm has an effi-
ciency score of one. If  C x B x C ′ > ′ , the firm is inefficient. Hence, the output-ori-
ented efficiency measure is bounded by unity at the lower end. Output-oriented 
and input-oriented efficiency measures are equivalent only when constant 
returns to scale exist (FÄRE and LOVELL 1978). Assuming a variable returns to 
scale technology (production frontier Pv), it is obvious from Figure 6-4 that in-
put and output-oriented measures are no longer equivalent.  
The assumption of constant returns to scale is only appropriate if all farms operate 128  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
at an optimal scale. A firm is scale efficient if it exhibits constant returns to 
scale, i.e., if the average product is at its maximum (FÄRE et al. 1987). Follow-
ing FÄRE et al.  (1987), the assumption of constant returns to scale can be 
released to allow also for technologies with variable returns to scale. This results 
in a measure of technical efficiency consisting of two components, 'pure' techni-
cal efficiency and scale efficiency (SE). The concept of scale efficiency is also 
illustrated in Figure 6-4. In this figure, a firm operating at point A is scale effi-
cient (and technically efficient). In other words, at point A an increase in input x 
would lead to a proportional increase in output Y. Production on the production 
function using higher inputs (to the right of point A) show decreasing returns to 
scale, production using fewer inputs (to the left of point A) exhibits increasing 
returns to scale. The output-oriented technical inefficiency of firm C would be 
CBV under variable returns to scale, and CBC under constant returns to scale. 
Accordingly, the distance BCBV describes scale inefficiency, whereas CBV corre-
sponds to 'pure' technical inefficiency. Scale efficiency is measured as 
VRS CRS TE TE SE / =  which is equivalent to the distance ratio  V C B x B x ′ ′ / ( C OELLI 
et al. 1999). Hence, a firm operating at point BV could increase output by the 
distance  V C B x B x ′ ′ /  if it were operating at an optimal scale. All output-oriented 
and scale efficiency measures are bounded by one at the lower bound. 
6.3.3 Non-parametric  estimation of technical efficiencies 
DEA utilises linear programming methods to construct a piece-wise frontier 
over the data (CHARNES et al. 1978; COELLI et al. 1999). DEA is non-parametric 
in that the frontier is estimated based on given data. Therefore, efficiency scores 
of individual firms are estimated exclusively based on available firm data.
74 The 
following linear programming problem is used to estimate the Farrell-type out-
put-oriented technical efficiency. Assume that there are k ( K k , , 1K = ) farms in 
the sample. Assume that each farm k's technology, i.e., its production frontier, 
can be described by its output sets  { }




k k k x x x x + ℜ ∈ ′ = ) , , , ( 2 1 K  denotes N inputs that farm k uses to produce a 
vector of M outputs, denoted by 
M k
M
k k k y y y y + ℜ ∈ ′ = ) , , , ( 2 1 K . Inputs and outputs 
are assumed freely disposable. The Farrell output-oriented technical efficiency 
                                           
74   DEA furthermore avoids a parametric specification of technology and the distribution of 
efficiency scores. Furthermore, DEA shows to have good statistical properties (KNEIP et 
al. 2003; KNEIP et al. 1998).   6.3  Measuring production efficiency of agricultural structures  129 
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where  θ  represents the overall Farrell output-oriented technical efficiency 
( 1 ≥ θ )under the assumption of weak disposability of inputs.
75 y is the observed 
vector of outputs, x is the observed vector of inputs. Firm weights are repre-
sented by a  1 × K  vector λ, where K is the number of firms in the sample. This 
problem formulation takes the input-output specification of firm k and then 
seeks to maximise the output vector, while keeping inputs fixed (COELLI et al. 
1999). The first and second constraints reflect strong disposability (SD) of out-
puts and inputs, respectively. The third constraint  1 = ′λ K  implies a variable 
returns to scale technology (VRS). When this constraint is dropped, the under-
lying technology is constant returns to scale (CRS).  
6.3.4  Structural efficiency of a group of firms 
The measurement of technical efficiency of a group of firms, the component 
parts of a structure, is not new. Already in his seminal paper, FARRELL (1957) 
introduced a concept of 'structural efficiency of an industry'. According to Far-
rell, the structural efficiency of an industry measures (p. 216-262) "… the extent 
to which an industry keeps up with the performance of its own best firms…". It 
can be measured by the average (weighted by output) of its individual units' 
efficiency scores. In other words, if all firms perform equally the industry is 
structurally efficient; otherwise, it is inefficient.
76 However, Farrell has not further 
                                           
75   All results were obtained using Matlab and the (modified) code originally programmed by 
SIMAR and ZELENYUK for their (2003) paper. 
76   This particular example may also suggest that structural efficiency can be interpreted as a 
measure of heterogeneity of a group as done by CANTNER and HANUSCH (2003). 
However, the authors do not explicitly a measure of structural or aggregate efficiency. 130  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
elaborated on his concept beyond the one output, constant returns to scale case.
77  
Recently, FÄRE and ZELENYUK (2003) have extended the structural efficiency 
concept to the multi-output case. They propose a simple measure of structural 
efficiency, which is derived from the relationship that "…maximised industry 
output (revenue) equals the sum of maximised firms' revenues". Based on this 
relationship, the structural efficiency of a group of firms corresponds to the sum 
of individual firm efficiency scores weighted by output shares.  
However, what is of interest to many researchers is not only the efficiency of a 
system as a whole, but also the efficiency of various sub-groups within the sys-
tem. Applied to agricultural policy analysis this gives rise to the following ques-
tions: What are the efficiencies of distinct groups of firms operating under 
different policy regimes? Which group is more efficient? Why is it more effi-
cient?  
Based on these questions, SIMAR and ZELENYUK (2003) present a methodology 
for analysing and comparing the efficiency of various economic systems: firms, 
industry, regions, etc. The method merges two recent streams of literature in 
efficiency analysis, aggregation and the smooth bootstrap. Aggregation is used 
to derive consistent estimates of the structural efficiencies of different sub-
groups of firms.  
In this thesis, SIMAR and ZELENYUK'S (2003) approach is applied to study the 
relationship between the efficiency of regional agricultural structures and certain 
agricultural policies at different points in time. Instead of looking at different 
sub-groups within one region, a sub-group is interpreted as a regional agricul-
tural structure under one policy scheme. To compare different policies one fron-
tier for the different policies is therefore estimated. Individual firm efficiency 
estimates underlying the structural efficiency measure are estimated using DEA 
assuming output-orientation. The smooth bootstrap (SIMAR and WILSON 2000; 
KNEIP et al. 2003) is used to derive confidence intervals of the structural DEA 
efficiency estimates and to test for the equality of structural efficiencies of one 
or more sub-groups.  
                                           
77   Only in recent years, a number of studies have explored the concept anew (BLACKORBY 
and RUSSELL 1999; FÄRE and ZELENYUK 2003; LI and NG 1995; SENGUPTA 1997; 
YLVINGER 2000). YLVINGER (2000) provides a critical review of even earlier studies 
pointing out that some approaches yield inconsistent measurements of structural 
efficiency.   6.3  Measuring production efficiency of agricultural structures  131 
More formally, based on SIMAR and ZELENYUK (2003), a technical structural 
efficiency measure is derived as follows. Let l be a region under policy scenario 
l consisting of K firms. Total input allocation within region l is denoted by 
) , , (
, 1 , K l l l x x X K =  and the sum of output vectors of all firms in the l
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1 . The output set of a region  ) (
l l X P  is assumed to correspond to 
the sum of the individual output sets of all firms in the region. The aggregate 
structural technical efficiency of region l corresponds to the price-independent 
output-share-weighted sum of individual firm technical efficiencies, i.e., 
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TE  is a 
multi-output generalisation of what Farrell called the 'structural efficiency of an 
industry' (SIMAR and ZELENYUK 2003). The measure assumes the standardisa-
tion proposed by FÄRE and ZELENYUK (2003) for making output weights price-
independent. This particularly avoids that price information impacts the struc-
tural measure of technical efficiency. To estimate structural efficiency scores, 
first, individual farm efficiency scores are estimated using the DEA model in 
section 6.3.3, which, in a second step, are aggregated to structural efficiency 
scores. After structural efficiency scores have been determined, a bootstrap is 
carried out as in SIMAR and ZELENYUK (2003) to determine confidence intervals, 
bias-corrected estimates and standard errors of the structural efficiency esti-
mates. Confidence intervals are used to statistically test for differences between 
structural efficiencies of regions and policy regimes. Details of the bootstrap and 
the statistical test are given in appendix A-3 and A-4. 
6.3.5  Application to data simulated for Hohenlohe 
In this subsection, the model setup in the previous subsections is adapted to the 
region Hohenlohe. In particular, input and output specifications are given. 
Results are presented in the respective policy experiments in chapters 7 and 8. 
6.3.5.1 Inputs 
The DEA model adapted to simulated data from the Hohenlohe region considers 
four input variables and one output variable. Input variables include the main 
production factors, land, labour, capital, and intermediate inputs. Labour enters 
the model as the total annual hours used for agricultural production. The vari-
able includes farm-family labour as well as fixed and variable hired labour. 
Labour input can vary substantially between farms, depending on the economic 
and physical size of the farm, operation of a professional or non-professional 132  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
farm, and depending on the labour requirements of differently sized assets. Land 
is included as total land in hectares managed by a farm. Capital is included as 
the aggregate of average annual capital costs of fixed assets including interest on 
equity and borrowed capital, interest on floating capital, the value of milk quota, 
and the costs of services provided by private contractors.
78 Book values as a 
proxy for capital could not be used because in AgriPoliS depreciation is progres-
sive such that farms with relatively young assets (high book value) would be 
discriminated against farms with old assets (low book value). This would also 
distort the determination of adequate capital costs because new or relatively new 
assets are assumed technically more advanced than relatively old assets. The 
fourth input variable is variable production costs, i.e., costs of fertiliser, feed-
stuff, seeds, etc. Variable production costs vary across farms either because of 
the assumed differences in managerial ability, and secondly because of the indi-
vidual farm's investment activity.  
6.3.5.2 Output 
Output is considered in value terms as total revenue.
79 It includes all agricultural 
products in addition to manure exports and imports (see chapter 3 and 4), fines 
for exceeding the maximum permissible stocking density, and set aside. Subsi-
dies, i.e. compensatory payments, and direct payments are not included. All 
farms face the same output prices. This is an important assumption required for 
the aggregation procedure (cf. FÄRE and ZELENYUK 2003). Appendix A.5 shows 
a detailed listing of all inputs and output considered.  
                                           
78   The use of milk quota as a production input is questionable because from a technical point 
of view it is not necessary input for producing milk. However, one may argue that under 
the current (and future) policy regime in the EU, milk quota is not a technical requirement 
for production, but just grants the right to produce milk. If quota costs were not included 
into the model, some farms could take advantage of selling quota.  
79   In a previous DEA-model specification, total gross margin was taken as output, such that 
variable costs were dropped on the input side. This model resulted in larger (statistically 
significant) differences in efficiency scores between policy scenarios. The model 
specification is, however, problematic as gross margin includes both inputs (variable 
costs) and outputs (revenue). In the literature (e.g., BALMANN and CZASCH 2001; OUDE 
LANSINK et al. 2002; LISSITSA and BALMANN 2003; ONDERSTEIJN 2002) it is common to 
define output in terms of revenue or in physical terms, whereas variable costs are included 
on the production side. To avoid theoretical inconsistencies also in this application 
revenue was chosen as output.   6.3  Measuring production efficiency of agricultural structures  133 
6.3.5.3 Assumptions 
Based on this model specification, the DEA model is estimated assuming con-
stant returns to scale technology and output-orientation. Constant returns to 
scale imply that all farms in the sample operate at an optimal scale. The result-
ing individual farm efficiency scores are greater or equal to unity. Efficiency 
scores greater unity denotes inefficiency.  
The choice of constant returns to scale needs to be further explained. Although 
constant returns to scale imply all farms to operate at an optimal scale, the 
underlying simulated data sample by definition includes some diseconomies of 
scale introduced, for example, by the assumption about technological change 
(see chapters 4 and 5). Despite of this inconsistency, constant returns to scale are 
still imposed in the DEA estimation mainly because of two reasons: One is that 
constant returns to scale in addition to variable returns to scale allow identifying 
scale differences between farm agents. Secondly, under variable returns to scale, 
each farm agent in the sample is only compared to similar farms. Consequently, 
a small farm using old technology and operating at high costs may turn out to be 
technically efficient because it is benchmarked only against similar farms. De-
spite of being efficient under variable returns to scale, these farms nevertheless 
often fall victim to structural change in the simulations. The reason is that all 
farms in a region compete, for example, for land, irrespective of their size and 
specialisation. The assumption of variable returns to scale thus tends to distort 
the link between efficiency and farm survival such that farm survival cannot be 
attributed to efficiency advantages. When assuming constant returns to scale, 
competition between all farms in the region is explicitly introduced in the DEA 
estimation.  
The assumption of constant returns to scale together with technological change 
in the data has one further consequence. Because of the presence of technologi-
cal change in the data, it is no longer only technical differences that are meas-
ured by the DEA estimates, but also differences in productivity. Farms with a 
more advanced technology produce the same output at lower costs. Because of 
this, the use of the term 'technical efficiency' is dropped in the analysis of results 
but replaced by 'individual efficiency' which includes the combined effect of 
technical, scale, and productivity differences. 
6.3.6  Measuring overall economic efficiency 
Since only one output is considered in the DEA model, technical and allocative 
efficiency as defined above are the same. However, to assess the allocation of 134  6  Analytical framework and assumptions for measuring policy impacts 
production factors in the region, economic land rent is utilised as an indicator. 
This is done in analogy to BALMANN (1996).  
Economic land rent is based on the functional income of land. It provides a 
measure of the residual utilisation of land after all other production factors (la-
bour, capital) have been paid for. If calculated at the individual farm level, eco-
nomic land rent is an indicator for the utilisation of production factors of the 
farm. Alternatively, it can be calculated as a regional average which serves as an 
indicator of factor allocation in the entire region.  
In this study, economic land rent is measured as total household income (which 
corresponds to farm net value added plus off-farm income) minus by opportu-
nity costs of capital and farm family labour.
80 Economic land rent as used in this 
study was defined at the beginning of this chapter in Figure 6-2. Long-term 
opportunity costs of farm-family labour are valued at the comparative salary of 
an industrial worker.  
To draw conclusions about the allocation of all factors in the region, economic 
land rent is furthermore adjusted by support payments as well as realised sunk 
costs of farms leaving the sector to take account of productive capital that is no 
longer used. The economic land rent calculated here takes a long-term perspec-
tive because it includes also the costs of fixed assets, i.e. it includes deprecia-
tion. In the short-term, depreciation is not considered.  
6.4 Other  analysis  techniques 
6.4.1 Kernel  density  estimation 
The goal of density estimation is to approximate the probability density function 
) (• f of a random variable X (HÄRDLE et al. 2000). Assuming that there are n 
independent observations  n x x , , 1K  from the random variable X. The kernel den-
sity estimator  ) ( ˆ x fh  to estimate the density value f(x) at point x is defined as  
                                           
80   This adjustment to the way economic land rent is calculated may be justified by the fact 
that in particular non-professional farms cross-finance farm activity with income earned 
off-farm. This, in turn, can be interpreted as a household-internal transfer payment, which 
in the end adds stability to the farm household. On the other hand, all family owned 
labour, i.e., also labour not used on-farm is considered when opportunity costs of labour 
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where  K is the so-called kernel function which satisfies the condition 
1 ) ( = ∫
∞
∞ − dx x K , h is the bandwidth parameter. In this thesis, K is a symmetric 
normal probability density function (Gaussian kernel). The critical parameter in 
density estimation is the bandwidth h. All density estimates presented in this 
thesis are computed using Matlab code by BEARDAH (2003). The bandwidth 
chosen is the Silverman bandwidth (SILVERMAN 1986, p. 47) which is computed 
as 
5 / 1 06 . 1
− ⋅ = An h  with  
A = min(standard deviation, interquartile range/1.349).  (6.3)
Density estimations of efficiency scores are estimated using a Gaussian kernel 
and bandwidth based on the method by SHEATHER and JONES (1991). 
6.4.2 The  Lorenz  curve and the Gini index 
To measure equality or inequality of income within in a population, the Lorenz 
curve and the Gini index are two popular and widely used approaches. The 
Lorenz (or concentration) curve describes the distribution of income in a popu-
lation. The Lorenz curve represents cumulative income share as a function of the 
cumulative population share (SHKOLNIKOV et al. 2003). The Lorenz curve as a 
function varies from 0 to 1 and is defined on the interval [0,1]. In a situation of 
perfect equality for any income, the Lorenz curve is simply a diagonal, con-
necting points (0,0) and (1,1). If income were distributed unequally, the Lorenz 
curves for income distributions would lie below the diagonal. The higher the 
variability in income across a population, the greater is the divergence between 
the diagonal and the Lorenz curve. 
The Gini index is a numerical measure of inequality based on the Lorenz curve. 
The Gini index is a measure of divergence between the Lorenz curve and the 
line of perfect equality. It is defined as the area between the Lorenz curve and 
the line of absolute equality, divided by the whole area below the diagonal 

















where the Gini coefficient is one-half of the average of absolute differences 
between all pairs of a variable x in a population of size n by the average value x 














= ,  (6.5)
When based on individual data and when observations are positive, the index 
ranges from 0 to 1 (OECD 1994). An index of 1 indicates absolute inequality, a 
coefficient of 0, absolute equality. 
6.5  General assumptions underlying the policy analyses 
The policy experiments conducted in the following chapters are based on a 
number of assumptions. Most of these have been mentioned before, either in 
chapter 4 or in this chapter, but they shall be repeated here. Assumptions 
specific to a policy experiment will be discussed in the respective chapters.  
-  Simulation length: Each policy scenario is simulated for 25 periods. This 
appears a sufficiently long time frame to asses short-term, medium-term and 
long-term effects of a policy. A longer time frame would be interesting only 
if the long-term behaviour of AgriPoliS was of interest. In this thesis, this is 
not done, though.  
-  Policy change: Each policy scenario is initialised with the reference policy 
Agenda 2000. Only after 4 simulation periods, a policy change toward an 
alternative policy sets in.
81 
-  Parameter settings: All policy scenarios are based on the data and parameter 
settings specified in chapter 4. Exceptions are the increase in opportunity 
costs of labour when a farm is handed over to a successor. Whereas in 
                                           
81   Following the convention in the C++ programming language, counting starts with zero, 
i.e. time period t=3 is the fourth time period in the simulation.   6.5  General assumptions underlying the policy analyses  137 
chapter 4 and 5 opportunity costs were assumed to increase by 15%, the 
value assumed in the policy experiments is 25%. This appears a more rea-
sonable assumption in view of real wage differences between small-scale 
farms and industrial workers' wages. 
-  Region size: Although altogether 2800 farms were situated in Hohenlohe in 
2000/2001 (see chapter 4), it proved to be technically infeasible to simulate 
always the entire regions. The reason was mainly, that output files exceeded 
the maximum permissible number of rows supported by most analysis pro-
grammes (e.g. Microsoft Excel, SPSS). However, in chapter 5, section 5.2, 
some evidence was delivered that the size of the region simulated did not 
have significant impact on results. Although this was not investigated for 
policy scenarios other than the reference, in the policy experiments, 20% of 
the total region is simulated. This means that the respective scaling factors 
derived for each of the 24 typical farms (see Table 4-3 in chapter 4) was 
divided by five such that 572 farms were initialised.
82 
-  Prices and variable costs: Prices are assumed the same for all farms. Unit 
costs, however, vary between farms depending on managerial ability and 
technical change due to farm investment activity (see chapter 4 for details). 
Because of the relatively small size of the region and the family farm-domi-
nated structure, it can be expected that farms are price takers.83 Prices there-
fore do not change in response to quantities produced. However, a pressure 
on some output prices was introduced (see chapter 4). 
-  Price changes: Product prices as well as prices of short-term variable and 
fixed labour are assumed to decrease (or in case of labour and capital) in-
crease as specified in Table 4-11 in chapter 4. 
-  Costs of fixed assets: Once a farm invests, costs of the investment are 
assumed fully sunk, i.e., opportunity costs are zero throughout the entire use-
ful life of the investment.  
-  Education of farm agents: Farm agents are assumed equally smart with 
regard to their ability to work off-farm. Moreover, it is assumed that all 
farmers have the same opportunities to work off-farm, irrespective of age. 
 
                                           
82   Just to illustrate, a full simulation produces output files of up to 80 MB of data. An 
analysis of the impact of the region size is presented in chapter 5. 
83   This assumption has to be loosened if large scale farms are concerned, as these farms are 
more in the position to negotiate about prices of inputs as well as about output prices.  
 
  
7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single 
farm payment 
7.1 Introduction  and policies analysed 
The general introduction (chapter 1) identified some impacts of agricultural sup-
port policies on structural adjustment and possible impediments to adjustment 
caused by existing agricultural support policies. The starting point of the analy-
sis in this and the next chapter is the hypothesis that Hohenlohe's agricultural 
structure displays structural inefficiencies because structural adjustment in the 
past has been impeded by existing agricultural policies and factor immobilities. 
In addition, this effect is aggravated by existing structural difference, which can 
be attributed mainly to three phenomena: unexploited returns to scale, adjust-
ment costs causing the immobility of production factors, and path dependencies 
meaning that a path, e.g. a specialisation or the emergence of a specific structure 
once taken, can only be left at high costs. 
Based on this, the aim of this chapter is to simulate and analyse the effects of 
three different policy reforms aimed at reducing some of these impediments to 
structural adjustment while, at the same time, increasing the efficient allocation 
of production factors. Even if, in reality, a bundle of (often complementary) 
policies affects structural change, the simulation experiments in this chapter 
consider one policy at a time. The aim is to identify the specific adjustment pat-
terns induced by the respective policy measure. The emphasis is on support 
given by way of direct payments. A variation of market price support is not con-
sidered here. 
The policies considered in this chapter are listed in Table 7-1. The first policy, 
RETPAY, is a factor market policy that intends to provide an incentive for small 
and inefficient farms to withdraw from the sector. The reasoning behind this 
policy must be seen against the structural deficits mentioned before. In fact, in 
Hohenlohe – as in many regions in southern Germany –large amounts of family-
labour are bound in agriculture either in very small farms with labour intensive 
older technologies, or in non-professional farms (chapter 4). Hence, it could be 140  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
envisaged that an incentive payment for relatively unproductive farms to with-
draw labour from agriculture could lead to overall efficiency increases of farm-
ing in the region. The policy is introduced such that an incentive payment is of-
fered to all farms, but only farms willing to withdraw receive the payment.
84 In 
this scenario, everything else but the introduction of the retirement payment is 
kept equal, i.e. remaining farms operate under Agenda 2000 policy conditions 
and get the corresponding coupled direct payments.  
Table 7-1:  Policy scenarios 
Abbreviation  Scenario name  Scenario description 
REF Agenda  2000  -  Full implementation of Agenda 2000 at the end of 2002 
-  No requirement to manage all land belonging to a farm 
RETPAY Retirement  pay-
ment 
-  Payment of 10,000 Euros if a farm withdraws from the 
sector 
-  Leaving farms receive payment for the next 20 periods  
-  Policy environment for active farms is Agenda 2000 
-  No requirement to manage all land belonging to a farm  
PHASEOUT10 Phasing  out  of 
coupled direct 
payments 
-  Linear cut of coupled direct payments as granted under 
Agenda 2000 over 10 periods 
-  After this, farms operate without subsidies 
-  No requirement to manage all land belonging to a farm 
DECOUP Fully  decoupled 
single farm pay-
ment 
-  Each farm household receives a decoupled single farm 
payment based on the average direct payment paid to a 
farm during three periods before the policy change 
-  Bound to person of the farmer and legal successor 
-  Single farm payment is granted independent of farming, 
i.e. it is also paid if a farm leaves the sector, for the next 
20 periods after policy change 
-  Farms are required to manage all farmland belonging to a 
farm at least in a very basic way (cutting) 
 
The second policy option (PHASEOUT10) is a step-wise reduction of direct 
payments granted to farms over 10 time periods. At the final stage, after 10 peri-
ods, support to agriculture is zero. Unlike policy RETPAY, the general direction 
of adjustment, which could be expected from a step-wise reduction of direct 
payments, is twofold: on the one hand, farms can be expected to diversify into 
areas with highest productivity, which are less dependent on direct payments. 
On the other hand, farms whose development potential is low are expected to 
                                           
84   Unlike retirement programmes offered within the second pillar of the EU common agri-
cultural policy, the payment introduced here is independent of the age of the farmer. The 
reason is that the policy is directed at marginal farmers in general.   7.1  Introduction and policies analysed  141 
not renew fixed assets or rental contracts. Whenever the operating life of fixed 
assets is reached, these farms are expected to leave the sector.  
Finally, the third policy is geared to increasing the market orientation of produc-
tion while providing a safety net at the same time to farms through direct pay-
ments. Policy DECOUP introduces fully decoupled single farm payment granted 
exclusively to the person of the farmer. The payment replaces the coupled direct 
payments to certain products mentioned in chapter 4. The single farm payment 
is granted independently of farming, i.e., production decisions are decoupled 
from the provision of payments to certain products. The payment is to give farm 
agents greater flexibility and to increase their market orientation.
85 In this sce-
nario, the single farm payment granted to each farm agent after a policy change 
is based on historical payments during a reference periods before the policy 
change. In the literature, a switching to a single farm payment independent of 
farm activity is expected to have significant effects on factor markets (see e.g., 
WISSENSCHAFTLICHER B EIRAT BMVEL 1997; SWINBANK and TANGERMANN 
2000; OECD 1994). For example, a decoupled single farm payment could serve 
as an incentive payment for marginal farmers to withdraw, particularly because 
the right for the payment remains with the person of the farmer who initially ac-
quired the payment. Hence, the payment should not be transferred into rental 
prices but rental prices would be at the level of the economic land rent without 
subsidies. In addition, it is assumed that the bargaining position of farmers on 
the land market increases (cf. ISERMEYER 2003). To reflect these two aspects in 
the farm agents' opportunity cost calculations at the end of each period, the spe-
cific expectation formation regarding rental prices is changed. As for fully de-
coupled payments it is assumed that farms expect rental prices (and hence op-
portunity costs of land) for arable land (grassland) to drop to some 75% (50%) 
of the regional average.
86  
Having introduced the policy scenarios considered in this chapter, the following 
sections present results using the analytical framework introduced in chapter 6. 
As outlined in chapter 6, each policy scenario is simulated over 25 time periods. 
The policy change sets in after four simulation periods. Simulation results are 
analysed from different perspectives: structural development, efficiency, and 
income. At the end of the chapter, results are discussed in a synopsis. To give an 
overview of results the next section presents a brief summary. 
                                           
85   In this and the following chapter, the terms farm agent and farm are used interchangeably. 
86   Different values for the expected decrease of rental prices were analysed as well but the 
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7.2 Summary  of  results 
The goal of this section is to show and discuss selected results for each policy 
experiment to stimulate the in-depth analysis in the following sections. To pro-
vide a preliminary overview about reactions to a policy change, Table 7-2 com-
bines information on farm types with averages for key indicators, and the num-
ber of farms in each group. Two time periods are considered, one before a policy 
change (t=3), and a second shortly after the policy change (t=6). Longer-term 
effects are discussed further down in the chapter. The table illustrates the aver-
age short-run change of key indicators such as farm size, income (with profits 
from agriculture as a proxy), equity change and stocking density induced by a 
policy change. 
As regards farm size development in the region, certain scenarios (DECOUP 
and RETPAY) create strong exit dynamics already in the short-run. In the case 
of policy RETPAY, more than half of the farm agents leave the sector within 
three periods after the policy change. Accordingly, average farm size increases. 
These policies have in common that they provide incentive payments for non-
profitable farms to leave the sector. These same policies also lead to a concen-
tration of specialised granivore farms (pig and poultry production) in the region. 
Specialised field crop farms and grazing livestock farms almost vanish com-
pletely in response to a policy change.  
Farm income is generally higher on average for scenarios DECOUP and RETPAY 
because of the aforementioned reasons. Farm income varies not only by farm 
type, but also by policy scenario. In this respect, the only aspect to be high-
lighted here is the fact that in all policy scenarios (except for scenario RETPAY), 
average profits of specialised field crop, grazing livestock, and mixed farms are 
below the average of all farms. This suggests that in response to a policy change, 
farms either move away from crop and grazing livestock production and re-
organise, or leave the sector altogether. 
 
 
                                           
assumed figures appeared to lead to most plausible results.  
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On the opposite, average profits are significantly above the regional average for 
specialised granivore farms. What can be observed for profits also applies to the 
change in equity. Here, as well as for farm income, the level of change in equity 
is directly related to the size and the number of farms in the region. An excep-
tion to this is policy PHASEOUT10, where the stepwise premium cut on aver-
age leads to lower income and lower changes in equity compared to all other 
policy scenarios irrespective of farm type. As regards stocking density, a switch 
towards policies RETPAY and DECOUP, on average, leads to an immediate fall 
in livestock production intensity in the region. However, stocking densities may 
be higher on individual farms specialising in livestock production (see 7.3.3). 
7.3 Structural  adjustments  following a policy change 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate and discuss key structural effects of 
the policies defined in Table 7-1 on the agricultural structure of Hohenlohe. In 
particular, two questions are of interest when interpreting the results: Why do 
farm agents withdraw from the sector under each policy scenario? How do sur-
viving farm agents in the sector develop with regard to production? The first 
question will be answered in sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 which are devoted to the 
analysis of farm size changes. As regards the second question, this relates to the 
activities of farms remaining in the sector. Answers to this question will be 
given in section 7.3.3.  
7.3.1 Farm  size  dynamics 
The evolution of the total number of farms in the region and the average farm 
size measured in hectares are shown in Figure 7-1.
87 The figure demonstrates 
clear differences between policy scenarios. It illustrates that the number of farms 
withdrawing is particularly large in case of the retirement payment. The sud-
denly decreasing number of farms indicates that many farms take the retirement 
payment as an opportunity to leave the sector. Thus, for more than 50% of the 
farms, an annual payment of 10,000 € results in a higher total household income 
compared to regular farm activity. Because so many farms withdraw, this offers 
scope for the remaining farms to grow. Figure 7-1 (b) shows that the average 
farm size doubles immediately after the policy change. 
                                           
87   The source of all other figures and tables in this chapter is simulated data. Data has been 
compiled and prepared by the author.    7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  145 






































































Taking into account that farms can only increase their acreage by renting addi-
tional land, the share of rented land increases by up to 30 percentage points over 
25 time periods (Table 7-3). After the initial adjustment reaction, average farm 
size in scenario RETPAY develops parallel to the reference and the number of 
farms leaving the sector is even below the reference. This indicates that the pol-
icy elicits an immediate and strong initial adjustment reaction, which is followed 
only by small but nevertheless steady further adjustments after the policy 
change.  
Fully decoupled direct payments granted in policy DECOUP have a similar ini-
tial effect on the number of farms and on average farm size than a retirement 
payment, though at a lower level. The fact that farms receive decoupled pay-
ments irrespective of agricultural production leads some farms to quit and to 
take the decoupled single farm payment as a kind of retirement payment. With 
respect to this, the two policies induce a similar adjustment reaction at the ag-
gregate level.  146  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Table 7-3  Land use by farms and share of rented land in region for different 
policy scenarios and time periods 
Time period  REF  RETPAY  PHASEOUT10  DECOUP 
Before policy change (t=3)         
  Total land use (ha)  14,645  14,645  14,645  14,645 
  Share of rented land  40.0%  40.0%  40.0%  40.0% 
Short-term effect (t=6)         
  Total land use (ha)  14,645  14,645  14,638  14,050 
  Share of rented land  43.4%  63.4%  45.2%  53.2% 
Medium-term effect (t=14)         
  Total land use (ha)  14,645  14,645  13,453  13,805 
  Share of rented land  52.3%  68.0%  56.6%  58.2% 
Long-term effect (t=24)         
  Total land use (ha)  14,645  14,645  13,183  13,502 
  Share of rented land  60.4%  71.0%  63.1%  64.1% 
        
Nevertheless, there are differences. One difference is that the retirement pay-
ment of 10,000 € per year induces more farms to withdraw than a fully decoup-
led single farm payment. Since in scenario DECOUP there are some farms with 
a single farm payment smaller than 10,000 € per farm, more farms remain in the 
sector under policy DECOUP than under RETPAY. In other words, only if ex-
pected yields in policy DECOUP are greater than total opportunity costs, but 
below 10,000 €, the farm would remain in the sector. In policy RETPAY, the 
same farm would withdraw from the sector. Accordingly, in particular with re-
spect to small farms, policy RETPAY creates a strong incentive to leave the sec-
tor as the retirement payment of 10,000 € maybe significantly higher than the 
single farm payment granted in scenario DECOUP (see also Table A-9 in Ap-
pendix A.6). A second difference is that under policy scenario DECOUP some 
land is abandoned, i.e., it is not rented by farms (Table 7-3). 
In scenario PHASEOUT10, the reasons for farms to leave the sector are differ-
ent than in either policy DECOUP or RETPAY. As already mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, it is expected that farms with insufficient develop-
ment potential do not reinvest in fixed assets or renew rental contracts; over time 
they are expected quit. In fact, in scenario PHASEOUT10, which introduces a 
gradual policy change over 10 periods, farmers need to adjust to gradually de-
creasing direct payments. Whereas in scenarios RETPAY and DECOUP the re-
tirement payment as well as the decoupled single farm payment pull farmers out 
of the sector by providing an incentive payment, in scenario PHASEOUT10 
farms are pushed out. When going back to Figure 7-1, one can additionally ob-
serve that the number of farms gradually declines in response to the stepwise 
payment cut. In this scenario, only unprofitable farms at the margin quit; i.e.,   7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  147 
farms whose opportunity costs of farm-owned factors are just above expected 
profits. A Farm with opportunity costs just below expected profits remain in the 
sector at least until the next premium cut, provided the farm's organisation re-
mains unchanged until the next premium cut.  
Compared to policies DECOUP and RETPAY, two phenomena are particularly 
about PHASEOUT10 interesting. On the one hand, after direct payments have 
ceased, which is 10 periods after the policy change, about the same number of 
farms remains in the region as in policy DECOUP, despite of no support pay-
ments. Figure 7-2 shows the percentage share of abandoned land, i.e., land, 
which is neither rented nor owned by farms. Accordingly, in scenario PHASE-
OUT10 all land is rented to farms only until period 6. One could thus conclude 
that the direct payment level in this period represents a kind of critical threshold 
below which land was abandoned.  













































Based on Table 7-3 and Figure 7-2 it becomes apparent that land is abandoned 
only when direct payments are either fully decoupled or if payments undergo 
successive cuts. The phenomenon of land abandonment thus directly relates to 
the provision of coupled direct payments. In the case of livestock production, 
direct payments are linked exclusively to production activities depending on 
grassland. This is reflected in revenue shares (Table 7-4) as well as in extremely 148  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
low rental prices for grassland, which is shown in Figure 7-18.  
On the other hand, the number of farms in scenario PHASEOUT10 is consis-
tently above the number of farms in scenario RETPAY. This suggests that under 
free-market conditions more farms would remain in the sector than in case of a 
retirement payment. From this, one could conclude that also farms with a devel-
opment perspective leave the sector in response to the retirement payment. 
Whether or not this is the case, will be analysed – amongst other things – in the 
remainder of this chapter.  
Kernel density estimates and cumulative density functions allow to analyse the 
distribution of farms in the region and to derive some insights about the evolu-
tion of surviving farms. The curves in Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4 thus show the 
probability mass of the respective variable across the sample of farms at four 
time periods: before the policy change (time period t=3), the short-term effect 
(time period t=6), the medium-term effect (time period t=14), and the long-term 
effect (time period t=24).  
In general, the distribution of farm size in all policy scenarios moves to the right, 
indicating farm growth. This is inline with the analysis of averages in Figure 
7-1. Furthermore, particularly in the medium and long-run, the shapes of the 
curve are more pronounced for scenarios REF, DECOUP and PHASEOUT10 
with peaks appearing at around 40 ha, 60 ha, and 90 ha. Hence, clusters of farms 
of similar sizes emerge. Nevertheless, distributions show differences, particu-
larly if periods are compared.  
For example, Figure 7-3 (b) illustrates the strong initial effect of policy RET-
PAY. Based on this figure, the significant shift in average farm size, observed in 
Figure 7-1, could be attributed to small farms withdrawing from the sector. On 
the one hand, this can be seen from the fact that the smallest farm, after intro-
duction of policy RETPAY, has about 20 ha; i.e., even smaller farms either have 
quit or grown in size. On the other hand, the peak of the distribution is located 
considerably further to the right indicating the existence of more large farms 
compared to the other scenarios. In addition, a few very large farms emerge. It is 
interesting to observe that the retirement payment is only effective in the short-
run, with many farms taking the opportunity to leave. This offers more growth 
potential to surviving farms. However, in subsequent periods, the retirement 
payment's incentive function, and the impact on structural change is negligible. 
Even though policies RETPAY and DECOUP both provide and incentives for 
labour to move out of farming, farm size distributions differ significantly be-
tween the two scenarios.    7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  149 
Figure 7-3: Kernel density estimates of farm size 





































































































In fact, farm size distributions of policy DECOUP are similar to those of sce-
narios REF and PHASEOUT10. Overall, for these three scenarios, a similar de-
velopment over time can be detected. First, the distributions slowly shift to the 
right indicating that over time small farms either leave the sector, or have grow. 
Second, particularly in the medium and long-run, the shape of the curve be-
comes more pronounced with peaks appearing at certain local maxima. How-
ever, a further analysis of economic farm size (Figure 7-5), and profits from ag-
riculture (Figure 7-23) suggests that although farms are similar in size, they nev-
ertheless differ with respect to output, and economic importance. 
Moreover, policy scenarios REF, PHASEOUT10, and DECOUP create policy 
environments that allow for the further existence of small farms, at least in the 
short-run and in the medium-run (Figure 7-4). This particular aspect constitutes 
a major difference between a retirement payment in scenario RETPAY and a 
decoupled single farm payment.  150  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Figure 7-4: Empirical cumulative density function of farm size 

























































One possible explanation for small farms to exist in policy scenarios DECOUP 
and PHASEOUT10 could be that farms under these policy regimes do not quit 
immediately but convert into non-professional farms. Indeed, a decoupled single 
farm payment provides the ground for mixing income sources in the best possi-
ble way as long as this is profitable. In policy RETPAY, a farm will only receive 
the payment, if it withdraws. The same line of reasoning applies to policy 
PHASEOUT10, where, as long as coupled direct payments are granted, small 
farms mix income sources (see Figure 7-25). In any case, the existence of small 
farms is a phenomenon, which appears only in the short and medium-run. In the 
long-run, i.e., after 24 time periods, also small farms disappear in scenario DE-
COUP. However, as small farms disappear in the long-run, it shows that the 
strategy of mixing income sources is only viable for a limited number of time 
periods. It is interesting to observe that also in the case of fully coupled direct 
payments (REF) very small farms disappear in the long-run. Hence, one may 
conclude, that very small farms continue to exist not only because of coupled   7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  151 
direct payments, but also because the policy provides an incentive to mix in-
come sources. In this regard, only a policy, such as RETPAY, directed at remov-
ing labour from the sector, effectively 'removes' very small farms already in the 
short-run.  
7.3.2  Economic farm size 
Farm size in hectares is just one indicator for the actual size of the farm. Yet, it 
does not give precise information about the economic importance of the farm. 
For this, the economic size of a farm is a more appropriate indicator. The eco-
nomic farm size, expressed in European Size Units (ESU), corresponds to the 
total production valued at standard gross margin.
88 Figure 7-5 and Figure 7-6 
present kernel density estimates and the empirical cumulative density function 
of the economic size of farms.  
Four points are worth noting here. First, the economic size of farms and its de-
velopment over time does not exactly correspond to the farm size measured in 
hectares. For example, in the reference scenario, the average standard gross 
margin per ha for specialised granivore farms is twice as high (2,103 €/ha) than 
for grazing livestock farms (1,011 €/ha) or mixed farms (1,116 €/ha). Gross 
margin per hectare is generally higher for intensive livestock farming than for 
other types of farming despite of the land required for manure disposal. A com-
parison of Figure 7-4 and Figure 7-5 shows differences to appear particularly at 
the lower tails of the distributions. Also with respect to economic size, the speed 
of adjustment varies between scenarios. Most prominent is policy scenario 
RETPAY, where the distribution shows a considerable shift immediately after 
the policy change.  
Second, Figure 7-5 shows that in terms economic size all alternative policy sce-
narios (RETPAY, PHASEOUT10, and DECOUP) increase economic size com-
pared to the reference. Over 20 time periods, the peak of the distributions shifts 
significantly to the right. Differences also become apparent at the lower tail and 
the centre of the distribution. At the upper tail, however, differences – in par-
ticular relative to the references – get smaller or even disappear (Figure 7-6). 
This indicates that few very large farms act more or less independently of the 
prevailing policy environment. 
Third, the reference scenario – and less so policy DECOUP – provide the basis 
                                           
88   See chapter 6 for a definition and the respective data base used for calculation. 152  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
for small farms to survive throughout all time periods, even though their number 
steadily decreases over time. Reasons for this were given above in the discus-
sion of farm size. Fourth, also with regard to economic size local maxima appear 
in the long-run in scenarios RETPAY, PHASEOUT10, and DECOUP around 70 
ESU, 110 ESU, and 210 ESU.  
Figure 7-5: Kernel density estimates of economic farm size 




































































































   7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  153 
Figure 7-6: Empirical cumulative density function of economic farm size 

























































7.3.3  Impacts on production and factor input 
As was seen in the previous sections, some of the policy scenarios considered, 
lead to dramatic and sudden changes on the region's farm structure. Thus far, the 
analysis has put emphasis on farm size and farms' economic size. This section is 
devoted to the investigation of specific adjustment reactions of active farms, i.e., 
farms remaining in the sector. The relationship between policies, on the one 
hand, and specialisation as well as production intensity, on the other hand, are at 
the centre of analysis. 
Figure 7-7 shows the evolution of revenue per hectare of farmland for each pol-
icy scenario. Farmland includes all land rented or owned by farms.  154  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 




























Revenue per hectare in scenario RETPAY is considerably below that of the ref-
erence and the other alternative scenarios. Hence, production becomes less in-
tensive if related to land. The difference to the reference is due to a lower in-
crease in total revenues. In scenarios DECOUP and PHASEOUT10, production 
intensity is higher in the short-run compared to the reference and policy RET-
PAY. Immediately after the policy change, growth in revenue exceeds the rate at 
which land is abandoned in scenarios DECOUP and PHASEOUT10 (refer back 
to Figure 7-2). A look at revenue shares allows analysing the contribution of 
production activities to total revenue. Table 7-4 presents revenue shares of main 
products measured at four different points in time.    7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  155 
Table 7-4:  Revenue shares of product by policy and time periods 










Policy Time  period 
% 
REF Bef.  policy 
change 
100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3
 Short-term    100  15.0 56.7 11.5 2.4 6.0  0.7  7.7
 Medium-term    100  14.2 58.1 13.3 2.7 8.6  0.2  2.8
 Long-term    100  13.1 49.1 23.6 2.8 11.4  0.0  0.0
RETPAY Bef.  policy 
change 
100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3
 Short-term    100  16.0 48.4 22.6 3.2 8.1  0.2  1.4
 Medium-term    100  15.1 38.0 31.0 3.1 12.4  0.1  0.3
 Long-term    100  13.2 25.2 45.8 2.4 13.4  0.0  0.0
Bef. policy 
change 
100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3 PHASE- 
OUT10 
Short-term   100  14.7 54.5 14.5 2.0 6.3  0.6  7.4
 Medium-term    100  14.5 53.2 22.0 0.0 8.0  0.0  2.3
 Long-term    100  13.8 43.5 32.4 0.0 10.3  0.0  0.0
DECOUP Bef.  policy 
change 
100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3
 Short-term    100  15.2 51.3 20.0 0.1 7.3  0.0  6.1
 Medium-term    100  15.2 50.6 24.6 0.1 7.5  0.0  2.1
 Long-term    100  14.0 41.8 36.7 0.3 7.2  0.0  0.0
        
Although policy RETPAY leads to a more extensive production, revenue shares 
of products show that in this scenario a dichotomy in production emerges. On 
the one hand, additional grassland available due to structural change offers 
scope to increase extensive suckler cow production. On the other hand, arable 
land of leaving farms provides the grounds for increased intensive livestock 
production. Interesting with regard to this policy is the fact that both dairy pro-
duction and intensive beef cattle almost disappear shortly after the policy 
change, despite of coupled direct payments. The main reason behind this phe-
nomenon is that dairy cows and beef cattle are held in smaller farms, which quit 
in response to a policy change (see Table A-9 in appendix A.6). The question 
remains why large farms remaining in the sector after the policy change do not 
take up dairy production despite of declining quota prices from initially 
0.05 €/litre to around 0.03 €/litre. Compared to fattening pig production and tur-
key production, dairy production is both more labour and capital intensive, and 
it requires grassland as a fodder base as well as additional quota. In all scenarios, 156  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
farms do not (re-)invest in larger dairy operations.
89 Dairy investments in 
Hohenlohe are thus less competitive than investments in pig and poultry.  
Unlike scenario RETPAY, production in scenarios DECOUP and PHASE-
OUT10 is mainly characterised by intensive livestock production only. Both, 
beef cattle production and suckler cow production are not viable in the medium 
and long-run.
90 
91As for policy DECOUP, direct payments are paid as a decoup-
led single farm payment, such that production decisions are made exclusively 
based on market price signals. In this case, the single farm payment adds to 
household income (section 7.5), but not to the profitability of single production 
activities.  
Finally, the reference policy REF is discussed. Two observations are of interest 
with respect to this policy: just like in the alternative scenarios, in the reference 
scenario, the relative share of intensive livestock production, and particularly 
fattening pig production and turkey production increases. Furthermore, dairy 
production and beef cattle ceases also in this scenario as in all other scenarios. 
The reasons for this were given in the discussion of policy RETPAY: dairy and 
beef production are located mostly in small farms withdrawing from the sector 
over time.  
The specific production development also explains the development of the aver-
age stocking density in the region (Figure 7-8). In the figure, stocking density is 
measured relative to total farmland. Abandoned land is not considered. On aver-
age, stocking density is highest in the reference scenario. With respect to that, all 
other scenarios represent an extensification in the short-run. However, the figures 
                                           
89   Although dairy production ceases in the long-run, quota prices do not decline to zero. 
There are two reasons for this. One is that quota in AgriPoliS can be traded not only 
within the region, but across regions. Despite of no production in Hohenlohe, other farms 
in neighbouring regions could equally produce milk. The other region is that price cuts 
were introduced as percentage changes relative to the respective price in the year before 
(cf. chapter 3 and 4). Moreover, the assumption regarding milk price chances does not 
take account of the potential effect of an additional devaluation of quota in response to 
decoupled direct payments. 
90   This result, however, has to be taken with care because in reality the profitability of suck-
ler cow production also strongly depends on marketing possibilities. Furthermore, suckler 
cow production is one of the measures specifically supported through the second pillar of 
agricultural policy of the EU. These policy measures, which mainly include structural, so-
cial, and agri-environmental policies, are not explicitly considered here.  
91   The fact that in scenario DECOUP suckler cows are still produced although at very low 
numbers is a direct result of the very low (almost zero) rental price of grassland in this 
scenario.    7.3  Structural adjustments following a policy change  157 
also show that in the medium and long-run only scenarios DECOUP and 
PHASEOUT10 lead to a lasting extensification of production at a lower level 
(approx. 2 LU/ha on average) compared to the reference (see Figure 7-9) while 
RETPAY recovers.  

















































Although stocking density in scenarios DECOUP and RETPAY decreases right 
after the policy change, starting in period 11 stocking density in scenario RET-
PAY shows a strong increasing tendency, whereas stocking density in scenario 
DECOUP remains at a lower level. Hence, in scenario RETPAY, where direct 
payments are still coupled to production, production gradually re-intensifies af-
ter the initial policy shock. In response to the policy change in scenario RET-
PAY, many farms quit (Figure 7-1), letting about 45% of all agricultural land to 
the land market. Leaving farms are predominantly engaged in producing field 
crops, and grazing livestock (see Table A-9 in appendix A.6), i.e. the farms use 
grassland. Farms remaining in the sector are for the most part specialised 
granivore farms.  158  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Figure 7-9: Kernel density estimates of individual farm stocking density 

































































































With respect to farms remaining in the sector, the policy change has two effects. 
Because land becomes cheaper, farms exceeding the maximum stocking density 
of 2.5 LU/ha before the policy change (and therefore paid fines) can now attain 
the maximum level without incurring fines. Hence, in the short-run the retire-
ment payment leads to an extensification of production. But, in the longer run 
coupled direct payments, which are paid in scenario RETPAY, provide the basis 
for re-intensification. On the one hand, remaining farms increase their engage-
ment in intensive livestock production (fattening pigs, and turkeys). On the other 
hand, farms increase suckler cow production to take advantage of low rental 
prices for grassland in addition to direct payments for suckler cows. 
The development of livestock production obviously also influences labour input. 
The average labour input annual work units (AWU) per 100 ha is presented in 
Figure 7-10. Labour input is measured against all farmed agricultural area. It 
comprises farm-owned labour as well as hired labour.   7.4  Efficiency implications  159 
As was seen in the previous figures, production in scenario RETPAY re-intensi-
fies after the policy change. This is why permanently lower labour input in this 
scenario can only be explained with size effects generated by larger production 
facilities and larger machinery. As was seen, policies RETPAY and DECOUP 
(and in later periods also PHASEOUT10) favour the development of larger 
farms.  








































7.4 Efficiency  implications 
Having analysed the main structural effects, this section will focus in particular 
on the efficiency effects of policies. Efficiency is looked at from two sides. The 
frontier-based DEA approach (cf. chapter 6) is used to derive individual effi-
ciency scores for individual farms and the aggregate of farms. This latter aggre-
gate or structural efficiency measure allows drawing conclusions about the effi-
ciency of the region as a whole. Economic land rent is used as an indicator for 
the allocation of production factors on individual farms and the region. 160  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
7.4.1  Analysis of individual and structural efficiency 
To derive efficiency scores, the DEA model is estimated as described in chapter 
6. Assuming output-orientation and constant returns to scale technology, the 
density estimates of efficiency scores for each policy alternative at four different 
time periods are visualised in Figure 7-11 and Figure 7-12.
92 In the output-
oriented model, a score of unity denotes efficiency, whereas inefficient farms 
receive a score greater one.  






































































































                                           
92   Units with an efficiency score of '1' are excluded from the density estimation.    7.4  Efficiency implications  161 
Relative to the situation before the policy change, two main observations can be 
made in the short-run. One is that, scenarios RETPAY and DECOUP create 
strong incentives for inefficient farms either to quit farming or to become more 
efficient through investments and realisation of size effects. Because of this, the 
group of remaining farms becomes more homogenous with respect to individual 
efficiency. Greater homogeneity is also reflected in the majority of surviving 
farms following the same specialisation, which is pig and poultry production 
(see Table 7-4). In the other two scenarios (REF and PHASEOUT10) the upper 
tail of the efficiency distribution shows a slight, but minor change. Relative to 
the situation before the policy change, however, farms increase efficiency. 
The second observation is that – except for policies REF and PHASEOUT10 – 
the peak of most distributions is not at the point of the highest efficiency in the 
short-run. Because of the assumed technological change and size effects, one 
should expect the peak of the distributions at the point of highest efficiency, par-
ticularly for policies RETPAY and DECOUP, where farms are more efficient in 
the short run (Figure 7-11). But technological change may also provide one pos-
sible explanation for this phenomenon. With every new investment that is tech-
nologically more advanced, a farm reduces variable production costs. Hence, it 
is likely to move closer to the frontier. Farms that invested in previous periods 
become relatively less efficient. Because of the assumed technological change 
and size effects, one should expect the peak of the distributions at the point of 
highest efficiency, particularly for policies RETPAY and DECOUP, where 
farms are more efficient in the short run (Figure 7-11). Regarding policies DE-
COUP and RETPAY, the peak phenomenon relates to the fact that in RETPAY 
and DECOUP, a few very large farms emerge causing a slight shift in the fron-
tier, such that the majority of farms are located just below the frontier.
93 
                                           
93   This phenomenon could also be related to a kind of inherent inefficiency originating from 
the random properties of the DEA estimator (KNEIP et al. 2003). But the fact that the peak 
does not appear consistently across all scenarios makes this rather unlikely. 162  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Figure 7-12:  Empirical cumulative density function of output-oriented indi-
vidual efficiency scores 














(a) Before policy change


















































To further differentiate efficiency scores, Table 7-5 provides mean individual 
efficiencies and mean scale efficiency by revenue class. Accordingly, mean inef-
ficiency of farm agents with revenue below 50,000 Euros is significantly higher 
than inefficiency of all other farm agents. However, depending on the policy, the 
group of low revenue farms is comparatively smaller. The main source of ineffi-
ciency with low output farms is scale inefficiency.    7.4  Efficiency implications  163 
Table 7-5  Mean individual efficiencies and mean scale efficiencies by revenue 
class (all periods taken together) 
Revenue class (1000 €)  REF  RETPAY PHASEOUT10  DECOUP 
<50  Indiv. eff.  1.2205 (352) 1.2235 (134) 1.2139 (237)  1.1834 (188)
 Scale  eff.  1.144 1.132 1.140  1.103
50-200  Indiv. eff.  1.0629 (736) 1.0650 (504) 1.0609 (682)   1.0568 (634)
 Scale  eff.  1.007 1.006 1.007  1.007
200-350  Indiv. eff.  1.0345 (415) 1.0396 (302) 1.0315 (399)   1.0315 (344)
 Scale  eff.  1.004 1.004 1.004  1.004
>350  Indiv. eff.  1.0319 (151) 1.0390 (203) 1.0224 (170)  1.0243 (190)
 Scale  eff.  1.003 1.005 1.003  1.003
Total average  Indiv. eff.  1.0865 1.0723  1.0730   1.0634 
 Scale  eff.  1.0350 1.0200 1.0270  1.0190
Note:  Total number of farms in brackets. 
Regarding the aggregate efficiency of the entire region, Table 7-6 presents a 
summary of results. In particular, it shows bias-corrected mean efficiencies 
(MeEff) and structural efficiencies (StEff) for the four policy scenarios.
94 Struc-
tural efficiencies are derived by weighting individual farm efficiency scores by 
output shares. Furthermore, the table shows efficiency ratios (RD) of both mean 
and structural efficiencies. 
Policies inducing a strong immediate effect (DECOUP and RETPAY) increase 
mean efficiency in the short-run with a bias-corrected efficiency score of 1.0608 
for DECOUP and 1.0728 for RETPAY. Relative to the reference, mean effi-
ciency remains higher in all following periods. Because of the stepwise payment 
cut, the effect of policy PHASEOUT10 sets in later, such that differences only 
become apparent in the medium-run. This corresponds with results from the 
density estimation. Already in the medium-run, the situation changes with mean 
efficiency being highest for policy PHASEOUT10 (1.0446). This indicates that 
the stepwise removal of coupled direct payments and the subsequent adjustment 
of farms, leads to considerable efficiency increases with farms remaining in the 
sector while very inefficient farms quit (Figure 7-12). Only policy DECOUP 
yields comparable results on average, despite of the different policy design. Re-
garding DECOUP and PHASEOUT10, differences in mean efficiency to the 
reference and RETPAY are statistically significant at the 5% level in the me-
dium and long-run. Regarding RETPAY, the difference to the reference is statis-
                                           
94   Bias-correction is required because the DEA estimator underestimates the true efficiency 
score (SIMAR and ZELENYUK 2003). 164  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
tically significant in the short and medium-run, but vanishes in the long-run. 
This is inline with previous observations, where it turns out that the policies af-
fect farms in the region quite differently in the short-run whereas in the long-
run, differences in the farm performances almost disappear. 
Table 7-6:  Bias-corrected mean efficiencies, structural efficiencies, and effi-
ciency ratios of structural efficiencies and mean efficiencies CRS 
Effi-
ciency 








MeEff REF  1.1190  1.1277  1.0916  1.0786 
 RETPAY  1.1187  1.0728  1.0582  1.0575 
 PHASEOUT10  1.1190  1.1146  1.0446  1.043 
 DECOUP  1.1185  1.0608  1.0491  1.0449 
StEff REF  1.0524  1.0595  1.0466  1.0581 
 RETPAY  1.052  1.0595  1.0517  1.0491 
 PHASEOUT10  1.0523  1.0563  1.0351  1.0394 
 DECOUP  1.0521  1.0482  1.0374  1.0389 
REF/RETPAY  1.0002  1.0516*)  1.0317*)  1.02  RD 
MeEff REF/PHASEOUT10  0.99993  1.0119  1.045*)  1.0342*) 
 REF/DECOUP  1.0004  1.0634*)  1.0407*)  1.0323*) 
 RETPAY/PHASEOUT10  0.99966  0.96178  1.013*)  1.0139*) 
 RETPAY/DECOUP 1.0001  1.0113  1.0087  1.0121*) 
 PHASEOUT10/DECOUP 1.0004  1.051*)  0.99575  0.9982 
REF/RETPAY  1.0003  0.99997  0.99501  1.0086  RD 
StEff REF/PHASEOUT10  1.0001  1.003  1.0111*)  1.0181*) 
 REF/DECOUP  1.0003  1.0108**)  1.0089  1.0185*) 
 RETPAY/PHASEOUT10  0.99973  1.003  1.0161*)  1.0094 
 RETPAY/DECOUP 0.99989  1.0108**)  1.0139*)  1.0098 
 PHASEOUT10/DECOUP 1.0001  1.0077  0.99776  1.0004 
Notes:   *) Efficiency difference statistically significant at the 5% level; **) efficiency difference 
statistically significant at the 10% level; StEff = structural efficiency, MeEff = mean effi-
ciency; RD of StEff = bootstrap-based ratio of structural efficiencies; RD of MeEff = boot-
strap-based ratio of mean efficiencies; B=1000 bootstrap rounds, κ =0.7. 
As mean efficiency does not account for the economic importance of individual 
farms but puts equal weights on all farms in the region, structural efficiency 
scores are computed. One immediately observes structural efficiencies to be 
lower than mean efficiencies, indicating that the region is generally more effi-
cient than the mean would suggest.
95 This result does not surprise because larger 
                                           
95   It should be noted that efficiency is measured relative to all farms and scenarios in a sin-
gle period, i.e., farms and policies were pooled in single sample in each time period. 
Because of this, it is not possible to compare structural efficiencies between time periods. 
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farms having a higher output share are generally more efficient due to techno-
logical change, size effects, and labour saving investments. However, when out-
puts are used as weights, it also appears that the differences between scenarios 
that existed for mean efficiency disappear in the short-run.  
Referring back to Figure 7-11 and Figure 7-12 it also becomes apparent, that 
many inefficient farms can be neglected when it comes to the economic impor-
tance of these farms. Because inefficient farms mostly have a very low output 
weight, the contribution of inefficient farms to structural efficiency is very 
small. This explains why differences between structural efficiencies between 
scenarios are smaller than differences between mean efficiencies. Although it 
would have been desirable that agricultural policies increase structural effi-
ciency significantly, none of the policies neither significantly increase nor de-
crease structural efficiency. Nevertheless, structural efficiency does not decrease 
after a policy change. 
In general, efficiency scores in Figure 7-11 cover a relatively small range with 
maximum inefficiency in scenarios REF being around 1.5 in the short-run. Still, 
the bootstrap-based statistical test captures differences in mean and structural 
efficiencies at the 5% level. The test of the equality of mean efficiencies con-
firms the graphical results given in Figure 7-11. In case of scenarios REF and 
RETPAY, the null hypothesis of equal structural efficiencies has to be accepted. 
In other words, although these scenarios differ with respect to mean efficiency, 
considering economic importance, the efficiency of the entire region is not sig-
nificantly different.  
7.4.2 Economic  efficiency   
The second efficiency aspect considered in this section is economic efficiency. 
In other words, it addresses the question of the allocation of farm-owned pro-
duction factors of individual farms and within the entire region. Figure 7-13 and 
Figure 7-14 show the evolution of average economic land rent in the region. In 
                                           
Because of this, it is not possible to compare structural efficiencies between time periods. 
This would require pooling farms, policy scenarios, and periods. A formal method for 
comparisons between time periods would be a Malmquist analysis (cf. COELLI et al. 1999) 
which allows identifying productivity change over time and the contribution of efficiency 
and technological change to productivity change. For the purpose of this study, a Malm-
quist analysis was not yet undertaken. In case of comparing structural efficiencies, the 
usual Malmquist approach needs to be augmented. This, however, is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. It is the subject of work in progress. 166  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Figure 7-13, subsidies (coupled direct payments, single farm payment) are in-
cluded, whereas Figure 7-14 excludes subsidy payments to compare and show 
how economic land rents would develop if subsidies were removed in any one 
period. Sunk costs of fixed assets are not included either (without sunk costs). It 
shows that economic efficiency is highest for policy scenarios RETPAY and 
DECOUP relative to the reference with and without subsidies. This result indi-
cates that the efficiency gain induced by these policies in any case outweighs the 
influence of subsidy payment in the reference.  





























































Regarding policy PHASEOUT10, average economic land rent in Figure 7-13 is 
considerably below the other policy scenarios and it declines while payments are 
cut successively. However, if subsidies are not included in the calculation, there 
is step-wise increase in economic efficiency in this scenario, pointing towards a 
gradual re-organisation of production. Moreover, Figure 7-14 demonstrates that 
in the medium-run average economic land rents of all alternative policy scenar-
ios are closely together. In other words, regarding overall efficiency a similar 
situation is reached with three very different policy measures. But, this only 
holds in the medium-run. In the longer-run, the curves diverge slightly again.   7.4  Efficiency implications  167 



























































To assess the respective adjustment costs associated with a policy change, Table 
7-7 shows average economic land rents with and without sunk costs for labour 
and fixed assets. In the comparison, subsidies are not included to make the indi-
cator comparable across all policy scenarios and time periods. Economic land 
rent is computed as defined in chapter 6.  
Two aspects are most noteworthy about the table. First, economic land rent is 
negative in most time periods. This means that the initialised structure with data 
from the Hohenlohe region is highly inefficient with respect to the allocation of 
production factors unless subsidies are provided (Figure 7-13). That is to say, 
production factors are not necessarily used where productivity is highest. How-
ever, with structural change, economic land rent increases in all policy scenarios 
indicating that efficiency in the region increases. This can be observed best in 
Figure 7-14. 168  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Table 7-7:  Comparison of economic land rent including sunk costs and eco-
nomic land rent without sunk costs excluding subsidies 
Economic land rent  REF  RETPAY  PHASEOUT10  DECOUP 
 (€/ha) 
Before policy change (t=3)  -430  -430  -430  -430 
without sunk costs  -319  -319  -319  -319 
Immediately after change (t=4)  -388  -2,360  -437  -1,259 
without sunk costs  -299  -112  -291  -162 
Short-term effect (t=6)  -336  -131  -374  -191 
without sunk costs  -274  -97  -247  -144 
Medium-term effect (t=14)  -194  -49  -108  -71 
without sunk costs  -176  -21  -63  -49 
Long-term effect (t=24)  -104  115  -3  21 
without sunk costs  -73  144  -60  75 
Capital value of economic land rent 
incl. sunk costs (base: t=3)
a)b) 
-4,021 -2,893  -2,859  -2,638 
Ave. annual economic land rent incl. 
sunk costs
c) 
-221 -159  -157  -145 
Notes:   a) Interest: 5.5%; b) under the assumption that policy is not terminate; c) computed from 
capital value of economic land rent. 
Second, structural adjustment leads to a massive devaluation of asset and human 
capital as represented by sunk costs. These can also be interpreted as the costs of 
structural adjustment. Initially, policies RETPAY and DECOUP are very costly 
in this respect. Accordingly, a large amount of productive capital is lost by 
farms leaving the sector. Despite of this short-term effect, farms in policy sce-
narios RETPAY and DECOUP generate a significantly higher economic land 
rent in all following periods as compared to the reference. To evaluate the total 
adjustment costs caused by the policy, the capital value of economic land rents 
including sunk costs is computed for an infinite number of periods.
96 Results 
show that capitalised adjustment costs per hectare are highest in scenario REF, 
and lowest in scenario DECOUP. Hence, compared to all other policies policy 
DECOUP creates the highest efficiency gains in the long-run which compensate 
for high adjustment costs incurred immediately after the policy change. 
Although the previous figures provided some substantial information on the al-
location of production factors together with advantages of individual efficiency, 
there are drawbacks with using averages. Due to a sample effect, the number of 
farms as well as the total amount of agricultural land managed by farms changes 
                                           
96   It is assumed that the policies do not terminate, and the rate of structural change continu-
ous after period t=24 at the average of periods 20 to 24.    7.4  Efficiency implications  169 
over time and between scenarios (Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2). Therefore, on av-
erage, economic land rent may increase, but the direction of change depends on 
the development of the sample of farms and the amount of land farmed. Fur-
thermore, average economic land rent is calculated from aggregate values, i.e. it 
does not account for heterogeneity between farms. Because of this, density esti-
mates of economic land rent calculated across individual active farms (Figure 
7-15) allows for additional insights.  
Figure 7-15:  Kernel density estimates of individual farm economic land rent  
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The density estimates highlight the fact that all alternative policy scenarios in-
crease overall efficiency compared to the reference at least in the medium-run. 
Even though in all scenarios a significant and over time increasing share of 
farms generates a positive economic land rent, the question remains, why in all 
scenarios even in the long-run, the share of farms with a negative economic land 
rent is considerably high. A likely answer may be found in the specific exit 170  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
dynamics generated by the different policy scenarios. In particular policies REF 
and PHASEOUT10, but also policy DECOUP create a policy environment that 
allows small, non-professional farms to remain in the sector in the short and me-
dium-run even though the long-run opportunity costs of the farms are not cov-
ered. This issue has been discussed at several instances in this chapter. It also 
provides an explanation for differences at the lower end of the density curves. 
The maximum economic land rent of policy scenarios RETPAY and DECOUP 
are about equal as well as the curves' peaks. But, the distribution of scenario 
DECOUP is significantly wider than that of RETPAY. The difference between 
the uniform retirement payment and a decoupled single farm payment may be 
explained by the fact that in case of the first policy more farms leave than under 
the latter policy (see section 7.3.1).  
7.4.3  Impact on rental prices 
Surviving farms may also take advantage of some relaxations on factor markets 
and in particular the situation on the land market. As Figure 7-16 illustrates, 
rental prices decrease despite of increasing economic land rents. In particular, 
impact is greatest for fully decoupled direct payments.  

































   7.4  Efficiency implications  171 
Apparently, a decoupled single farm payment leads to lower shadow prices for 
land, which immediately transfer into lower rental prices for arable land and 
grassland (Figure 7-17 and Figure 7-18).
97  
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Policy RETPAY has only minor effects on rental prices: in the short-run and in 
the medium-run, rental prices for arable land and grassland decrease, mainly 
                                           
97   This effect was also aggravated because it was assumed that farms expect rental prices to 
decrease. Accordingly, they valued own land after the policy change at only 75% (arable 
land) and 50% (grassland) as compared to the reference. In scenario PHASEOUT10, a 
comparable expectation was not made. Different expectations were introduced into the 
model because it was assumed that farms are able to anticipate effects of policy changes 
in a very basic way.  172  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
because of land supplied by leaving farms (about 7000 ha). Since remaining 
farms receive coupled direct payments, in the longer-run, the situation gets 
tenser again. In particular, direct payments for suckler cows directly transfer into 
higher shadow prices – and therefore higher rental prices – for grassland (see 
Figure 7-18). 
Figure 7-18:  Kernel density estimates of grassland rental price at four time 
periods 








































































































Cutting direct payments (scenario PHASEOUT10) results in a continuous ad-
justment of rental prices to the rental price level of scenario DECOUP. Scenario 
PHASEOUT10 also leads to increased dynamics on the land market, as between 
15 to 20% of the land is newly negotiated in each period (Table 7-8).  
The decoupled rental price level is only reached in time period 20, six time peri-
ods after direct payments ceased. The reason is that existing rental contracts are 
continuously re-negotiated and adjusted towards the average rent paid in the   7.5  Income implications  173 
region. Furthermore, with the absence of direct payments after 14 periods, the 
price of grassland drops nearly to zero (Figure 7-18).  
Table 7-8:  Share of newly negotiated rental contracts for policy scenarios REF, 
RETPAY, PHASEOUT10, and DECOUP 
Time period  REF  RETPAY  PHASEOUT10  DECOUP 
Before policy change (t=3)  9.3%  9.3%  9.3%  9.3% 
Immediately after change (t=4)  9.4%  59.5%  14.4%  61.4% 
Short-term effect (t=6)  7.8%  6.4%  19.4%  13.8% 
Medium-term effect (t=14)  5.3%  4.6%  19.9%  6.0% 
Long-term effect (t=24)  3.6%  1.1%  12.4%  4.6% 
        
7.5 Income  implications 
Before a policy change, about 40% of farmland is rented land. The share gener-
ally increases over time with structural change (refer back to Table 7-3). The 
increase is stronger for policies RETPAY and DECOUP which induce a strong 
and rapid structural change. As a result of this, the relation of rental prices to 
economic land rent changes in a way that average farm incomes are positively 
affected (Figure 7-19) as well as the distribution of farm incomes (Figure 7-20).  
Figure 7-19:  Evolution of average farm incomes for (a) all farms, and (b) 






































































































 174  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
Based on the explanations and insights provided so far in this chapter, the spe-
cific income responses differ substantially between policies. In case of the re-
tirement payment RETPAY, income grows as a combination of two effects. On 
the one hand, substantial structural change immediately after the policy change 
takes away pressure from the land market and provides the basis for surviving 
farms to grow and realise size effects. On the other hand, coupled direct pay-
ments favour certain production activities. However, despite of coupled direct 
payments less competition on the land market also reduces the degree to which 
direct payments transfer into rental prices. It should be stressed that these two 
effects weight higher than a fully decoupled single farm payment, which trans-
fers fully into farm incomes.  
Figure 7-20:  Kernel density estimates of farm incomes at four time periods 





























































































































Policy PHASEOUT10 is particularly interesting because from Figure 7-19 (a) it 
could be concluded that, on average, efficiency gains (Figure 7-14) and lower   7.5  Income implications  175 
rental prices compensate for income losses due to direct payment cuts. Against 
this, one may hold that the supposed efficiency gains may also result from a 
sample effect because the total number of farms in the sample changes over 
time. If instead of all farms, only farms surviving in all policy scenarios are ana-
lysed, Figure 7-19(b) shows that in scenario PHASEOUT10 farms on average 
incur income losses as compared to the reference scenarios DECOUP and RET-
PAY. With regard to stepwise payment cuts, the average income of surviving 
farms develops significantly below all other scenarios. Only when payments 
cease, restructuring leads to income increases.  
7.5.1 Income  differences  by size and farm type 
Before the policy change, the average farm income of the top quartile based on 
economic size is more than two times bigger than that of all farms (Figure 7-21). 
With structural change, income disparity decreases, though at varying degrees 
depending on the policy scenario.  
Figure 7-21:  Average farm income of the top quartile (25% largest farms 





REF RETPAY PHASEOUT10 DECOUP
Bef. policy change Short-term effect
Medium-term effect Long-term effect
 
Differences become obvious in the short and medium-run, where for policy sce-
narios REF and PHASEOUT10, income disparity between the 25% best farms 
and the average of all farms remains quite high. Because of the large number of 
particularly small farms leaving in response to policies RETPAY and DECOUP, 176  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
income dispersion in these scenarios decrease to their long-term level immedi-
ately after the policy change. From a long-term perspective, all policies narrow 
the dispersion of income by farm size and the farm income is therefore more 
equally distributed.  
There are also income disparities between farm types, but they are not as large 
as between farms classified by economic size. This is shown in Figure 7-22. For 
example, in the short-run in scenario RETPAY, the average farm income of 
grazing livestock farms and specialised granivore farms, which account for 2% 
and 75% of all farms, is respectively 25% and 10% higher than that of all farms. 
However, already in the medium-run none of the farms specialises in grazing 
livestock production. Farms increasingly derive income from activities not af-
fected by policy (Table 7-4). 
Thus, the comparative income advantage of the grazing livestock farms in pe-
riod 6 is not sufficient for the farms to keep their specialisation. Also specialised 
field crop farms are an exception in this scenario as only 1% of the farms in the 
region follow this specialisation. Overall, income differences are much higher in 
specialised granivore farms, which account for between 45% and 80% respec-
tively of all farms in the region. It has to be taken into account that the majority 
of specialised field crop and mixed farms are operate as non-professional farms, 
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7.5.2  Impact on income distribution 
The distribution of farm incomes within the farm sector is an important issue. 
Based on simulation results, distributions of farm incomes are analysed for dif-
ferent time periods. Using the methodology introduced in chapter 6, the distri-
bution of farm incomes is compared graphically in Figure 7-23 showing Lorenz 
curves and numerically in Table 7-9 using Gini indexes.  
Figure 7-23:  Empirical distribution of farm income at four time periods 

































































































































































Differences in distribution are highest shortly after the policy change. In the ref-
erence, farms in the lower quartile earn approximately 10% of total farm income 
(see Figure 7-20 for absolute values), whereas farms in the upper quartile ac-
count for more than 50% of total farm income. Over time, income inequality 
decreases in the reference scenario and scenarios DECOUP and PHASEOUT10.    7.5  Income implications  179 
Table 7-9:  Gini indexes of income distribution 
Time period  REF  RETPAY  PHASEOUT10  DECOUP 
Bef. policy change  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39 
Short-term 0.38  0.21  0.38  0.30 
Medium-term 0.34  0.22  0.28  0.26 
Long-term 0.27  0.31  0.26  0.25 
        
The introduction, in particular of a retirement payment (scenario RETPAY) has 
a significant impact on the distribution of incomes within the group. In particu-
lar, in the short-run, farm incomes are more equally distributed as about 75% of 
the farms accounted for about 65 % of the total income. The explanation for this 
is quite straightforward and follows a pattern that appeared already several times 
in this chapter: compared to the situation before the policy change a large num-
ber of low-income farms leaves the sector, such that the remaining farms can 
increase their income share. Right after the policy change, the group of farms 
remaining in the sector in scenario RETPAY is comparatively more homogene-
ous with respect to specialisation and economic size, which explains why the 
distribution of incomes is more equal. Note furthermore that inequality increases 
over time. This is quite surprising, as the agricultural structure quickly adjusts in 
response to the policy change, as was shown above. But, it confirms that, after 
the consolidation, the group of farms is getting increasingly heterogeneous.  
Thus, retirement payments together with coupled direct payments decrease ine-
quality in terms of income because of structural change in the short-run, but this 
is not a lasting effect. All other policies lead to a more lasting decrease in ine-
quality. In comparison with these policy scenarios, the absence of direct pay-
ments in scenarios PHASEOUT10 affects incomes of all farms in the sample in 
that the distribution of farm incomes moved to the left (Figure 7-20). This im-
plies that the average income decreases in the short-term.The absence of direct 
payments also affects the lower tail of the distribution as eventually some farms 
experience income losses. This influences the stability of a farm in a negative 
way because equity diminishes (Figure 7-24). In particular, in scenario PHAS-
EOUT10, low profits transfer into very low or even negative change in equity 
capital, which puts the stability of the farm at risk.
98 This provides one further 
indication that farms in this particular scenario are driven out.  
                                           
98   Change in equity capital is calculated as total household income including off-farm in-
come minus total household consumption, which is at least 15,500 Euros per family la-
bour unit. 180  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
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7.5.3  Off-farm income sources 
In view of equity change, it is interesting to observe the role that off-farm in-
come sources play in the process of structural change in particular as non-
professional farming is often considered as an adjustment strategy with respect 
to decreasing subsidy payment. The contribution of off-farm income sources to 
total household income (from which change in equity is calculated) is shown in 
Figure 7-25. Before the policy change, farms, on average, earn a quarter of total 
household income outside the farm. With structural change, the share of off-
farm income decreases in all policy scenarios.    7.5  Income implications  181 































The figure suggests that the contribution of non-professional farming as a source 
of income generation is declining significantly over time. This could be either 
because of the decreasing share of non-professional farms, or because of a grow-
ing share of on-farm incomes. A more differentiated view on this can be ob-
tained from Table 7-10 which shows the contribution of off-farm income to total 
household income for farms with an economic size of less than 25 ESU.  
Table 7-10: Off-farm income share of small farms < 25 ESU
a) 
Time period  REF  RETPAY  PHASEOUT10  DECOUP 
Bef. policy change  65% (228)  65% (228)  65% (228)  65% (228) 
Short-term  64% (189)  41% (6)  65% (167)  54% (80) 
Medium-term  60% (100)  24% (1)  58% (30)  48% (34) 
Long-term  47% (41)  28% (2)  90% (3)  42% (15) 
Note:   a) Number of farms in parentheses. 
The average off-farm income share is significantly above the average in the en-
tire region. Despite of this, the number of very small farms also dramatically 
decreases over time, particularly in scenario RETPAY. This may explain the 
declining share of off-farm income in total farm household income.  182  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
7.6  Government outlays  
The last perspective from which the policy alternatives are analysed is the gov-
ernment's total expenditure (outlays) on policy. For this, Figure 7-26 shows total 
outlays going to active and farmers who have left the sector in the course of 
simulation. As expected, with the introduction of a retirement payment, total ex-
penditure increases rapidly and substantially compared to the reference. Remov-
ing labour from the sector by means of an incentive payment – in this case paid 
as an annual rent of 10,000 € – thus turns out to be a very costly policy. Of 
course, the pull-effect of the incentive payment also depends on the amount, as 
it can be expected that a lower payment will draw less farms out of the sector.  
















































When contrasted with the achieved efficiency gains brought about by policy 
RETPAY, the net effect is in fact negative. Figure 7-27 illustrates that expendi-
ture per hectare in each time period exceeds efficiency gains measured in eco-
nomic land rent relative to the reference (see Figure 7-14). In this comparison, 
sunk costs of fixed assets are not included. If they were included, at least in sce-
narios DECOUP and RETPAY, the devaluation of fixed assets due to structural   7.6  Government outlays  183 
change (see Table 7-7) would be very large and outweigh any social efficiency 
gains in the short-run. In the long-run, efficiency gains from policy DECOUP 
outweigh the adjustment costs of the policy relative to the reference (see Table 
7-7) at equal costs to the government. 
Figure 7-27:  Net efficiency gain measured as the difference between economic 
land rent per hectare farmland, and total government outlays per hectare relative 











































Economic land rent > government outlays
Economic land rent < government outlays
 
Note:  Economic land rent including subsidies. 
On the contrary, efficiency gains are highest for policy PHASEOUT10, which is 
not surprising as 10 periods after the policy's introduction costs to the state are 
zero and adjustment costs to the policy are not included here. However, the so-
cial efficiency gain has to be seen against lower incomes by farmers. Once pay-
ments are removed, equity change was negative for very few farms, putting 
some farms' stability at risk (Figure 7-24).  
Whereas policies RETPAY and PHASEOUT10 represent two extremes in terms 
of policy expenditure, policy DECOUP takes a neutral position. Compared to 
the reference, total expenditure on the policy is positive remained at the same 
level, but efficiency gains are higher. Furthermore, as Figure 7-26 shows, in the 
short and medium-run the share of payments going to active farm is higher than 184  7  Retirement payment, phasing out, and a decoupled single farm payment 
the share going to farms withdrawing from the sector. However, the total 
amount going to active farms steadily decreases over time which is reflected in a 
decreasing efficiency gain in Figure 7-27.  
7.7  Summary and discussion of results 
The simulation experiments carried out and analysed in this chapter focussed on 
three policies. Table 7-11 provides a synopsis of key results for individual alter-
native policies. 
While each policy affected the agricultural structure of Hohenlohe in a different 
way, the original intention behind each policy was to reduce impediments to 
structural change and increase the efficiency of production in the region. At this 
point, it should be stressed that the results obtained are limited by the assump-
tions on which AgriPoliS, the underlying data and the analysis methods are 
based. As stated in OECD (1994), "any assessment of the implications of policy 
reforms will be complicated by the multitude of conflicting and contrasting 
forces that can be expected to exert adjustment pressures, particularly the over-
all state of the economy, changes in tastes and demographics changes." 
With regard to this application of AgriPoliS, it was assumed in particular that 
exogenous framework conditions do not change. In AgriPoliS, this applies to the 
labour market, interest rates, and the volatility of product prices not directly 
regulated by policy. Furthermore, results rest upon the assumption of techno-
logical change and size effects. Against this background, the results derived in 
this chapter have to be interpreted. Regarding the sections of this chapter, the 
following points shall be made.  
7.7.1 Agricultural  structure 
-  As expected, policies providing incentives for small farms to withdraw from 
the sector, lead to significantly larger farms that realise size effects and pro-
duce at lower costs.  
-  Depending on the definition of the respective policy, the speed of structural 
adjustment differs substantially between policy scenarios. Policies that pro-
vide incentive payments cause stronger adjustment reactions right after the 
policy change (DECOUP and RETPAY) than a policy introducing gradual 
changes (PHASEOUT10).  
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-  If payments are coupled to production, all land is rented in the region. If pay-
ments are either removed or decoupled from production, some land is aban-
doned, i.e., it is not demanded by farms. This results in very low rental 
prices, particularly for grassland. Even with very low rental prices for grass-
land, suckler cow production is not taken up at large scale. Hence, suckler 
cow production in this model is only profitable at a larger scale when there 
are coupled direct payments. 
-  Dairy production and beef cattle production cease in the long-run irrespec-
tive of the policy environment. On the one hand, this is owed to the fact that 
dairy and cattle are mostly held in small production units, most of which 
leave the sector over time. On the other hand, farms do not invest in dairy 
and cattle production because of high investment costs and high labour in-
tensity. 
-  In all policy scenarios, the dominant position of specialised granivore farms 
grows despite of the downward trend in product prices. Farms operating as 
specialised granivore before the policy change have the highest chances to 
survive during structural change in any of the alternative policies. What does 
this mean? First of all, with structural change, production in the region 
moves away from low productivity production activities depending on grass-
land toward policy-independent production activities. This is because farms 
already operating as specialised granivore farms do not switch to dairy or 
cattle production. If the rental price for grassland is low, or direct payments 
are available, suckler cow production, which is less capital intensive than 
dairy production (policy RETPAY), is taken up by a few farms. Second, 
specialisation in intensive livestock production is also the result of the possi-
ble production activities defined in the model. The model only considered 
production activities, which were typical for the base year. Other alternative 
production options were not considered. If other alternatives were provided, 
farms could be expected to diversify more.  
-  A decoupled single farm payment leads to extensification of production in 
terms of stocking density. Scenarios REF and RETPAY eventually lead to 
an increase in the stocking density in the medium and long-run due to the 
combined effect of low rental prices for (mainly) grassland and coupled di-
rect payments. 
-  Farms increasingly specialise and operate as professional farms, i.e., the de-
cision of farms is increasingly a leave-or-stay decision. Non-professional 
farming as an option 'in between' is an adjustment reaction to some farms in 
the short and medium-run, but it becomes irrelevant in the long-run.    7.7  Summary and discussion of results  187 
7.7.2 Efficiency 
-  Regarding individual DEA efficiency, they are statistically significant differ-
ences in means. Policies RETPAY and DECOUP increase mean efficiency 
in the short-run as structural change takes place and inefficient farms with-
draw. In the medium and long-run, the impacts of policies DECOUP and 
PHASEOUT10 on mean efficiency is higher, though.  
-  Regarding the share-weighted structural efficiency, differences between sce-
narios are smaller, but remain significant. The output share of relatively inef-
ficient farms is relatively small such that their contribution to total produc-
tion can be neglected.  
-  Compared to the reference, policies DECOUP and PHASEOUT10 represent 
improvements regarding mean and structural efficiencies throughout the en-
tire simulation. Although differences between these scenarios and the refer-
ence are small, they are statistically significant. Accordingly, the individual 
efficiency of farms increases.  
-  Taking adjustment costs into account, all alternative scenarios represent 
overall economic efficiency gains that compensate for adjustment costs. 
Overall efficiency gains are highest for policy DECOUP. 
7.7.3 Income 
-  Under the assumed framework conditions (constant interest rates and wages, 
little downwards trend of product prices), farm incomes on average increase. 
However, there are income differences between farm sizes and farm types. 
-  If no direct payments are paid to farms (scenarios PHASEOUT10 after 14 
simulation periods), a few farms generate a very low farm incomes eventu-
ally leading to negative equity change. Still, 98% of the farms operate at 
farm income levels of 20,000 € and above (including non-professional 
farms). Although average farm incomes of farms operating without direct 
payments are lower than in other policies, the stability of the great majority 
of farms is not at risk. Additionally, declining land values may also endanger 
farm stability as the land serves less as a loan security. 
-  As for off-farm income sources, mostly small farms derive income from off-
farm sources. In general, the stronger the policy under consideration induces 
structural adjustment process (RETPAY, DECOUP), the lower is the share 
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7.7.4 General 
This last point not only holds for structural efficiency but also for other indica-
tors (profit, farm size, economic land rent), namely that in the long-run differ-
ences between scenarios in terms of the distribution of indicators but also in the 
averages get smaller. What are the reasons for this? First of all, sudden and hard 
policy changes (RETPAY and DECOUP) lead to strong reactions on the side of 
the farms in the short-run. With a large number of farms leaving right after the 
policy change, the region is more or less consolidated with the remaining sample 
of farms being comparatively homogeneous. In the periods following the policy 
change, the heterogeneity of farms continuously increases, as for example the 
emergence of few but very large farms in the sample shows. In addition, the ini-
tial adjustment pressure created by policies RETPAY and DECOUP is strong. 
Following this, in policy RETPAY the retirement payment provides only little 
incentives for further structural change. This is fundamentally different in policy 
scenario PHASEOUT10 and even in the reference. In the latter case, the 'natural' 
structural dynamics inherent in AgriPoliS provide a constant, but slow adjust-
ment pressure to farms. However, effects similar to a sudden policy change are 
only visible in the long-run.  
Moreover, the simulation results have to be interpreted within the assumptions 
made. Several points appear especially relevant. First, AgriPoliS assumes 
economies of scale and technological change (cf. chapter 4) by way of lower 
costs which can be realised by all farms in the region by investing in assets, re-
spectively. This assumption is in accordance with empirical observations on cost 
digressions (e.g., KUHLMANN 1999; KUHLMANN and BERG 2002) as well as 
theoretical considerations (e.g. BRANDES and ODENING 1992). Second, it is as-
sumed that the rural labour market is capable of taking up all excess labour from 
agriculture as well as to meet farms' demand for hired labour. Third, farms face 
high sunk costs, as opportunity costs of farm-owned production factors are low, 
or zero in the case of fixed assets (cf. BALMANN 1995). Yet, one should not for-
get that opportunity costs between farms are heterogeneous and depend, e.g., on 
education and mobility. Fourth, rather moderate differences in the managerial 
ability of farms were assumed. That is, unit production costs of farms with high 
managerial ability and farms with low managerial ability differed by a 10% 
maximum. In reality, production cost differences between individual farms are 
potentially much larger. Fifth, labour-saving technical change and the assumed 
increase in costs of hired labour were considered comparatively low. Finally, 
sixth, as for off-farm labour opportunities, there are no differences in skills of 
individual farmers, i.e., farmers are equally smart and capable to work off-farm.  
8  Decoupling direct payments 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the focus of analysis was on three different policies. 
Each policy directed at lifting some impediments to structural change caused by 
agricultural policies. From the analysis, some general conclusions were drawn 
regarding adjustment reactions to policy changes. This chapter takes one of the 
policies discussed in chapter 7, decoupled direct payments, and analyses differ-
ent approaches to decoupling direct payments. 
The agricultural sector has a long tradition of protection and support payments. 
For nearly half a century, the main motivation for payment and support has been 
to raise incomes to small family farms. However, this traditional way of agri-
cultural policy making is associated with numerous negative effects. On the side 
of the farms, it has over the years lead farmers into a path-dependence in that 
support has stimulated farmers to invest and specialise in certain areas. More-
over, support is costly and not well targeted to the intended beneficiaries, which 
limits the acceptance of policy by society. If tied to the production of livestock 
or land, future support payments tend to be capitalised in land and paper assets 
(BEARD and SWINBANK 2001). At the more global level, support policies have 
depressed world market prices and reduced export shares of countries which do 
not support agriculture (BAFFES 2004). The central characteristic of all these 
policies is that they are coupled to production levels, input use, and prices.  
Given the harmful effects of traditional support policies, it has long been advo-
cated to decouple support from production, input use, and prices. (cf., BAFFES 
2004; BEARD and SWINBANK 2001, DEWBRE et al. 2001; KOESTER and TAN-
GERMANN 1976; LEWIS and FEENSTRA 1989; OECD 2001a; SWINBANK and 
TANGERMANN 2000; WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT BMVEL 1997). A policy is 
fully decoupled if it "… does not influence production decisions of farmers re-
ceiving payments, and if it permits free market determination of prices" (CAHILL 
1997). Assuming that a sudden move towards free market conditions will not be 
a socially and politically feasible alternative, the primary motivation for decoup-
ling is to compensate farmers for the move to free markets with transitions 190  8  Decoupling direct payments 
adjustment assistance while at the same time making the policy transparent and 
palatable (BAFFES 2004; BEARD and SWINBANK 2001).  
In the European Union, partly decoupled direct payments were first introduced 
as part of the MacSharry reforms in 1992, and they were further augmented by 
Agenda 2000. Regarding cereal production, payments were partly decoupled in 
that they combined a reduction of price support with compensatory payments. 
But, these compensatory payments still influenced the farmer's decision on how 
much land to plant. In that way, they were tied to the production of certain prod-
ucts, mainly cereals and cattle, such that decision making was not yet fully inde-
pendent of support. As for headage payments, BAFFES (2004) mentions two rea-
sons why these payments were coupled to production: first, because farmers 
were allowed to keep more cattle than are eligible for payments. Second, be-
cause the maximum number of cattle is not linked to numbers on farms prior to 
the introduction of the policy. 
Decoupling of direct payments has been the predominant topic in European ag-
riculture already before it has been brought into the discussion in the mid-term 
review of Agenda 2000 (EU COMMISSION 2002). The key element in the mid-
term review proposal is the introduction of a decoupled 'single farm payment' 
which is not related to production but based on historical payments and cross-
compliance rules. Although the 'single farm payment' was envisioned as the 
standard form of decoupling, the Commission granted member states the option 
to introduce a regionalised single area payment instead (COUNCIL REGULATION 
(EC) No 1782/2003). This single area payment is based on the total regional en-
velop of payments divided by the total number of eligible hectares. In response 
to political pressures from several member states, the final decision taken by the 
agricultural council in June 2003 offered even greater choice to individual 
member states as for specific provisions to decouple direct payments (COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) No 1782/2003). In particular, member states were allowed to 
maintain limited coupled elements to avoid abandonment of production. That is, 
for some products, direct payments remain coupled to production, though at 
varying degrees. 
Hence, three principal ways of decoupling direct payments have been decided 
upon: a single farm payment, a regionalised single area payment, and partially 
decoupled direct payments.
99 Although all three alternatives are named 'decoup-
                                           
99   It is generally also possible to combine the described approaches as, for example, the dy-
namic hybrid scheme to be implemented in Germany shows. Depending on the farm type 
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led', the direction of effects can be expected to differ. For example, whereas un-
der a single farm payment the payment to farmers remains at the same level than 
before the policy reform, a single area payment is expected to lead to redistribu-
tion of payments between farms (KLEINHANß 2004). Starting from this, the goal 
of this chapter is to show and discuss adjustment reactions and adjustment pat-
terns that could emerge from different ways of decoupling direct payments.  
8.2 Policies  considered 
The alternative decoupled policy scenarios considered in this chapter are listed 
in Table 8-1. Although they do not exactly correspond to the proposals of the 
EU commission, the policies defined reflect the three main directions in which 
decoupling will be made possible in the EU after 2005. 
The first policy is the decoupled single farm payment (DECOUP) which was 
introduced and defined in chapter 7. The analysis carried out in chapter 7 shows 
that a decoupled single farm payment (scenario DECOUP) leads to overall effi-
ciency gains in terms of a better allocation of production factors across farms, 
and an increase in social efficiency. However, this comes at the expense of some 
land being abandoned. On average, about 7% of the total agricultural area in the 
region is abandoned after the policy change.  
A key element of the new common agricultural policy of the EU, however, is to 
keep all agricultural land in good condition (COUNCIL R EGULATION (EC) 
1782/2003). To prevent the abandonment of agricultural land, the single farm 
payment in scenario DECOUP is adjusted by introducing a mixed payment.  
This mixed payment, granted under the second policy DECOUPREG50, com-
bines a decoupled single farm payment with a low area payment. In principle, 
the total payment granted to each farm after policy reform is at least as high as 
before the reform, since their calculation is based on a historical reference pe-
riod. The decoupled single farm payment is paid to the person of the farmer. The 
area payment was chosen such that it covers the costs of maintaining grassland 
in minimum condition. A payment of 50  € per hectare proved sufficient for 
Hohenlohe. Moreover, to keep government outlays to finance the policy at the 
same level than the reference policy REF, the single farm payment component 
of the mixed payment is set at 84% of the single farm payment granted in policy 
                                           
and location, the payment going to farmers is initially mixes a regional area payment, 
with elements of a single farm payment and coupled payments. Over time, the payment 
mix changes dynamically towards a regionalised single area payment. 192  8  Decoupling direct payments 
DECOUP. If a farm withdraws from the sector, it continues to receive the single 
farm payment component. The area payment component is granted to active 
farmers to provide an additional incentive to farmland. A comparison of policies 
DECOUP and DECOUPREG50 is presented in appendix A-7. The comparison 
shows that results of these two scenarios are very similar. This is why scenario 
DECOUP is dropped from the further analysis in this chapter. 
Table 8-1:  Policy scenarios 
Abbreviation  Scenario name  Scenario description 
REF Agenda  2000  -  Full implementation of Agenda 2000 at the end of 2002
-  No requirement to manage all land belonging to a farm 
DECOUP Fully  decoupled 
single farm pay-
ment 
-  Each farm household receives a decoupled single farm 
payment based on the average direct payment paid to a 
farm during three periods before the policy change 
-  Bound to person of the farmer and legal successor 
-  Single farm payment is granted independent of farming, 
i.e. it is also paid if a farm leaves the sector, for the next 
20 simulation periods after policy change 
-  Farms are required to manage all farm land belonging to 





ment + low area 
payment  
-  Combination of DECOUP and REGPREM 
-  Total payment is split into single farm payment part and 
area payment part 
-  Decoupled payments are set to 84% of the decoupled 
payment in scenario DECOUP
a) 
-  Low area payment of 50 €/ha that is granted if the plot 
is managed.  
REGPREM Regional  single 
area payment 
(310 €/ha)  
-  Calculated based on average total payments granted to 
all farms over the last three time periods before the pol-
icy change in the region 
-  Farms can only claim the payment for thei plots  
-  Farms are required to manage plots belonging to the 
farm in the most basic way (cutting grass) 
-  Farm s cannot claim a payment for land that is not man-
aged or abandoned 
PARTIAL Partly  decoup-
led payment 
-  50% of the total amount of direct payments granted to 
farms in the reference period remains coupled 
-  The remaining 50% are decoupled as an individual sin-
gle farm payment  
-  Payments is split into payment entitlements per hectare 
which are assumed to be transferred with the plot
b) 
Notes:   a) It is equal to the historical reference payment minus 50 €/ha of average UAA before the 
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The third policy considered, REGPREM, introduces a regional single area pay-
ment. The payment per hectare corresponds to the average payment in the last 
three periods before the policy change divided by all agricultural land in the re-
gion. This amounts to an area payment of 310 € per hectare. The single area 
payment is uniform across the entire region. It is implemented as a payment en-
titlement per hectare, which a farm receives for all its plots. Grassland and ar-
able land are equally eligible for claiming the payment. Unlike policy DE-
COUPREG50, a single area payment does not guarantee that each farm in the 
region receives the same amount of payments as before the policy reform. 
Hence, it can be expected that there will be an immediate and potentially strong 
redistribution of payments between farms (ISERMEYER 2003).  
Finally, the fourth policy, PARTIAL, introduces direct payments which are only 
partially decoupled from production. Policy PARTIAL is defined in a way that 
half of a farm's total coupled payment before the reform is paid as a decoupled 
single farm payment after the reform. Unlike policies DECOUPREG50 and 
REGPREM, coupled direct payments for cereals, suckler cows and beef cattle 
were kept, but cut by 50% each. The decoupled farm payment is granted to ac-
tive farms, but not to the person of the farmer such as in policy DECOU-
PREG50. Furthermore, the decoupled payment component going to each farm is 
split into payment entitlements per hectare. Active farms, thus, can claim pay-
ments for each plot they manage. It is assumed that payment entitlements cannot 
be traded, but remain fixed to a plot of land, also when the plot is traded. This 
particular policy setup has three implications. One is that payment entitlements 
per hectare differ between farms depending on their historical level of direct 
payments and acreage. Second, support is paid only to active farmers. Third, 
because payment entitlements are not tradable, their value can be expected to 
transfer to higher land rental prices.  
As mentioned in chapter 7, farms' expectations about the value of land after pol-
icy reform are exogenously given. In the decoupled scenarios DECOUP and 
DECOUPREG50 farms are assumed to expect rental prices (and hence opportu-
nity costs of land) for arable land (grassland) to drop to 75% (50%) of the re-
gional average. In scenarios REGPREM and PARTIAL, the decrease of rental 
prices is assumed lower (90% for arable land and 50% for grassland) respec-
tively because farm agents expect a greater share of the direct payment to trans-
fer into land prices.
100  
                                           
100  Different values for the expected decrease of rental prices were tried out, but results are 
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The following sections present results using the analytical framework of chapter 
6. The summary at the end of the chapter gives synoptically an overview of key 
results. As the previous chapter introduced more general adjustment patterns to 
policy changes, these will not be developed again in this chapter. Rather, special 
focus is put on differences between decoupling alternatives. The discussion in 
this chapter will focus exclusively on the issue of decoupling direct payments. It 
will not touch issues such as cross-compliance, rural development, market regu-
lations, or modulation, which are also key elements of the 2003 EU policy re-
form package.
101 
8.3  Impact on farm size 
The development of the region with respect to farm size measured in hectares 
and economic size measured in ESU is depicted in the following figures (Figure 
8-1, Figure 8-2, and Figure 8-3). The figures give an impression about the speed 
of structural change under the defined policy conditions. Structural change takes 
place in all policy scenarios, but a significant shift right after the policy change 
can only be observed, where direct payments are bound to the person of the 
farmer and decoupled from production and land (except for the low area pay-
ment). Two aspects attract particular attention. On the one hand, over time there 
is a development towards larger farm sizes. This is not surprising as with farms 
quitting production, remaining farms take over the land and grow in size. Fur-
thermore, irrespective of the prevailing policy environment, the share of small 
farms decreases with time either because farms grow or withdraw (Figure 8-2).  
                                           
not reported here. 
101  Indirectly, the maximum stocking density of 2.5 LU per hectare can be considered as one 
way to implement cross-compliance.    8.3  Impact on farm size  195 






































Showing the empirical cumulative distribution of farm size at four points in 
time, Figure 8-2 also underlines the strong impact of a decoupled single farm 
payment. It shows that the share of farms above 50 hectares of farmland is per-
sistently higher in scenario DECOUPREG50. However, with the exception of 
scenario REGPREM, the gap between scenarios closes over time. This means 
that also without a policy change, structural change under the reference Agenda 
2000 would have led to a similar farm size distribution in the long-run.  
Regarding the distribution of the economic size of farms and the shift of the dis-
tribution over time, one can observe that in the medium-run, the distribution is 
slightly bimodal with a peak around 40 and 80 ESU. In the long-run, this bimo-
dality mostly disappears in scenarios REGPREM and PARTIAL, although a 
significant shift to the right can be observed with a peak around 80 ESU. In sce-
nario DECOUPREG50 the distribution is three-peaked in the long-run with very 
large farms around 200 ESU, a concentration of farms with around 100 ESU, 
and farms with a size of 80 ESU. 196  8  Decoupling direct payments 
Figure 8-2: Empirical cumulative density functions of farm size at four time 
periods 

























































It shows that scenarios REF, REGPREM, and PARTIAL are similar with re-
spect to farm size in hectares and economic size. In other words, unless direct 
payments are fully decoupled from production, i.e., granted also when the per-
son of the farmer is no longer engaged in farming, the size distribution of farms 
does not differ significantly between scenarios. Compared to the reference, al-
ternative policy scenarios REGPREM and PARTIAL provide no additional in-
centive for farms to leave the sector. Only scenario DECOUPREG50 grants an 
explicit financial incentive for farms to leave the sector. This was analysed in 
detail in chapter 7. It is hence interesting to investigate in what ways and where 
exactly policy scenarios REGPREM and PARTIAL affect farms in the region. 
As these policies do not lead to significant changes in both the economic and 
physical farm size, other starting points for an analysis of policy effects would 
be profits, land rental prices, the organisation of production, specialisation of 
farms and efficiency impacts. These will be analysed next.   8.4  Impact on production  197 
Figure 8-3: Kernel density estimates of economic size at four time periods 





































































































8.4  Impact on production 
Table 8-2 illustrates how production capacities of selected production activities 
change after a policy change. The table shows the change in production capaci-
ties immediately after the policy change (t=4) and change in the medium-run 
(t=14). Compared to the reference scenario, suckler cow production ceases im-
mediately after the introduction of payments, which are decoupled from live-
stock production. Dairy production also shows a steady decrease, which is inde-
pendent of the prevailing policy environment. Dairy farms do not re-invest in 
dairy production or quit farming altogether. Intensive livestock production is 
more dependent on the policy environment. Whereas in the reference scenario, 
fattening pig production decreases, this could be reversed or slowed down in the 
decoupled scenarios. A reason for this is the easier accessibility of land due to 
lower rents, which alleviates manure restrictions (see section 8.5.2). 198  8  Decoupling direct payments 
Table 8-2:  Change of production capacity relative to the situation before the 










 REF  DECOUP-
REG50 
REGPREM PARTIAL 
 t=3    t=4 t=14 t=4 t=14 t=4  t=14  t=4 t=14
Cereals ha  8,547    0.5 2.5 13.9 19.0 4.2  11.5  3.0 14.0
Rape seed  ha  1,152    -1.6 14.0 -82.6 -96.4 -21.4  -54.7  -20.1 -69.1
Sugar beet   ha  282    0.0 0.0 -17.2 20.3 14.2  18.3  3.5 12.8
Dairy places  2,659    -10.7 -70.0 -9.7 -78.1 -6.8  -59.2  -9.4 -65.4
Suckler cows  places  2,117    4.1 35.5 -95.5 -96.2 -92.0  -92.4  -20.6 -54.5
Beef cattle   places  880    -14.2 -85.5 -100 -100 -100  -100  -14.7 -83.9
Fatt. pigs   places  19,537    1.2 21.3 66.1 121.0 4.0  -10.4  1.2 20.4
Sows places  27,547    2.5 22.0 0 4.2 4.6  33.8  4.9 31.3
Turkeys places  85,000    17.7 100 76.5 70.6 23.5  58.8  2.5 41.2
        
Table 8-3 shows revenue shares of different product groups. The table thus pro-
vides some information on the relative contribution of a production activity to 
total produce in the region. Two points are worth noting here. First, intensive 
livestock farming, i.e., sows for breeding, fattening pigs and turkeys, accounts 
for 70% to 85% of total revenue in all policy scenarios. Scenarios differ, though, 
with respect to specialisation within intensive livestock farming.  
For example, in line with the previous table, the revenue share of fattening pigs 
in policy scenario DECOUPREG50 triples over the 20 periods after the policy 
change. At the same time, the revenue share of sows for breeding decreases. The 
reverse can be observed for policy scenarios REGPREM and PARTIAL in 
which sows for breeding account for up to 65% of total revenue in the medium 
to long-run. Likewise, revenue shares of production activities related to grass-
land (dairy cows, cattle, suckler cows) show only minor changes.    8.5  Efficiency implications  199 
Table 8-3:  Revenue shares of different product groups for policies REF, DE-
COUPREG50, REGPREM, and PARTIAL at different time periods 










   % 
REF Bef.  change  100  15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3
  Short-term   100 15.0 56.7 11.5 2.4 6.0  0.7 7.7
  Medium-term   100 14.2 58.1 13.3 2.7 8.6  0.2 2.8
  Long-term   100 13.1 49.1 23.6 2.8 11.4  0.0 0.0
        
Bef. change  100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3 DECOUP-
REG50  Short-term   100 15.2 51.3 20.0 0.1 7.3  0.0 6.1
  Medium-term   100 15.2 50.6 24.6 0.1 7.5  0.0 2.1
  Long-term   100 14.0 41.8 36.7 0.3 7.2  0.0 0.0
        
REGPREM Bef.  change  100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3
  Short-term   100 15.6 59.4 11.3 0.2 5.2  0.0 8.4
  Medium-term   100 14.8 64.4 9.9 0.2 6.9  0.0 3.8
  Long-term   100 14.2 63.6 15.0 0.1 7.0  0.0 0.0
        
PARTIAL  Bef. change  100 15.7 53.4 12.2 2.3 4.8  1.3  10.3
 Short-term    100 14.9 57.1 11.7 1.6 5.9  0.8 8.1
 Medium-term    100 14.5 62.1 13.1 0.9 6.0  0.2 3.2
 Long-term    100 13.4 58.2 21.2 0.7 6.5  0.0 0.0
        
A similar line of reasoning applies to suckler cow production. Although one 
could have initially expected that a single area payment would lead to a higher 
revenue share of suckler cows, the results show the opposite. Again, the reason 
is related to the special management requirement that was implemented in pol-
icy REGPREM. When direct payments are decoupled from specific production 
activities, it is more profitable for the majority of farms to manage grassland in a 
very basic way than to use it as an intermediate input in grassland-related live-
stock production. 
8.5 Efficiency  implications 
The next step is to analyse the impact of the decoupling policies on efficiency 
utilising the methods in chapter 6.  200  8  Decoupling direct payments 
8.5.1  Analysis of individual and structural efficiency 
To assess the production efficiency of individual farms and the region as a 
whole, the DEA model specified in chapter 6 was estimated assuming output-
orientation and constant returns to scale technology. The density functions of 
individual efficiency scores shown in Figure 8-4 underline the outstanding posi-
tion of policy DECOUPREG50 that became already apparent in the analysis of 
structural change indicators.  
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Accordingly, policy DECOUPREG50 leads to an overall increase in the indi-
vidual efficiency of farms. The reason is that farms remaining in the sector in-
creased individual efficiency by investing or by re-organising production while, 
at the same time, inefficient farms leave the sector. Alternatively, one can con-
clude that with the policy change, farms become more homogeneous with re-
spect to production efficiency (Figure 8-5). In subsequent periods (medium and 
long-term effects), mainly farms at the lower end of the distribution increase 
their efficiency over time. For example, whereas in the short-run about 90% of 
the farms in the sample have an efficiency score below 1.1, in the long-run 
nearly 98% of the farms in the sample had scores below 1.1.  
Figure 8-5: Empirical cumulative density function of output-oriented efficiency 
scores at four time periods 














(a) Before policy change
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As regards policies REF, REGPREM, and PARTIAL efficiency increases 
gradually with time for the majority of farms. But, these policies also provide 
the ground for a few number of inefficient farms to stay in business.  
In addition, Figure 8-5 shows a dichotomy of farms in all policy scenarios. 
Whereas the distribution of the 50% most efficient farms is very similar between 
scenarios (there are hardly any differences in individual efficiency scores), the 
50% least efficient farms, differ considerably regarding efficiency scores.
102 
More clearly, this can be seen in Table 8-4. On average, individual efficiency of 
the 50% most efficient farms hardly changes in response to a policy reform. In 
contrast, mean individual efficiency in the group of the 50% least efficient farms 
changed considerably.  
Table 8-4:  Mean efficiencies of best 50% and worst 50% farms 








Best    REF  1.0293 1.0296 1.0258  1.0185 
50  %  DECOUPREG50  1.0293 1.0228 1.0217  1.0181 
  REGPREM  1.0293 1.0263 1.0228  1.0175 
  PARTIAL  1.0293 1.0279 1.0238  1.0209 
Worst    REF  1.1640 1.1529 1.1341  1.1096 
50  %  DECOUPREG50  1.1640 1.0762 1.0733  1.0554 
  REGPREM  1.1640 1.1265 1.1099  1.1042 
  PARTIAL  1.1640 1.1440 1.1028  1.0774 
        
Mean efficiencies (MeEff) for the entire region are reported in Table 8-5, which 
shows a summary of results. On average, the introduction of alternative policy 
schemes improves mean efficiency in all cases in the short-run. In correspon-
dence with observations made in the graphical analysis of Figure 8-4, Figure 8-5 
and Table 8-4, mean efficiency is highest in case of policy DECOUPREG50. 
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that in the long-run, differences in the 
mean between the reference and scenario REGPREM almost disappear despite 
of the different nature of the policy. Regarding policy PARTIAL results show 
that impact on mean efficiency is greatest in the long-run. However, compared 
to the reference, only policy DECOUPREG50 leads to statistically significant 
differences.  
                                           
102  It should be stressed that samples and, in particular, sample sizes underlying the estimates 
differ.   8.5  Efficiency implications  203 
Table 8-5:  Bias-corrected mean efficiencies, structural efficiencies, and effi-
ciency ratios of structural efficiencies and mean efficiencies CRS 
Effi-
ciency  








MeEff REF  1.1190  1.1151  1.0961  1.0779 
 DECOUPREG50 1.1187  1.0606  1.0582  1.0469 
 REGPREM  1.1190  1.0993  1.0801  1.0726 
 PARTIAL  1.1185  1.1055  1.0758  1.0602 
StEff REF  1.0524  1.0576  1.0496  1.0536 
 DECOUPREG50 1.0520  1.0475  1.0408  1.0362 
 REGPREM  1.0523  1.0515  1.0432  1.0392 
 PARTIAL  1.0521  1.0561  1.0460  1.0442 
REF/DECOUPREG50 1.0002  1.0516*)  1.0359*)  1.0297*)  RD 
MeEff  REF/REGPREM 0.99993  1.0144  1.0148  1.0049 
 REF/PARTIAL  1.0004  1.0088  1.0189  1.0168 
 DECOUPREG50/   
REGPREM 0.99966  0.96421*)  0.9796*)  0.97587*) 
 DECOUPREG50/   
PARTIAL 1.0001  0.95899*)  0.98357  0.98741 
 REGPREM/PARTIAL  1.0004  0.99447  1.004  1.0117 
REF/DECOUPREG50  1.0003  1.0097  1.0085  1.0169*)  RD 
StEff REF/REGPREM  1.0001  1.0058  1.0062  1.0139*) 
 REF/PARTIAL  1.0003  1.0015  1.0035  1.0091 
 DECOUPREG50/   
REGPREM  0.99973  0.99617  0.99766  0.99708 
 DECOUPREG50/   
PARTIAL  0.99989  0.99188  0.99498  0.9923 
 REGPREM/PARTIAL  1.0001  0.99569  0.9973  0.99519 
Notes:   *) Efficiency difference statistically significant at the 5% level; **) efficiency difference 
statistically significant at the 10% level; StEff = structural efficiency, MeEff = mean effi-
ciency; RD of StEff = bootstrap-based ratio of structural efficiencies; RD of MeEff = boot-
strap-based ratio of mean efficiencies; B=1000 bootstrap rounds, κ =0.7. 
To account for the economic importance of farms, structural efficiencies (StEff) 
are calculated and shown in Table 8-5. Two observations shall be discussed at 
this point. First, structural efficiency scores of all scenarios are generally below 
mean efficiencies indicating that the region is in fact more efficient than the un-
weighted mean efficiency would suggest. This particular result is not surprising 
as larger farms save costs and labour due to larger operations. This creates an 
efficiency advantage. Second, if output shares are used as weights, statistically 
significant differences between scenarios, which were apparent in the mean, al-
most disappear. This can be explained by the fact that the output share of inef-
ficient farms is comparatively lower than output shares of efficient farms. This 
is reasonable because of the mentioned size effects of efficient farms. Only in 
scenario DECOUPREG50, differences between mean efficiencies and structural 204  8  Decoupling direct payments 
efficiencies are small as in this scenario, farms are generally larger after the pol-
icy change (see Figure 8-3). However, in comparison with the reference, the 
structural efficiency in scenario DECOUPREG50 is only statistically significant 
in the long-run. Also in case of scenarios REF and REGPREM, the null hy-
pothesis of equal structural efficiencies has to be rejected in the long-run. This is 
in contrast to the test on mean efficiencies, were no statistically significant dif-
ferences could be observed. 
8.5.2 Economic  efficiency 
The efficiency of agricultural production in the region, measured as the eco-
nomic land rent with and without subsidies, increases in all policy scenarios 
(Figure 8-6 and Figure 8-7).  










































































Compared to the reference, all alternative policies represent an improvement 
even when subsidies are considered. As analysed and explained already in chap-
ter 7, fully decoupled payments lead to a strong immediate increase in efficiency 





   8.5  Efficiency implications  205 







































































However, if sunk costs of leaving farms are taken into account, the strong re-
allocation immediately after the policy change in scenario DECOUPREG50 
generates high adjustment costs (Table 8-6). Even though economic land rent is 
highly negative in policy DECOUPREG50 right after the policy change, 
throughout the remaining periods of the simulation a significant increase can be 
observed. Thus, despite of high adjustment costs in the short-run, in the medium 
and long-run efficiency gains in policy DECOUPREG50 as expressed by the 
capitalised value of economic land rent including sunk costs are significantly 
higher than in the other policies in which adjustment takes place more gradu-
ally.
103  
                                           
103  If compared to policy DECOUP in chapter 7, the mixed payment scheme introduced in 
policy DECOUPREG50 generates additional efficiency gains because of the higher share 
of land farmed. Policy DECOUP generated a capitalised economic land rent including 
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Table 8-6:  Comparison of economic land rent including sunk costs and eco-
nomic land rent without sunk costs excluding support 




Before policy change (t=3)  -430  -430  -430  -430 
without sunk costs  -319  -319  -319  -319 
Immediately after change (t=4)  -388  -1,121  -428  -420 
without sunk costs  -299  -174  -276  -287 
Short-term effect (t=6)  -336  -178  -312  -324 
without sunk costs  -274  -157  -251  -259 
Medium-term effect (t=14)  -194  -79  -176  -190 
without sunk costs  -176  -53  -15  -141 
Long-term effect (t=24)  -104  40  -93  -91 
without sunk costs  -73  102  -64  -23 
Capital value of economic land rent 
incl. sunk costs (base: t=3)
a)b) 
-4,021 -2,478 -3,672  -3,575 
Ave. annual economic land rent incl. 
sunk costs
c) 
-221 -136 -201  -197 
Notes:   a) Interest: 5.5%; b) under the assumption that policy is not terminate; c) computed from 
capital value of economic land rent. 
In Table 8-6, economic land rent is calculated as an average of the whole region, 
which abstracted from the actual economic land rent of individual farms. Figure 
8-8, therefore illustrates the distribution of individual farm economic land rents. 
On the one hand, the distributions of alternative policies are to the right of the 
reference, indicating an efficiency improvement. On the other hand, differences 
between scenarios are apparent at the lower tail of the distributions. This corre-
sponds to what was observed in the analysis of individual DEA efficiency esti-
mates, where differences between scenarios were evident mainly with respect to 
inefficient farms.   8.5  Efficiency implications  207 
Figure 8-8: Kernel density estimates of individual farm economic land rents 











Economic land rent (€/ha)



























Economic land rent (€/ha)































Economic land rent (€/ha)



























Economic land rent (€/ha)


















Despite of their increasing trend, economic land rents do not correspond with 
the rental prices paid by the farms (Figure 8-9). Particularly scenario DECOU-
PREG50 shows a sharp contradiction. While the productivity increases sharply, 
the rental price for land falls dramatically by about 50 % shortly after the policy 
change. This shows that the lower shadow prices for land resulting from decoup-
led payments are transferred quickly into lower rents.
104 Vice versa, scenario 
REGPREM that couples premiums to land use leads to significantly increasing 
rental prices while the efficiency increase is only modest.  
                                           
104   In reality, this process can be expected to last longer as lease contracts are usually made 
for a fixed time period. However, it has to be noticed that rental contracts often include 
clauses that allow for the adjustment of rental prices to reflect changes in overall supply 
and demand on the land market.  208  8  Decoupling direct payments 



































Also in scenario PARTIAL, rental prices increase because of coupled payments 
on the one hand, and decoupled payment entitlements, on the other hand. As ar-
gued in the introduction, these payment entitlements were expected to affect 
rental prices, which can, in fact, be observed in the figure. However, as payment 
entitlements in PARTIAL are generally below the single area payment, average 
rental prices are below those in scenario REGPREM. The coupling to land use 
increases the shadow prices, particularly of grassland, as the kernel density es-
timates in Figure 8-10 (a) and (b) show. Results thus show that payments cou-
pled to production and/or land lead to rents for land owners. The intended posi-
tive income effect on the producers' side is therefore lost.   8.5  Efficiency implications  209 
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e210  8  Decoupling direct payments 
8.6  Implications for incomes and farm specialisation 
8.6.1  Impact on farm incomes 
Taking into account that rental prices for land are at a high level unless direct 
payments are fully decoupled, it could be expected that high rental prices have 
negative effects on farm incomes in case of policies REGPREM and PARTIAL. 
However, Figure 8-11 (a) illustrates that the average effect on farm incomes is 
marginal compared to the reference.
105 As for scenario REGPREM, the result 
implies that the direct payment for grassland introduced with a single area pay-
ment on average compensates for possible income losses due to higher rental 
prices. It could therefore be expected that particularly grazing livestock and 
mixed farms benefit from policy REGPREM. 
Figure 8-11:  Evolution of average farm income of (a) all farms and (b) farms 
surviving in all policy scenarios 





































































































More significant, though, is the impact of a fully decoupled single farm pay-
ment. Taking into account that already before the policy change nearly half of 
the total agricultural land was rented, it is farms with a higher share of rented 
land that benefit most from lower rents. This is supported by Figure 8-11 (a) 
                                           
105  Kernel densities are shown in Figure A-1 in appendix A.6.   8.6  Implications for incomes and farm specialisation  211 
which illustrates that particularly scenario DECOUPREG50 leads to higher farm 
incomes, while farm incomes are lower if rental prices are higher. One could ar-
gue that this interpretation is also the result of a sample effect as the composition 
of the farm sample changes over time and depending on the policy. However, an 
analysis of the farms surviving under all policy conditions (Figure 8-11 (b)) 
shows that these farms can generate persistently higher farm incomes in any 
case. Hence, farms with a growth potential high enough to guarantee the farm 
business to operate also in the long-run, benefit most from fully decoupled pay-
ments. To investigate the income effects in a more differentiated way, farm in-
comes are differentiated by farm types and by policies and shown in Table 8-7.  
Table 8-7:  Average farm income by farm type and time period 
Time  
period 
Farm type  REF  DECOUP-
REG50 
REGPREM PARTIAL
      €/farm 
Total average  27,349  27,349  27,349  27,349  Bef. policy 
change  Spec. field crops  5,871  5,871  5,871  5,871 
 Grazing  livestock  30,381  30,381  30,381  30,381 
   Spec. granivore  40,340  40,340  40,340  40,340 
 Mixed  farms  17,589  17,589  17,589  17,589 
Total average  30,461  38,365  31,247  31,514  Short-term 
effect  Spec. field crops  6,532  13,081  6,993  7,471 
 Grazing  livestock  26,463  29,503  28,747  27,310 
   Spec. granivore  42,278  44,720  40,838  42,212 
 Mixed  farms  21,874  24,573  21,345  19,928 
Total average  40,221  50,393  41,384  42,854  Medium-
term effect  Spec. field crops  10,068  20,932  13,007  15,429 
 Grazing  livestock  21,873  34,589  26,863  27,085 
   Spec. granivore  51,167  54,502  48,785  49,457 
 Mixed  farms  27,364  33,815  27,892  25,027 
Total average  56,261  70,739  53,858  57,452  Long-term 
effect  Spec. field crops  18,486  24,847  18,980  17,897 
 Grazing  livestock  9,510  -  -  - 
 Spec.  granivore  64,646  75,483  62,338  64,062 
   Mixed farms  41,848  63,512  37,708  36,389 
          
In comparison with the reference, for policies REGPREM and PARTIAL, aver-
age farm income after the policy change is higher in absolute terms for grazing 
livestock farms and specialised field crop farms in the short and medium run, 
whereas specialised granivore farms, on average, experience income losses. 
There is no considerable change in the number of farms per farm type compared 
to the reference (see Table 8-8). In the long-run, policy REGPREM neither 212  8  Decoupling direct payments 
holds up the decrease in the revenue share of dairy and cattle, nor prevent cattle 
production from ceasing. Once dairy and cattle production facilities reach their 
useful lifetime, farms do not re-invest in dairy and cattle production but rather 
re-organise towards intensive livestock production or leave the sector. 
As regards policy DECOUPREG50, farms of all farm types, on average, in-
crease farm incomes compared to the reference. However, it has to be noted that 
the number of farms of each farm type also changes drastically compared to the 
reference due to farms leaving the sector. The ratio of income by farm type to 
average income of all farms gives a measure of income disparity (cf. OECD 
2003). Although farm income disparities increase for grazing livestock farms in 
general, relative to the reference, the alternative policies slightly narrowed in-
come disparities for grazing livestock farms in the short and medium-run. Only 
specialised granivore farms, on average, earn incomes persistently above the av-
erage of all farms. 
8.6.2 Farm  specialisation 
The following Table 8-8 shows the share of non-professional farms and profes-
sional farms by farm type and time periods. Before the policy change, about half 
of the farms in the region operate as professional farms, specialising mainly in 
granivore production or grazing livestock farming. Non-professional farms 
mainly specialise in field crops or operate as mixed farms. Over time, with 
structural change proceeding, up to 84% of all farms operate as full professional 
farms. 
Although the importance of specialised granivore farms is common to all policy 
scenarios, the relative importance of intensive livestock farming is pronounced 
in policy scenario DECOUPREG50. The adjustment patterns induced by this 
policy have been discussed at before in this chapter, but Table 8-8 sheds some 
additional light on this policy. Shortly after the policy change, almost 70% of all 
farms in the region are specialised granivore farms; 46% of all farms are operat-
ing as professional farms increasing to 82% 20 periods after the policy change. 
In other words, half of the farms in the region have a size such that at least one 
full-time labour unit can be employed. This result could also indicate that the 
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Fully decoupled direct payments lead to a strong decrease of specialised field 
crop farms and grazing livestock farms already in the short-run. Whereas the 
share of specialised non-professional field crop farms slowly increases with 
time, mixed farming and in particular grazing livestock farming did not turn out 
to be viable specialisations in the long-run. With respect to policies REGPREM 
and PARTIAL, changes are not as evident as in scenario DECOUPREG50. 
Viewed across all time periods, a single area payment as well as partially de-
coupled payments show to have no great impact on results despite of the differ-
ent setup of the policies. Differences such as the high share of non-professional 
mixed farms in scenario PARTIAL turn out to be a short-term reaction as the 
share of mixed farms in scenario PARTIAL decrease strongly in the medium-
run. In the long-run, the specialisation of farms and the shares of professional 
and non-professional farms do not change considerably.  
8.7  Redistribution effects of a single area payment 
When policy REGPREM was introduced in section 8.2, it was already men-
tioned that the policy could potentially lead to a redistribution of direct pay-
ments. This can be analysed based on Figure 8-12. The figure shows the change 
in direct payments per hectare before the policy change relative to a single area 
payment of 310 €/ha.  
Accordingly, in comparison with the single area payment, ceteris paribus, ap-
proximately 20% of the farms benefit from the new policy.
106 These farms are 
predominantly engaged in dairy production. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the level of direct payments per hectare would be significantly lower for about 
20% of the farms; 10% of the farms will even experience dramatic losses in di-
rect payments per hectare, which are mainly specialised granivore farms and 
mixed farms (Table 8-9). Above all, farms producing suckler cows and beef cat-
tle suffer most from the policy change. Hence, with the introduction of a single 
area payment, payments are redistributed from farms producing suckler cows 
and beef cattle to dairy farms.
107 Note, that this redistribution takes place between 
                                           
106  Calculation of the single area payment is based on a three-year reference period. This 
explains why there are slight losses in direct payments for the majority of farms in Figure 
8-12, where only the last period before the policy change considered. 
107   This result has to be interpreted within the assumptions made; in particular, the assump-
tion on milk prices. The simulations assume constant milk prices. If milk prices were fur-
ther cut, as foreseen by Agenda 2000 from 2002 onwards, then some dairy farms would 
also not benefit from the introduction of a single area payment.   8.7  Redistribution effects of a single area payment  215 
 
farms engaged in production activities depending on grassland. 
Still, the question his how much farms really suffer? An analysis based exclu-
sively upon Figure 8-12 would suggest significant income losses with some 
farms. Yet, when adjustment reactions are taken into account, income loss due 
to the policy change is – on average – only a temporary phenomenon for farms 
remaining in the sector. This can be seen in Table 8-9, which shows the develop-
ment of production for the 20% farms (105 farms in t=3) suffering from the pol-
icy and the 20% farms benefiting from a single area payment. 
Figure 8-12:  Deviation of direct payments per hectare and farm before policy 
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Based on this, it cannot be concluded in general that all farms incurring losses in 
direct payments will automatically loose income, despite of losses in direct 
payments of up to 250 € per hectare. Rather, a single area payment induces 
farms to adjust livestock production by giving up suckler cow and cattle pro-
duction and expand livestock operations and arable farming.  
Inevitably, a lower production of suckler cows and cattle has consequences for 
the use of grassland. Since policy REGPREM requires that land should not be 
abandoned to claim the payment, it is more profitable for farms to manage grass-
land in a basic way (e.g. cutting grass) than to keep livestock. 216  8  Decoupling direct payments 
 
Table 8-9:  Characterisation of groups of farms benefiting and suffering from 






   
Average 
farm size 





 (N)  (€/farm)  (ha)  (places) (places) (places)  (places)  (ha) 
  20% farms benefiting from policy REGPREM 
t=3 105  23,778  25.7  8,974  0  1,878  1,786  850 
t=4 103  25,011  27.1  8,397  0  271  2,061  962 
t=6 101  25,709  28.1  7,867  0  243  2,493 1,017 
t=14 77  33,118  35.0  3,757  0  239  4,152 1,234 
  20% farms suffering from policy REGPREM 
t=3  105  21,347  28.9 1,547 1,800  3,081 3,461  1,336 
t=4 100  19,486  30.8  1,350  0  124  3,846 1,638 
t=6 87  22,058 32.9  1,161  0 134  3,868  1,526 
t=14 67  28,823  37.3  631  0  138  3,812 1,379 
             
8.8 Government  outlays  and social efficiency 
Regarding the total government outlays on the policies, the following picture 
emerges (Figure 8-13). Considering the scale of the figure, differences between 
scenarios are moderate. Total government expenditure in policy scenarios REG-
PREM and DECOUPREG50 remains at a level slightly below outlays on the 
reference. Outlays for policy DECOUPREG50 are only slightly above policy 
REGPREM. This is remarkable in view of the fact that under policy DECOU-
PREG50, outlays also include payments going to farms who have withdrawn 
from the sector.  
In addition, the positive effects of a decoupled single farm payment with respect 
to efficiency, rental prices, and income, gives evidence that this policy is also 
efficient of expenses are contrasted with efficiency gains in the sector. This can 
be seen in Figure 8-14, which balances efficiency gains relative to the reference 
with differences in outlays. The figure clearly illustrates, that the net effect of 
policy DECOUPREG50 is highly positive and increasing with time. In other 
words, efficiency gains due to a better allocation of production factors in the re-
gion outweigh the costs of the policy. Although adjustment costs in policy DE-
COUPREG50 are high in the short-run (Table 8-6), this phenomenon is only 
temporary.   8.8  Government outlays and social efficiency  217 
 










































Finally, the third alternative policy, PARTIAL, is the only policy that shows a 
steady decrease in total government outlays. At first sight, this may be surprising 
taking into account that payments are partly coupled to production. The follow-
ing point may give an explanation. Policy PARTIAL grants coupled direct pay-
ments to production activities such as suckler cows, or beef cattle, the profitabil-
ity of which is not only dependent on the provision of direct payments as such 
but on their amount. Hence, it appears that the amount of direct payments per 
produced unit is not high enough to keep up production at the same level than in 
the reference. And indeed, referring back to Table 8-3, revenue shares of suckler 
cow production decrease over time, and therefore the total amount of direct pay-
ments granted to farms.  218  8  Decoupling direct payments 
 
Figure 8-14:  Net efficiency gain measured as the difference between economic 
land rent per hectare farmland, and total government outlays per hectare farm-










































Note:  Economic land rent including subsidies. 
8.9  Summary and discussion of results 
Central results of the policy simulations in this chapter are presented in Table 
8-10. Of course, these need to be seen within the assumptions stated in chapter 
6. In particular, it should be stressed that results assume labour-saving techno-
logical change. Moreover, farms are equally smart with regard to seeking off-
farm labour. From a purely economic point of view, the results presented in this 
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8.9.1 Policies 
Fully decoupled direct payments, granted independent of agricultural production 
show to have landslide effects. Shadow prices for production factors such as 
land, fall dramatically because of the policy. Thus, farms spend less on leasing 
land and look for alternative uses of the complementary factors labour and capi-
tal. This accelerates structural change. To prevent that marginal land will fall 
completely out of use, a basic land management premium of 50 € per ha is 
enough to prevent land from falling idle. As much as a single farm payment 
granted independently of farming increases the efficiency of agriculture in the 
region, their general acceptance by society can be questioned as it will be diffi-
cult to justify why farmers should still receive payments if they quit farming 
(Swinbank and Tangermann 2000). Food quality and environmental aspects that 
form another pillar of agricultural policy-making have also been left out. But, it 
can be expected that these policies have an indirect effect on agricultural struc-
tures and production efficiency, too. 
If payments are no longer attached to production, but to land use only (scenario 
REGPREM), this results in little change in the production structure compared to 
the reference. Efficiency and profits, on average, are only affected in a minor 
way. An exception is the rental price for grassland, which experiences an in-
crease over time as well as a re-distribution of payments between farms in the 
region. Conditional on the assumptions made on milk prices, the policy induces 
payments to be redistributed away from small mixed and specialised granivore 
farms producing beef cattle and suckler cows toward dairy farms. But, as men-
tioned above, this depends crucially on the assumption of constant milk prices. 
Yet, the extent of the redistribution depends on the level of the single area pay-
ment, the region's farming structure, and – very importantly – the farms' ability 
to adjust to the changing policy framework. Regarding the first issue, a different 
payment level would necessarily lead to a different percentage of farms that 
would, ceteris paribus, win or loose. As for the specific farming structure in the 
region, Hohenlohe's structure is comparatively heterogeneous region with many 
intensive livestock farms on the one hand, and a comparatively high share of 
smaller grazing livestock and mixed farms, on the other hand. Depending on 
their specialisation and size, farms in a region are affected differently. The 
analysis in this chapter also shows that farms suffering most from a single area 
payment are those who adjust to the changing policy conditions.  
The high demand for grassland in this scenario is related to the fact that arable   8.9  Summary and discussion of results  221 
 
land and grassland are eligible for the single area payment already if the land is 
managed in a very basic way. In this study, this requirement is interpreted as a 
basic plot management that involves cutting grass. Because of this, it is only ra-
tional that farms rent plots in order to claim the payment. As long as payments 
are higher than the marginal costs of plot management, land will not be aban-
doned. Furthermore, keeping grassland in good condition appeared to be more 
profitable for farms than to engage in grassland-dependent livestock production 
activities. 
Regarding partially decoupled direct payments (scenario PARTIAL), both the 
farm structure and the production structure do not change significantly with the 
introduction of the policy. Production activities that highly depend on the provi-
sion of coupled direct payments such as suckler cows decrease as 50% of the 
direct payment is changed to a decoupled payment. Most notably, scenario 
PARTIAL (and less so REGPREM), cannot prevent dairy production and cattle 
production from ceasing. Once dairy and cattle production facilities reach their 
useful lifetime, farms do not re-invest in dairy and cattle production but rather 
re-organised towards intensive livestock production or leave the sector. 
8.9.2 Winners  and  Losers 
As for the winners and losers of a policy change towards decoupled income 
payments, the model results produce a clear answer. Considering that farms 
maximise household income, both unprofitable farms and farms with a growth 
potential, benefit from fully decoupled payments (DECOUPREG50). Unprofit-
able farms profit because farms are rewarded for leaving the sector, despite of 
significantly lower opportunity costs of land. This takes away some strain on the 
land market, as more land is available for lease. The remaining farms have the 
opportunity to lease land at lower prices and to realise size effects more easily. 
As these farms' share of leased land is already higher at initialisation, farms re-
maining in the sector earn additional incomes from lower rental prices. Losers of 
policy DECOUPREG50 will be land owners, as a fall in rental prices is reflected 
in lower land values (cf. BEARD and SWINBANK 2001). This, however, has con-
sequences for the use of land as a security, which in return could endanger the 
stability of capital-intensive production activities. Moreover, it would make it 




9 General  discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
This study viewed agricultural structural change as an evolving (complex) sys-
tem. This specific point of view guided the identification of objectives of the 
study. The overall objective of this study was to gain more insight into the inter-
play of agricultural policy measures and regional structural change in a family-
farm dominated region. The emphasis was put on policy measures granting di-
rect payments to farmers. Moreover, the study aimed to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of farm-type specific adjustment reactions in response to a policy 
change.  
The research objectives were approached in three steps. First, agent-based sys-
tems were discussed as an approach to model structural change in agriculture. 
Based on this discussion, the agent-based spatial and dynamic model AgriPoliS 
was developed building upon previous research by BALMANN (1995). In AgriPo-
liS, structural change takes place endogenously in response to individual farms' 
factor endowments, behavioural foundations of farm-decision making, political 
and technical framework conditions as well as competition for land between 
farms. In the second part of the thesis, AgriPoliS was calibrated to the regional 
agricultural structure of the region 'Hohenlohe' in southwest Germany. The third 
part of the thesis was devoted to policy analysis with a focus on structural de-
velopment, efficiency and income effects. This last chapter is dedicated to the 
elaboration of different emergent issues resulting from the three parts of the the-
sis. The methods used and data issues will be discussed in sections 9.2 and 9.3. 
Section 9.4 discusses policy implications before in the final section; a brief out-
look on further research is undertaken in section 9.5. 
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9.2 Methodological  implications 
9.2.1 AgriPoliS 
A core component of this study was the development and application of the 
agent-based model AgriPoliS. The set-up of AgriPoliS concentrates on model-
ling core components of family-farm dominated agricultural structures: farms, 
product and factor markets, land as well as interactions between them. Inevita-
bly, AgriPoliS rests upon many specific assumptions about agent behaviour, in-
teractions between agents and parameters (chapters 3 and 4). Because of this, 
results and possible consequences ought to be interpreted and questioned against 
the assumptions made. For example, individual farm agents' sole objective is to 
maximise farm household income in addition to a very limited foresight of one 
period. Because of this, farm agents make decisions based on income expecta-
tions about the next period and do not account of changes in following periods. 
Assumptions are necessary to keep the model tractable, i.e., to make it comput-
able and to ensure the co-ordination of agents (chapter 2). Although they should 
be carefully chosen, assumptions are always subjective in nature. Nevertheless, 
simulations of the reference scenario (chapter 4 and 5) show plausible results 
compared to actual empirical observations and economic reasoning.  
The subjective nature of assumptions equally applies to the decision on the defi-
nition of core components of agricultural structures. Unavoidably, many other 
influencing factors that may be regarded important (by others) have been left out 
and not taken into consideration. For example, one could envisage extending the 
model by considering companies along the process and value chain. Besides the 
definition of core model components, the definition of adjustment possibilities 
defined in AgriPoliS can be considered relatively narrow, in particular, as alter-
native production activities are defined exclusively based on typical production 
activities undertaken in the past (e.g. intensive livestock production or crop pro-
duction). Moreover, real-world adjustment reactions such as possibilities to 
merge farms or co-operative resource use of farms were not considered.  
Hence, with respect to further extension, a dilemma opens up. On the one hand, 
there is the attempt to find a good, precise and valid representation of real agri-
cultural structures that includes important phenomena and components of the 
system. On the other hand, there are limits set by the complexity of a respective 
model. Although AgriPoliS maps basic components and adjustment reactions 
(but by far not all), the model itself has reached a level of complexity and speci-
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model and to connect causes and effects. Further extensions may bear the danger 
that the model becomes so complex that it cannot be comprehended in itself is of 
no explanatory use (HANNEMAN and PATRICK 1997). Hence, authors writing on 
simulation generally ask for models to be as simple as possible (e.g., BANKES 
1993; HANNEMAN and PATRICK 1997; MANSON 2002). In addition, time restric-
tions have to be considered. This relates to the computing time necessary to 
simulate a region over a specified number of periods and to the time devoted to 
model development and validation. The actual modelling and calibration is even 
more time consuming. 
A lesson learned with regard to modelling structural change in agriculture is that 
as much as structural similarity between the model and reality is desirable, the 
modeller needs to be able to communicate the model, its assumptions, limita-
tions and results, openly to an audience consisting of colleagues, knowledgeable 
experts, students and policy makers. This is mostly relevant because formal 
validation procedures cannot be applied in a straightforward manner to agent-
based simulation as discussed in chapter 2 and certain assumptions such as size 
effects have been a subject of heavy disputes among experts. So, critical discus-
sion and exchange also represent a part of the validation process.
108 
Nevertheless, simulation results with AgriPoliS are comparatively robust to pa-
rameter variations, as shown by the sensitivity experiments with AgriPoliS pre-
sented in chapter 5. Although the sensitivity analyses represented only a limited 
attempt at investigating the behaviour of AgriPoliS in a formal manner, the ob-
tained results are in line with results obtained from simulation experiments car-
ried out before this study using AgriPoliS or precursors of AgriPoliS. Moreover, 
results fit empirical observations such as slow structural change, persistently un-
exploited economies of scale, and income disparities (BALMANN 1999).  
To conclude, a model such as AgriPoliS offers many opportunities to look at the 
dynamics of agricultural structural change from new and different perspectives 
using a range of analysis methods. AgriPoliS, therefore, can be considered a 
promising tool for further policy analysis. To overcome the limitations posed by 
complexity, modellers will have to carefully extent AgriPoliS and conduct 
                                           
108   These challenges are not solved by the steady increase in computing capacity. More 
computing power might shift problems related to the computability of complex models. 
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the modeller and the audiences as well as the fact that complex models are prone to er-
rors. Finally, yet importantly, data availability becomes restrictive the more differentiated 
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intensive test periods at each new development step. This also extends to the 
implementation of different policy scenarios. Overcoming the shortcomings of 
complex simulation models will depend to some extent on further progress in 
information technology, methodological progress, the resourcefulness of its us-
ers, and continuous training of future researchers.  
9.2.2 Design  of  Experiments 
In general, it was found that the application of formal analysis procedures such 
as Design of Experiments (DOE) to study the behaviour of AgriPoliS contrib-
uted to a better understanding of AgriPoliS, especially under extreme conditions. 
Based on the analysis it turned out that AgriPoliS is most sensitive to changes in 
interest rates. The results, however, have to be taken with care. The reason is 
that the DOE specified in chapter 5 was of a very basic nature because only five 
factors out of the large number of parameters were selected to be included in the 
DOE. If more parameters had been chosen, different results concerning factor 
importance and interactions of factors would have potentially arisen. Moreover, 
in DOE no rules are defined as to the appropriate factor level settings. Because 
of this, the importance of factors is partly based on what was defined in the ex-
perimental setup. In view of this, it has to be seen that the primary intention be-
hind the approach followed in chapter 5 was to become acquainted with various, 
complementary ways of sensitivity analysis. 
9.2.3  DEA-model and structural efficiencies 
This study used a data envelopment approach to analyse differences in effi-
ciency between farms operating under different policy conditions. DEA was 
used because of its ability to compare a large number of farms with regard to 
inputs and outputs using different units of measurement (CURTISS 2002). DEA 
furthermore does not impose any functional form on the underlying production 
technology. Two kinds of analyses were carried out. First, kernel density func-
tions were estimated for each policy scenario showing the distribution of effi-
ciency scores also between time periods. Based on individual efficiency scores, 
for each policy scenario the measure of structural efficiency was derived as the 
output-share weighted mean efficiency. Unlike an application of DEA to real 
empirical data which includes noise into the measure of efficiency, the simulated 
data does not contain noise which could deter the efficiency estimates. This 
made DEA particularly suitable for the analysis.  
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validation of AgriPoliS. While carrying out and testing AgriPoliS and subse-
quently applying the DEA-model to the simulated data, it turned out that the 
DEA-model actually could also be interpreted as a meta-model just as the one 
applied in the DOE procedure. This offers some scope for further linkages be-
tween simulated data and efficiency analysis. 
9.3 Data  issues 
With regard to data, one needs to distinguish between the output and the input 
side of AgriPoliS. On the input side, the research in this thesis was based on data 
collected for the region Hohenlohe in the reference year 2000/2001. Many dif-
ferent kinds of data from different sources were required to calibrate AgriPoliS 
to the specific agricultural structure of Hohenlohe (chapter 4). In general, model 
results are conditional on data availability and the assumptions made.
109 Al-
though the financial year 2000/2001 was chosen as the base year, not all data 
was available for this year. The main reason is that statistical offices do not con-
duct surveys on an annual basis. For example, the agricultural survey providing 
data on the total number of farms and the distribution of farm types is conducted 
only every 5 years; the last available was from 1999. An exception is the farm 
accounting data, which is collected annually for the German agricultural report 
and for the European Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN). Another prob-
lem encountered is that data is not necessarily available for homogeneous re-
gions. It is more likely that data is available for administrative regions, which in 
many cases show very heterogeneous production conditions.  
On the output side, AgriPoliS generates a large panel data set based on the 
specified input data and the rules and assumptions governing the programme 
flow (see chapter 3). The development of each farm during the simulation can be 
traced based on a number of indicators (see table A-8 in the appendix). As 
shown in this study, different analytical techniques could be applied to the simu-
lated data sets. In particular, analysis techniques could be used that usually re-
quire a large number of observations such as Kernel density estimation.  
                                           
109  A restriction, which should not be underestimated, is data availability. In the first place, 
this concerns the accessibility of individual farm accountancy data which often is only 
available as aggregates of selected farm variables. Moreover, regional statistical may not 
be available for the considered regions. Whenever the required data is not available, one 
has to resort to a second-best solution. Obviously, data availability thus influences the 
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9.4 Policy  implications 
Before discussing results and implications from the individual policy simula-
tions presented in chapter 7 and 8, some general remarks shall be made. In the 
introduction in chapter 1, structural change was introduced as being an integral 
part of any economic process, as being a 'natural' process, inherent to any eco-
nomic activity. All too often structural change has a negative connotation and 
policy makers have aimed to work against it, e.g., by introducing subsidies. 
However, the simulation results presented in this study as well as practical ex-
periences from many decades of policy analysis show that policies cannot en-
tirely hold up structural adjustment such that all actors benefit from the policy. If 
policy slows down structural change, many problems accumulate and lead to 
high costs incurred at later time periods. Another key insight gained from this 
study is that agricultural policies affect individual farms in different ways de-
pending on the specific situation of the farms. It seems that policy makers un-
derestimating the power of market signals in structural adjustment, overestimate 
their own abilities to create policies that sustainably yield the desired results. 
Regarding the specific results from the policy simulations, in particular, the fol-
lowing points shall be pointed out: 
-  A policy directed at removing unprofitable and inefficient farms from the 
sector (policy RETPAY in chapter 7), would lead to strong and immediate 
structural adjustment with many farms leaving the sector. Although this 
leads to a relaxation of the situation on the land market in the short-run, the 
link between direct payments and production is upheld such that in the me-
dium-run, competition for scarce resources and production increases. Thus, 
the policy does not increase the market orientation of production. Moreover, 
under welfare considerations this policy, which tries to correct distortions 
with another distortion, is costly. Efficiency gains in factor re-allocation are 
outweighed by the total costs of the policy.  
-  More efficient from a societal point of view is a policy in which direct pay-
ments are not tied to production and production takes place in response to 
market signals. Three aspects are most noteworthy with regard to a real de-
coupling of transfers (policy DECOUP): First, inefficient and unprofitable 
farms have stronger incentives to withdraw from farming. Although leaving 
farms would not benefit from the growth possibilities of remaining farms, 
they would no longer be forced to engage in production activities unprofit-
able without support. In this sense, leaving farms have advantages at least in 
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coupled direct payments would lead to significantly lower shadow prices of 
land, labour, and capital at the farm level. Hence, farmers are no longer will-
ing to pay high rental prices for land. As much as lower rental prices may be 
an advantage for farmers with a high share of rented land and for growing 
farms, land owners could experience a devaluation of land and quotas, which 
could in return have a certain negative effects. The reason is that land is an 
important credit security, particularly in family-farm dominated agriculture. 
Devaluation could therefore reduce the financial stability of farms.110 
Third, the study showed that on marginal sites, some land might be aban-
doned if direct payments are fully decoupled. If society demands that all 
land is managed, the results indicate that in the case of Hohenlohe's struc-
ture, a policy combining a low single area payment (50 €/ha) and a single 
farm payment prevents most land from being abandoned. 
-  It was found that a stepwise reduction of direct payments (PHASEOUT10) 
had no such strong immediate effects on structural change unlike a retire-
ment payment or fully decoupled single farm payment. The particular effect 
of the policy is that it slowly, but surely increases structural adjustment pres-
sure with every payment cut. However, this effect has to be seen in relation 
to the assumptions made with regard to expectation formation and prices. As 
for the first issue, farms were only able to plan one period ahead in each case 
taking the next payment cut into account. In this way, farm agents are more 
inclined to invest in assets as compared to a situation where they took pay-
ments cuts in further periods into account.111 The second issue relates to the 
observation that without price fluctuations, the stability of a few farms is in-
creasingly at risk. Assuming that price fluctuations are present in reality, the 
impact of equity will even be stronger. Moreover, farms need to spread price 
and production risks.  
-  The different types of decoupling analysed in chapter 8 showed that unless 
payments are fully decoupled from production and land use, the effect on 
structural change, factor use and rental prices in Hohenlohe is comparatively 
small. As shown in the simulation, a single area payment induces a redistri-
                                           
110  This problem is particularly relevant for family-farm dominated regions in which farms 
generally own a significant share of land. Furthermore, the problem arises mainly for 
capital-intensive investments into livestock production because costs of stables and 
equipment are sunk in most cases as there are hardly any alternative uses (BALMANN 
1995, HAPPE and BALMANN 2002)  
111  In the AgriPoliS version used for this thesis, no account is taken of the timeliness of poli-
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bution of payments away from small mixed and specialised granivore farms 
producing also beef cattle and suckler cows toward dairy farms under the as-
sumption that lower milk prices are not transferred into dairy premia. Only a 
minority of farms was affected by the redistribution and it could not hold up 
dairy production to cease in the longer-term. The results obtained are not 
general, but specific to the agricultural structure of Hohenlohe and the un-
derlying assumptions. Hence, depending on the region, redistribution effects 
will differ. What is more, structural adjustment in any case will depend on 
the individual farms' ability to adjust to changing framework conditions. The 
impact of policy measures depends on the circumstances and reactions of the 
farmers who respond to them. 
One obvious conclusion from the results is that a full decoupling of direct pay-
ments creates the greatest potential for increasing factor mobility and making 
production more responsive to market signals. Even though the results obtained 
with AgriPoliS are subject to a number of assumptions that influence the behav-
iour and interactions of farm agents, and hence model results, the majority of the 
findings are plausible from a theoretical and empirical point of view and are 
consistent with other studies (e.g. BERTELSMEIER 2004).  
Whether or not the results obtained by the simulations can be transferred to real 
systems depends on a number of factors. One aspect is that the specific impact 
of a policy should not be seen independently of other policies such as social 
policies or tax policies as well as developments in other sectors. This concerns 
above all the labour market. Furthermore, as much as fully decoupled payments 
granted independent of farming make sense from an economic point of view, 
their general acceptance by society can be questioned, as it will be difficult to 
justify why farmers should continue to receive payments after they have left ag-
riculture (FENNEL 1997; ISERMEYER 2002; SWINBANK and TANGERMANN 2000). 
However, the positive income effects of decoupling and the evolution of the sec-
tor as such create scope for a stepwise reduction of the payments. Food quality 
and environmental aspects, which form another pillar of agricultural policy mak-
ing, have also been left out. But it can be expected that these policies have an 
indirect effect on agricultural structures and production efficiency, too. Finally, 
subsidies not only provide incentives, but also form farmers' thoughts and ac-
tions in a way that farmers over time get used to agricultural policies and subsi-
dies in particular. In many cases, agricultural policies have led to a degeneration 
of a kind of 'entrepreneurial spirit'. If production is to be more market-oriented, 
farmers will need to acquire or relearn an entrepreneurial approach to farming. 
With AgriPoliS, it is not possible to reflect this particular issue, but other behav-
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9.5  Implications for further research 
Based on the work presented in this thesis, a broad range of research directions 
opens up, some of which are being followed already. Starting directly from the 
work presented in this thesis, the most obvious step in further research is to cali-
brate AgriPoliS to regions other than Hohenlohe. In fact, at the time of writing 
this thesis, work on applying AgriPoliS to 17 regional agricultural structures in 
the enlarged EU had already started as part of two EU-funded projects. In addi-
tion to modelling different regions, the projects also involve further refinements 
of AgriPoliS with regard to environmental impact assessment, explicit consid-
eration of space in a GIS-type framework, a more detailed representation of de-
coupling options as well as Mediterranean agriculture. 
The policy simulations presented in this study assumed framework conditions 
(interest rates, managerial ability, etc.). The impact of agricultural policies is – 
amongst other issues - subject to the uncertainty about the development of the 
system to which the policy is applied. Uncertainty exists with respect to a num-
ber of framework conditions of agricultural production such as interest rates, 
wages, innovation, prices, managerial ability, farm succession, just to mention a 
few. In this study either selected framework conditions are varied or policies. It 
therefore would be of interest in future policy analyses to study the relationship 
between policy dynamics and varying framework conditions. Computer simula-
tion experiments to explore the implications of many plausible formulations of a 
problem are helpful in devising policies that come close to achieving a set of 
defined policy goals, whilst being reasonably effective given different versions 
of the future. 
Moreover, in this study, the consequences of structural adjustment are analysed 
exclusively from the farms' point of view and – in a very basic way – that of the 
state. BOEHLJE (1999) argues, though, that the process of structural adjustment is 
multi-dimensional including the whole supply and value chain, i.e., food produc-
tion, processing and distribution industries as well as society are equally af-
fected. Based on this, one could envision refocusing the analysis of structural 
change starting with supply and value chains rather than firms and markets. 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, different behavioural foundations of agents were ad-
dressed. In the process of understanding the behaviour of economic agents, other 
goals than income maximisation and optimisation could be explored. As many 
applications in the field of sociology and communication sciences have shown, 
it is furthermore possible to explicitly introduce different, not necessarily eco-
nomic, behavioural patterns into agent-based models. Another alternative, which 232  9  General discussion 
is increasingly winning grounds in agent-based systems, is to introduce artificial 
intelligence methods, either to create completely artificial societies, or to replace 
behavioural assumptions as done, e.g., by BALMANN and MUßHOFF (2004), or 
BALMANN and HAPPE (2001a). Moreover, learning is increasingly introduced in 
to agent-based models. 
To summarise, AgriPoliS offers an opportunity to look at the dynamics of agri-
cultural structural change from new and different perspectives. In this sense, it 
may represent a fruitful approach complementary to more traditional economet-
ric and normative modelling approaches. From the author's perspective, AgriPo-
liS offers some scope for further uses in policy analysis as well as in other fields 
of research. Last, but not least, the future of agent-based modelling in agricul-
tural economics will be subject to a critical and careful further development of 
existing models or the development of new models. Crucial in this regard is an 
open discussion of assumptions and model structures with an audience consist-
ing of colleagues, knowledgeable experts, students and policy makers, as well as 
the creativity and resourcefulness of future modellers and users.  
  
Summary 
Agricultural structures have been shaped by a variety of factors including eco-
nomic, cultural, historical, political, technological, and geographical conditions. 
Moreover, agricultural structures are not static. Structural change can be charac-
terised as an evolutionary process consisting – among other things – of constant 
adjustment to changes in demand, supply, and technological progress.  
The development of competitive and efficient agricultural structures has been 
one of the central goals of agricultural policy making in addition to ensuring a 
fair standard of living for farmers. To achieve these goals, the agricultural sector 
in most industrialised nations has long been the subject of government interven-
tions. However, many agricultural policies have worked counteractively to these 
goals by creating distortions in the use of resources. Against this background, 
the emergence of new and innovative modelling methods such as agent-based 
models, in addition to ever-increasing computing capacities has offered new 
possibilities to model adjustment reactions and to quantify the impact of agri-
cultural policies.  
This thesis takes up these new methodologies and applies them to the modelling 
and evaluation of agricultural policy impacts on regional structural change in 
Baden-Württemberg. The thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of struc-
tural change dynamics and factors causing structural change. The starting point 
of the analysis is the hypothesis that Hohenlohe's agricultural structure displays 
structural inefficiencies and that structural adjustment in the past has been im-
peded by existing agricultural policies. Based on these assumptions, it is studied 
whether and to what extent policy changes can facilitate structural adjustment 
towards a more efficient and competitive agricultural structure. 
At the centre of the thesis is the development of the spatial and dynamic simula-
tion model of regional agricultural structures AgriPoliS (Agricultural Policy 
Simulator). The core of AgriPoliS is the understanding of a regional agricultural 
structure as an agent-based system, i.e., a system of interacting heterogeneous 
agents. The model extends previous work by BALMANN (1995, 1997). AgriPoliS 
is a normative spatial and dynamic model in which a number of individually act-
ing farm agents interact with each other subject to their actual state and to their 
individual environment. Farms can engage in a number of production activities, 234 Summary 
invest into buildings and machinery, operate as part-time farms, or leave agricul-
ture altogether.  
The initial situation of the model is calibrated to the agricultural structure of the 
region 'Hohenlohe' in Baden-Württemberg in the reference year 2000/2001. The 
calibration aims to map the farming structure in the region and the variety of 
prevalent farms and production activities. The main data sources used are ac-
countancy data (FADN), regional statistics, investment data, as well as technical 
production coefficients. The full implementation of the Agenda 2000 by the end 
of 2002 is taken as the reference scenario.  
In a first set of simulations, AgriPoliS' behaviour in the reference scenario is in-
vestigated. In particular, parameter values for technological change, interest 
rates, region size, and managerial ability are varied. Accordingly, high interest 
rates together with heterogeneous managerial ability and high technological 
change induces a particularly strong structural change in the region. Moreover, 
results show no strong variations in response to different initial conditions. Fi-
nally, an impact analysis of managerial ability on farm survival shows that farms 
with higher managerial ability are more likely to survive structural change.  
In the policy simulations, emphasis is put on policies that are likely to support 
the development towards more efficient and competitive agricultural structures. 
In particular, a retirement payment, a stepwise cut of coupled direct payments, 
as well as several scenarios with decoupled direct payments are simulated (de-
coupled single farm payment, single area payment, and partially decoupled 
payments). Key results are the following: 
-  Structural effects: A fully decoupled single farm payment granted inde-
pendent of agricultural production shows to have strong effects in the short-
run. Shadow prices for production factors fall dramatically. Thus, farms 
have stronger incentives to spend less on leasing land and to look for alter-
native uses of the complementary factors labour and capital. This means ac-
celerating structural change. In addition, marginal land may no longer be 
managed. A basic land management premium of 50 € per ha prevents most 
land from falling idle. A stepwise reduction of payments leads to a gradual 
increase of adjustment pressure resulting in land prices falling over time. On 
the other hand, a single area payment if implemented as payment entitle-
ments per hectare results in no significant changes compared to the reference 
scenario. However, in the long-run, results do not differ greatly between 
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-  Income effects: As for the single farm payment and the retirement payment, 
unprofitable farms, and farms with a growth potential, benefit already in the 
short-run. Farms in the first group benefit because they are rewarded for 
leaving the sector. This takes away pressure from the land market, as more 
land is available for lease. Surviving farms benefit because they have the 
opportunity to lease land at lower prices and to realise size effects more eas-
ily. Most of all, farms with a high share of rented land benefit from falling 
land prices. Over time, a stepwise reduction of direct payments also transfers 
into lower rental prices. In case of this policy, farms that previously existed 
because of direct payments are successively pushed out of the sector. Losers 
of policies leading to lower rental prices will be land-owners as a drop in 
rental prices implies land values to decline.  
-  Efficiency: A Data Envelopment Analysis shows that on average efficiency 
increases significantly, if an incentive is provided to unprofitable and ineffi-
cient farms to leave the sector. If no incentive is provided or direct payments 
are coupled to production, inefficient farms remain in production. This is 
also the case for a uniform area payment. However, since inefficient farms 
are relatively small, the production share of inefficient farms is also rela-
tively small, such that the output-weighted structural efficiency shows only 
small differences between policy scenarios. To assess the efficiency of pro-
duction in the region, economic land rent is used as a measure for the allo-
cation of factors. In all scenarios, average economic land rent increases with 
time despite of lower rental prices in the case of fully decoupled payments. 
Considering adjustment costs, efficiency gains are highest and adjustment 
costs lowest for decoupled single farm payments.  
The results show agricultural policies to affect structural change in many ways. 
A full decoupling of direct payments creates the greatest potential for increasing 
factor mobility and making production more responsive to market signals. Even 
though the results obtained with AgriPoliS are subject to assumptions that influ-
ence the behaviour and interactions of farm agents, and hence model results, the 
majority of the findings are plausible from a theoretical and empirical point of 
view. Results point out that the individual farm's scope for adjustment depends 
on the specific circumstances of the farm and the conditions of the region within 
which the farm is situated. 
  
Zusammenfassung 
Agrarstrukturwandel ist geprägt durch eine Vielzahl ökonomischer, kultureller, 
historischer, politischer, technischer und geographischer Faktoren. Er ist ge-
kennzeichnet durch konstante Anpassungsprozesse an Angebots- und Nachfra-
geänderungen sowie an technische Fortschritte. Die Entwicklung wettbewerbs-
fähiger und effizienter Agrarstrukturen ist seit je her ein Hauptziel der Agrarpo-
litik neben der Erzielung eines angemessenen Einkommens. Zur Erreichung die-
ser Ziele ist der Agrarsektor in den meisten industrialisierten Ländern einer Rei-
he von Politikmaßnahmen unterworfen. Allerdings hat es sich gezeigt, dass viele 
der Politiken den gesetzten Zielen eher entgegengewirkt haben, indem sie zu 
Verzerrungen bei der Allokation von Ressourcen geführt haben. Vor diesem 
Hintergrund bieten neue und innovative Modellierungsmethoden, wie z.B. die 
agentenbasierte Modellierung, neue Möglichkeiten, die Wirkungen von Agrar-
politiken auf den Agrarstrukturwandel zu modellieren und zu quantifizieren. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit wendet die genannten neuen Methoden an auf die Wir-
kungsanalyse von Agrarpolitiken auf den regionalen Strukturwandel in der Re-
gion Hohenlohe in Baden-Württemberg. Die Arbeit soll beitragen zu einem tie-
feren Verständnis der Dynamik des Strukturwandels. Die Arbeit basiert auf der 
Hypothese, dass die Agrarstruktur Hohenlohes eine Reihe von Ineffizienzen 
aufweist und strukturelle Anpassungsprozesse in der Vergangenheit durch ag-
rarpolitische Maßnahmen, wie Preisstützungen und produktionsgebundene Di-
rektzahlungen, behindert wurden. Ausgehend von dieser Hypothese wird un-
tersucht, ob und inwieweit Politiken strukturelle Anpassungsprozesse in Rich-
tung einer effizienteren und wettbewerbsfähigeren Agrarstruktur unterstützen 
können. 
Im Mittelpunkt der Arbeit steht die Entwicklung und Anwendung des agenten-
basierten, räumlich-dynamischen Modells regionaler Agrarstrukturen AgriPoliS 
(Agricultural Policy Simulator). AgriPoliS setzt an bei der Interpretation einer 
Agrarregion als agentenbasiertes System, d.h., einem System interagierender 
und heterogener Agenten. Das Modell erweitert frühere Arbeiten von BALMANN 
(1995, 1997). AgriPoliS ist ein normatives räumlich-dynamisches Modell, das 
explizit die Aktionen und Interaktionen einer Vielzahl individuell agierender 
Betriebe abbildet. Betriebsagenten entwickeln sich in Abhängigkeit von ihrer  Zusammenfassung  237 
Umwelt. Jeder Betrieb kann mehreren Produktionsrichtungen nachgehen, für die 
Investitionsalternativen unterschiedlicher Ausrichtung und Größe zur Verfügung 
stehen. 
Das allen Simulationen zu Grunde liegende Referenzjahr ist das Wirtschaftsjahr 
2000/2001. Die Anpassung von AgriPoliS an die Region Hohenlohe verfolgt das 
Ziel, die Agrarstruktur Hohenlohes möglichst treffend abzubilden. Dazu werden 
Datenquellen wie Testbetriebsdaten, Regionalstatistik, Investitionsdaten, sowie 
technische Koeffizienten herangezogen. Die Umsetzung der Agenda 2000 am 
Ende des Jahres 2002 definiert das Referenzszenario.  
In einem ersten Satz von Simulationsrechnungen wird zunächst das Verhalten 
von AgriPoliS in der Referenzsituation untersucht. Insbesondere werden die ge-
troffenen Annahmen zum technischen Fortschritt, den Zinsen, der Regionsgröße 
sowie der Managementfähigkeiten der Betriebsagenten variiert. Es zeigt sich, 
dass hohe Zinsen in Verbindung mit heterogenen Managementfähigkeiten der 
Betriebsagenten und hohem technischen Fortschritt zu einem ausgeprägten 
Strukturwandel führen. Weiterhin zeigt es sich, dass AgriPoliS sich robust im 
Bezug auf Zufallsinitialisierungen verhält. Ein weiteres Ergebnis besteht darin, 
dass Betriebsaufgaben und Managementfähigkeiten negativ korreliert sind. 
Bei der Simulation und Analyse von Politikvarianten wurde der Schwerpunkt 
auf Politiken gelegt, die potenziell geeignet sind, strukturelle Anpassungspro-
zesse in Richtung einer effizienteren und wettbewerbsfähigen Agrarstruktur zu 
unterstützen. Konkret sind dieses eine Abwanderungsprämie, eine schrittweise 
Rückführung gekoppelter Direktzahlungen sowie verschiedene Varianten ent-
koppelter Direktzahlungen (eine an den Betriebsleiter gebundene Betriebsprä-
mie, einheitliche Flächenprämie, teilentkoppelte Prämien). Zentrale Ergebnisse 
sind die Folgenden: 
-  Strukturwirkungen: Es zeigt sich, dass die Einführung einer vollständig ent-
koppelten Betriebsprämie, kurzfristig zu starken Anpassungsreaktionen 
führt, bei der viele Betriebe ausscheiden. Insbesondere kommt es zu einem 
starken Verfall der Schattenpreise des Faktors Boden und damit der Pacht-
preise. Betriebe haben somit stärkere Anreize, die komplementären Faktoren 
Arbeit und Kapital anderen Verwertungen zuzuführen, was den Struktur-
wandel verstärkt. Als problematisch stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass ein nicht 
unbeträchtlicher Teil des Bodens brach fällt. Eine geringe einheitliche Flä-
chenprämie von 50 €/ha könnte diesem entgegenwirken. Auch eine Abwan-
derungsprämie von jährlich 10,000 € führt kurzfristig zu starken Anpassungs-
reaktionen. Allerdings kommt es, bedingt durch gekoppelte Direktzahlungen, 
zu keinem gravierenden Verfall der Schattenpreise der Produktionsfaktoren. 238 Zusammenfassung 
Während es bei den genannten Politiken zu einer sofortigen Strukturanpas-
sung kommt, führt die schrittweise Rückführung gekoppelter Direktzahlun-
gen über einen Zeitraum von 10 Perioden zu einem jährlich ansteigenden 
Anpassungsdruck, der sich in graduell fallenden Pachtpreisen ausdrückt. Die 
Einführung einer einheitlichen Flächenprämie führt zu keinen nennenswer-
ten Strukturveränderungen im Vergleich zur Referenz. 
-  Einkommenswirkungen: Bei Einführung einer Betriebsprämie sowie einer 
Abwanderungsprämie profitieren sowohl Wachstumsbetriebe, als auch un-
profitable Betriebe. Letztere profitieren, weil ihr Ausscheiden in beiden Poli-
tiken belohnt wird. Durch das Ausscheiden dieser Betriebe entspannt sich 
insbesondere die Lage auf dem Bodenmarkt, so dass Wachstumsbetriebe 
sowohl von niedrigeren Pachtpreisen als auch von der Realisierung von Grö-
ßeneffekten profitieren können. Besonders im Vorteil sind dabei Betriebe 
mit einem hohen Anteil Pachtland. Auch bei einer schrittweisen Absenkung 
gekoppelter Direktzahlungen profitieren Wachstumsbetriebe, allerdings auf 
geringerem Niveau, da im Gegensatz zu den anderen Politiken nach Ab-
schluss der Rückführung keinerlei Beihilfen gewährt werden. Die offensicht-
lichen Verlierer bei sinkenden Pachtpreisen sind die Bodeneigentümer.  
-  Effizienzaspekte: Mit Hilfe der Data Envelopment Analyse (DEA) wird die 
Effizienz der Betriebsagenten zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten bestimmt. Auf-
bauend darauf wird mit der so genannten strukturellen Effizienz ein Maß für 
die Effizienz der Agrarstruktur bestimmt. Es zeigt sich, dass die Effizienz 
der Betriebe im Durchschnitt deutlich ansteigt, wenn Anreize für ineffiziente 
Betriebe geschaffen werden, aus der Produktion auszusteigen. Der Anstieg 
erklärt sich durch die Realisierung von Größeneffekten und effizienzstei-
gernder Investitionen. Besteht ein solcher Anreiz nicht (wie z.B. bei einer 
einheitlichen Flächenprämie) oder sind Direktzahlungen an die Produktion 
gekoppelt, so verbleiben ineffiziente Betriebe. Allerdings ist der Anteil inef-
fizienter Betriebe an der Gesamtproduktion gering, so dass es zu keiner gra-
vierenden Änderung der mit dem Produktionsanteil gewichteten (strukturel-
len) Effizienz kommt. Zur Bewertung der Allokationseffizienz der einge-
setzten Produktionsfaktoren wird die Grundrente als Indikator hinzugezogen. 
Trotz zum Teil fallender Pachtpreise, steigt die durchschnittliche Grundrente 
in der Region über die Zeit, bedingt durch Strukturwandel, technische Fort-
schritte und Größeneffekte. Wenn die Anlagenentwertung ausscheidender 
Betriebe zusätzlich berücksichtigt wird zeigt sich, dass im Durchschnitt der 
Simulationsperioden, eine vollständig entkoppelte Betriebsprämie mit den 
geringsten Anpassungskosten verbunden ist. 
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Zusammenfassend kann festgestellt werden, dass die Politikwirkungen auf den 
Agrarstrukturwandel vielfältig sind. Eine zentrale Schlussfolgerung der Arbeit 
ist, dass eine vollständige Entkopplung von Direktzahlungen unter den getroffe-
nen Annahmen die Faktormobilität erhöht, und Produktionsentscheidungen sich 
stärker am Markt orientieren. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit sind theoretisch plausi-
bel und entsprechen weitestgehend empirisch gewonnenen Erkenntnissen. Den-
noch kann das vorgestellte Modell nur einen Teilaspekt struktureller Anpas-
sungsprozesse berücksichtigen. Die Ergebnisse weisen jedoch darauf hin, dass 
der jeweilige Anpassungsspielraum eines Betriebs in einer Agrarregion abhän-
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Appendix 
A.1 Definition  of  livestock production activities 
Table A-1:  Production activity 'fattening pigs' 
Performance    
Starting weight  kg  28 
Final weight  kg  117 
Carcass weight  kg  94 
Fattening days  days  135 
Revenue €/year  372 
Variable costs    
Piglets, equipment, vet, 
electricity, compound  
fodder etc.  €/year  314 
Gross margin  €/year  58 
 €/pig  produced  21.5 
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2001), STMLF 
(2003). 
Table A-2:  Production activity 'sows' 
Performance    
Piglets Piglets/year  20 
Useful lifetime of sow  Months  36 
Piglet price  €/piglet  53.3 
Revenue    
Piglets €/year  1067 
Old sows  €/year  83 
Variable costs    
Replacement, equipment, 
vet, electricity, compound 
fodder etc.  €/year  683 
Gross margin  €/year  467 
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2001), STMLF 
(2003). 256 Appendix 
Table A-3:  Production activity 'turkeys'   
Performance    
Final weight     
Hen kg  9.5 
Rooster kg  19.4 
Fattening days  Days  159 
Revenue €/year  33.75 
Variable costs    
Replacement, equipment, 
vet, electricity, compound 
fodder etc.  €/year  26.6 
Gross margin  €/year  7.15 
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2001). 
 
Table A-4:  Production activity 'suckler cows' 
    
Revenue incl. old cow  €/year  634 
Premium €/year  317 
Variable costs    
Replacement, equipment, 
vet, electricity, marketing 
costs, insurance etc.  €/year  266 
Gross margin excluding 
basic ration and premium  €/year  368 
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2001), STMLF 
(2003).  Appendix  257 
Table A-5:  Production activity 'beef cattle' 
Performance    
Starting weight  kg  90 
Final weight  kg  660 
Daily weight gain  g  1,140 
Fattening days  Days  500 
Revenue €/year  864 
Premium €/year  211 
Variable costs    
Calves, equipment, vet, 
electricity, compound fod-
der, insurance etc.  €/year  600 
Gross margin excluding 
basic ration and premium  €/year  264 
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2001), STMLF 
(2003), LEL (2003b). 
 
Table A-6:  Production activity 'dairy cows' 
Performance    
Milk yield  kg  5,700 
Milk price  €/kg  0.35 
Revenue    
Milk €/year  1,995 
Old cow  €/year  150 
Calves €/year  155 
Variable costs    
Replacement, equipment, 
vet, electricity, compound 
fodder, insemination etc.  €/year  920 
Gross margin  €/year  1,380 
Source:   SAHRBACHER (2003) based on REGIERUNGSBEZIRK MITTELFRANKEN (2001), STMLF 
(2003), KTBL (2000). 
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A.2 AgriPoliS  data  output 
Table A-7:  Data output at farm and sector level (selection of key data) 
Farm level  Unit   Sector level  Unit 
Structure     Production   
Farm size  ha    Region totals  ha, LU 
Economic size  ESU    Inputs   
Farm type      Total land input  ha 
Main income source  Professional/ 
non-prof. 
  Total capital input  € 
Owned land  ha    Total labour   h 
Rented land  ha    Investment   
Production     Investment  expenditure  € 
Output in quantities  ha, LU       
Output in value  €   
Costs    
Sector totals of farm level data  various 
units 
Overheads €       
Maintenance €       
Depreciation €    Farm level  Unit  
Wages paid  €    Financial situation   
Rent paid  €    Profit  € 
Interest paid  €    Equity capital  € 
Annualised average costs of 
fixed capital 
€    Change in equity  € 
Variable costs  €/unit    Net investments  € 
Subsidies     Income and labour   
Direct payments   €    Labour input  h 
Land     Family  labour  h 
Economic land rent  €/ha    Farm net value added  € 
Rent paid arable land  €/ha    Total household income  € 
Rent paid grassland  €/ha    Off-farm income  € 
Balance sheet        
Total assets  €       
Total fixed assets  €       
Total land assets  €       
Liquidity €       
Borrowed capital  €       
Short-term borrowed capital  €       
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A.3  Bootstrap procedure to derive confidence intervals on structural 
efficiency measures 
The bootstrap procedure to derive confidence intervals on structural efficiency 
estimates proposed by SIMAR and ZELENYUK (2003) is based on the bootstrap 
(EFRON 1979, SIMAR and WILSON 2000). The following points briefly describe 
the proposed procedure:
1 
1.  Assume the vector 
N k
N
k k k x x x x + ℜ ∈ ′ = ) , , , ( 2 1 K  to denote N inputs the farm k 
( K k , , 1K = ) uses to produce a vector M o outputs, denoted by 
M k
M
k k k y y y y + ℜ ∈ ′ = ) , , , ( 2 1 K . 
2. For each observation (farm k) in the sample  ( ) { } K k y x
k k
K , , 1 : , K = = Ξ  in 
period  T t , , 1K =  compute the DEA estimated technical efficiency  ) , ( ˆ y x E T . 
It is computed relative to an estimated best practice frontier  ) ( ˆ x P  as a solu-
tion of the linear programming problem  { } ) ( ˆ : max ) , ( ˆ x P y y x E T ∈ ⋅ = θ θ . 
) , ( ˆ y x E T  is an estimate of the relative efficiency of farm k in the sample 
( ) { } K k y x E T
k k , , 1 : , ˆ K = . 
3. Aggregate the estimates of individual efficiencies from step 2 into L sub-
groups, whereby sub-group l represents a policy regime. Derive L sub-group 
estimated aggregate efficiency measure using output shares as weights.  




b b s s k y x
l , , 1 : ,
* * *
, K = = Ξ  (b denote the 
bootstrap iteration  B b , , 1K = ) by sub-sampling with replacement independ-
ently from data on each sub-group l of the original sample of farms, where 
κ ) ( l l K s = , L l , , 1 , 1 K = < κ , where  l s is a sub-sample of the original sample 
of sub-group l.  
5.  Compute the bootstrap estimates of  ) , ( ˆ y x E T  with 
{ } ) ( ˆ : max ) , ( ˆ x P y y x E T ∈ ⋅ = θ θ  using the bootstrapped sample 
*
,b sl Ξ  obtained 
from step 4. Call the bootstrapped estimates of technical (in)efficiency 
k l
b E T
, * ˆ  
for  l l K s k < = , , 1K  farms in subgroup l ( L l , , 1K = .) 
6.  Compute the bootstrap estimates of the estimated structural efficiency scores 
using   
                                           









b b S E T E T
1
* * * , ˆ ˆ  for the aggregate efficiency scores between the sub-











b S E T E T
1
, * , * * ˆ ˆ  for the aggregate efficiency of all farms within one 
sub-group. The price-independent weights used for aggregation between sub-
groups are defined as  































and the weights for aggregation within one sub-group are defined as 
























7.  Repeat steps 4 through 6 B times. 
This procedure will provide B bootstrap estimates of estimated structural effi-
ciencies { } b E T ˆ . These estimates can be used to obtain the bootstrap confidence 
intervals, bias corrected estimates, and the standard error of the estimates.
2  
                                           
2   The bias-corrected estimates correct for the fact that estimated efficiency scores are al-
ways larger than the true efficiencies for output-oriented efficiency scores. See KNEIP et 
al. (1998) on the statistical properties of DEA estimators.  Appendix  261 
A.4  The test for equality of structural and mean efficiencies of two 
sub-groups 
SIMAR and ZELENYUK (2003) furthermore propose a statistical test for the equal-
ity of structural and mean efficiencies of two subgroups. The test is based on 
confidence intervals derived in the bootstrapping procedure. The test involves a 
pair-wise comparison of the structural and mean efficiencies of two sub-groups. 
Assuming that there are two sub-groups A and B,  
H0: 
B A TE TE =    is tested against H1:  
B A TE TE ≠  
It is then of interest, in how far the ratio RDA,B = 
B A TE TE /  is different from 
unity. To infer about RD, its DEA estimator 
B A
B A E T E T D R ˆ / ˆ ˆ
, =  can be used, 
whose behaviour is mimicked by its bootstrap analogue. Accordingly, the null 
hypothesis of the equality of structural efficiencies of two sub-groups is rejected 
if the bootstrap confidence interval does not include unity. 262 Appendix 
A.5  DEA-model inputs and output 




Var. prod. costs  (€) 
Capital (€) 
including: 
•  Average annual costs of fixed assets 
•  Interest on floating capital 
•  Costs of service by contractors 
•  Value milk quota 
Output Unit 
Total revenue  (€) 
including: 
•  Crops (+) 
•  Sugar beets (+) 
•  Rape seeds (+) 
•  Protein plants (+) 
•  Silage maize (-) 
•  Intensive grassland (-) 
•  Extensive permanent pasture (-) 
•  Sows for piglet production (+) 
•  Fattening pigs (+) 
•  Beef cattle (+) 
•  Suckler cows (+) 
•  Dairy cows (+) 
•  Turkeys (+) 
•  Set-aside land (+) 
•  Dispose of manure (-) 
•  Take in manure (+) 
•  Fine on livestock density exceeding 2.5 LU/ha (-) 
•  Minimum management of grassland (+) 
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In detail, capital input consists of the following components: 








































v A AC  
with:   : v  equity-finance share 
    % 5 . 5 = FK i  
% 4 = EK i  
2.  Value of milk quota 
Number of dairy cows times average milk yield times price of quota in pe-
riod  
3. Agricultural  services:  Costs of 1 ha services 










⋅ ⋅ = ∑
=1
) (  
with:   % 5 . 5 = FK i  
   i c : variable production costs of product i 
   i a : bound capital of product i in time period t 
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A.6  Additional tables and figures of chapter 7 and chapter 8 
Table A-9:  Overview of farms leaving the sector between period 3 and period 





Total number of farms leaving 
between t=3 and t=24…  258  352  316  320 
…of which farms of type         
Spec. field crops  74  90  82  90 
relative to total farms 
leaving  28.7% 25.6%  25.9%  28.1% 
relative to all farms of 
type in t=3  81.3%  98.9%  90.1%  98.9% 
Grazing livestock  38  63  41  49 
relative to total farms 
leaving  14.7% 17.9%  13.0%  15.3% 
relative to all farms of 
type in t=3  55.9%  92.6%  60.3%  72.1% 
Spec. granivore  60  81  81  78 
relative to total farms 
leaving  23.3% 23.0%  25.6%  24.4% 
relative to all farms of 
type in t=3  25.4%  34.3%  34.3%  33.1% 
Mixed farms  86  118  112  103 
relative to total farms 
leaving  33.3% 33.5%  35.4%  32.2% 
relative to all farms of 
type in t=3  63.7%  87.4%  83.0%  76.3% 
…of which farms with size         
< 20 ha  175  204  195  205 
relative 67.83%  57.95%  61.71%  64.06% 
20-30 ha  36  46  45  41 
relative  13.95% 13.07%  14.24%  12.81% 
30-40 ha  28  55  37  38 
relative  10.85% 15.63%  11.71%  11.88% 
40-50 ha  16  35  30  29 
relative  6.20% 9.94%  9.49%  9.06% 
> 50 ha  3  12  9  7 
relative  1.16% 3.41%  2.85%  2.19% 
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Figure A-1: Kernel density estimates of farm income for policy scenarios REF, 
DECOUPREG50, REGRPEM, and PARTIAL at four time periods 























































































































Source: Own  calculations. 266 Appendix 
A.7  Ensuring the management of agricultural area 
As Figure A-2 shows, a low regional per hectare payment leads to a significant 
decrease in idle land. A payment of 50 €/ha (scenario DECOUPREG50) ensured 
that almost all land in the region was farmed despite of the sharp decrease of 
cattle and dairy cow production that came about with decoupled direct payments 
(see chapter 7).  







































Source: Own  calculations. 
Since the area payment is uniform across all plots in the region, i.e. it is paid for 
grassland and arable land alike, the payment transfers into higher shadow prices 
of land (Figure A-3 (b)) and therefore higher rental prices of land. Approxi-
mately, 60% (approximately 30 €) of the area payment was transferred into a 
higher rental price, as the difference between the two curves in Figure A-3 (b) 
shows. Nevertheless, on average higher rental prices do not lead to significant 
income losses (Figure A-3 (a)). It can be explained by a slightly increasing share 
of suckler cow production, which is less capital intensive compared to intensive 
livestock production.   Appendix  267 
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